A   MILITARY 
PRIMER 


EXLlBRISlI 


A  MILITARY  PRIMER 


INCLUDING 


An  Outline  of  the  Duties  and  Responsibilities 
of  the  Military  Profession 


AND 


An  Elementary  Discussion  of  the  Principles 

and  Practice  of  the  Service  of 

Security  and  Information 


FOURTH  EDITION  —  Revised 


By 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Francis  C.  Marshall,  16th  Cavalry. 

and 
Captain  George  S-  Stfnjonfe,  2Zd  [Infantry 


1916 

THE  EDWARD  T.  MILLER  COMPANY 
COLUMBUS,  OHIO 


/vf 


FIRST  EDITION Printed  January,  1907 

SECOND  EDITION Printed  September,  1908 

THIRD  EDITION  ,  .  Printed  October,  1913 


COPYRIGHT   1907,    1908,   1913   and   1916 
By 

Francis  C.  Marshall 

and 

George  S.  Simonds 
PUBLISHED,   December,    1916 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTERS  PAGE 

I.     The  Objects  of  a  Military  Training,       -  9 

II.     Notes   on   the   Organization   of   the   Army  of   the 

United   States,     -  -     19 

III.  Map  Reading,  24 

IV.  Orientation,     -  40 
V.     The  Duties  of  Patrols,  -     46 

•  VI.     The  Solution  of  Tactical  Problems,  -  67 

VII.     Messages,  77 

VIII.     Outposts,  91 

IX.     Advance  Guards,     -  -  110 

X.     The  Advance  Guard,  Continued,      -  -  125 

XL     Flank  Guards,  -  138 

XII.     Rear  Guards,  -  -  146 

XIII.  Patrolling,  Reviewed,       -  -  150 

XIV.  Measures  of  Securtiy  for  Small  Commands,  -        -  162 
XV.     Field  Sanitation,  Individual  Cooking,  -  177 

APPENDIX,  ---------  185 


(iii) 


359185 


PREFACE  TO  FIRST  EDITION. 

This  book  is  in  no  sense  a  textbook  for  advanced  students 
of  military  science,  but  a  book  for  the  beginner,  designed  to 
teach  the  cadets  of  the  Military  Academy,  at  the  very  begin- 
ning of  their  military  education,  the  objects  of  the  profession 
for  which  they  are  preparing  themselves,  to  show  them  the 
reason  for  the  discipline  to  which  they  are  subjected,  and  to 
define  some  of  the  independent  duties  of  subaltern  officers,  in 
time  of  war  in  connection  with  the  service  of  security  and 
information. 

In  this  service  they  must  be  trained,  first,  by  thorough 
theoretical  study  of  the  general  principles  involved,  and  then 
by  such  practical  applications  of  those  principles  as  can  be 
made  when  the  enemy  is  imaginary,  and  all  danger,  save  that 
of  criticism,  is  absent. 

Whether  an  officer  so  trained  will  prove  valuable  under  the 
conditions  attending  actual  hostilities,  will  always  remain 
more  or  less  of  a  problem,  until  tested  by  those  conditions; 
but  it  can  be  asserted  positively  that  in  the  present  state  of  the 
military  profession,  no  one  can  hope  to  really  succeed,  as  an 
officer,  who  does  not  combine  courage  and  loyalty  with  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  strategy  and  tactics 
that  can  only  come  from  exhaustive  study. 

The  game  of  chess  is  the  most  complex  game  that  is  played 
with  inanimate  tools.  The  game  of  war  possesses  all  the 
intricacies  of  chess,  with  the  infinite  added  tangles  caused  by 
having  the  chess-men  equipped  with  human  minds,  moved  by 
the  will,  and  not  by  the  hand,  of  the  master  player,  and  by 
having  the  smooth  squares  of  the  chessboard  replaced  by  the 
ever  changing  terrain  of  the  theater  of  operations,  where  the 
weather  often  conspires  with  the  enemy  to  change,  and  often 
to  defeat,  the  most  carefully  laid  plans. 

An  appreciation  of  the  difficulties  of  his  profession  should 
make  clear  to  the  military  student  that  he  should  hasten  to 
prepare  himself  for  its  duties,  for  there  will  be  no  time  to  do 
so  when  war  is  declared. 

West  Point,  New  York,  January  1,  1907. 

(v) 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 

The  United  States  is  geographically  isolated  from  the  othei 
great  powers  of  the  world.  In  Europe,  Germany,  Russia, 
France,  Austria,  Italy,  and  the  Balkan  States,  maintain  at  all 
times  enormous  armies,  trained  and  equipped  in  instant  readi- 
ness for  war.  The  British  Empire  relies  mainly  on  a  very 
large  naval  establishment  for  its  home  protection.  In  Asia, 
Japan  is  the  only  nation  that  maintains  a  modern  military  and 
naval  force.  The  necessity  for  this  comes  from  the  fact  that 
both  Russia  and  Japan  include,  in  their  policies  of  expansion, 
the  occupation  of  Korea  and  Manchuria.  One  great  war, 
fought  in  1904,  between  these  two  nations,  resulted  favorably 
for  Japan.  Her  sovereignty  has  since  extended  completely 
over  Korea,  and  her  influence  in  the  political  and  commercial 
affairs  of  Manchuria  is  very  great.  These  advantages  can, 
however,  be  held  only  by  military  superiority,  and  Japan  must 
maintain  a  large  army  and  navy  in  a  state  of  high  efficiency  to 
keep  what  she  has  fought  for. 

The  United  States,  set  between  two  great  oceans,  and 
separated  from  her  only  two  neighbors  on  the  American  con- 
tinent, Canada  and  Mexico  by  natural  boundaries  at  all  points 
where  the  density  of  population  is  enough  to  require  any 
boundaries  at  all,  has  no  such  need  for  excessive  protection 
as  influences  Japan  or  the  European  States. 

The  policy  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  is 
announced  in  the  Constitution  as  opposed  to  large  standing 
armies.  Acting  on  this  policy,  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  has  built  up  a  military  system  based  on  a  small  Regular 
Army,  with  a  first  reserve  of  National  Guard  troops,  organized 
by  the  governments  of  the  several  States,  and  supported,  partly 
by  the  States,  and  partly  by  the  United  States. 

The  program  of  field  instruction  of  these  troops  culminates 
in  maneuver  exercises  held  from  time  to  time  in  various  parts 
of  the  country.  The  forces  engaged  in  these  maneuvers  are 
usually  very  small.  This  book  is  intended  to  illustrate  the 
application  of  the  Field  Service  Regulations  to  these  small 
forces,  during  the  period  of  the  maneuver  exercises  that  pre- 
cedes actual  contact, 
(vi) 


The  problems  discussed  are  little  more  than  map-reading 
problems,  and  if,  when  the  student  has  completed  the  book,  he 
can  read  the  maps  readily,  and,  at  the  same  time  he  has  learned 
the  relations  the  various  covering  detachments  bear  to  the 
larger  forces  they  protect,  the  purpose  of  the  book  will  be 
accomplished. 

The  art  of  war  is  no  less  an  art  than  the  art  of  painting. 
Neither  can  be  reduced  to  rule,  or  learned  from  formulas. 
But  the  student  of  the  art  of  painting  must  first  learn  to  hold 
his  brush  and  to  mix  his  colors.  So  the  student  of  the  art  of 
war  must  learn  to  read  his  maps,  and  the  meaning  of  his 
vocabulary  before  he  can  progress  in  the  knowledge  of  the  art. 

The  first  and  second  editions  of  this  book  were  designed 
for  the  use  of  the  Cadets  at  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy. 
This  edition  is  made  with  a  view  of  meeting  the  particular 
needs  of  the  students  in  other  military  schools  and  of  the 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  National  Guard. 
Hartford,  Conn.,  September  1,  1913. 


(vii) 


"Direction  by  the  higher  leaders  will  always  be  lacking, 
where  those  leaders,  in  peace  time,  are  unable  to  divorce 
themselves  from  the  surroundings  and  prejudices  of  their 
particular  arm,  whatever  it  may  be,  and  to  enter  whole- 
heartedly and  unreservedly  into  the  spirit  of  the  Napoleonic 
maxim:  INFANTRY,  CAVALRY,  AND  ARTILLERY 
ARE  NOTHING  WITHOUT  EACH  OTHER."— General 
M.  F.  Rimington,  British  Army. 


(viii) 


CHAPTER  I. 


THE  OBJECTS  OF  A  MILITARY  TRAINING. 

"The  responsibility  resting  on  an  offcer  in  war  is  great.  His 
mistakes  are  paid  for  in  blood.  To  seek  a  command  in  war  beyond 
his  capabilities  is  no  less  criminal  than  for  a  man  with  no  knowledge 
of  a  locomotive  or  railroading  to  attempt  to  run  the  engine  of  an 
express  on  a  busy  line." — Colonel  J.  F.  Morrison,  U.  S.  Army. 

The  prosecution  of  a  war  on  land  has  for  its  object  the 
destruction  of  an  enemy's  army  or  its  expulsion  from  coveted 
or  disputed  territory.  To  accomplish  this  it  is  necessary  for 
one  force  to  overwhelm  the  other  by  a  marked  superiority. 
This  superiority  may  be  in  strength,  armament,  supply, 
methods  of  attack,  quality  of  the  troops,  or  some  combination 
of  these  elements,  but  a  marked  superiority  there  must  be. 

Any  military  establishment  has  for  its  object  the  training 
of  a  mass  of  enlisted  men  so  that  at  a  given  moment  their 
energy  and  intelligence  can  be  concentrated  to  overwhelm  the 
enemy.  THE  ENLISTED  MEN  ARE  THE  ARMY.  In 
order  to  train  them  to  use  their  strength  and  minds  and  wills 
together,  they  are  united  in  small  groups — companies  of 
Infanty,  troops  of  Cavalry,  batteries  of  Field  Artillery,  etc., 
that  are  commanded  by  non-commissioned  officers,  chosen 
from  among  their  own  numbers,  and  by  commissioned  officers, 
selected  and  educated,  usually,  elsewhere  than  among  their 
ranks. 

The  functions  of  the  non-commissioned  officer  are  mainly 
executive.  He  remains  throughout  his  military  life  an  enlisted 
man,  except  in  those  instances  where,  by  his  conspicuous  merit, 
he  is  promoted  to  a  commission.  His  education  and  training 
are  limited  to  that  necessary  to  carry  out  intelligently  the 
orders  of  his  officers,  and  to  control  the  few  men  placed  in 
his  charge.  As  a  rule,  his  term  of  service  is  a  brief  one. 

The  commissioned  officer,  on  the  contrary,  must  prepare 
himself  to  fulfill  every  function  of  peace  and  war.  In  the 
ordinary  course  of  his  daily  duties,  he  must  combine  profes- 
sional, commercial  and  mechanical  talents.  He  must  instruct 


10  MILITARY  PRIMER 

officers  and  enlisted  men,  both  theoretically  and  practically,  in 
their  duties.  He  must  be  an  engineer  of  a  sort,  a  machinist, 
an  electrician,  a  telegrapher.  He  must  know  how  to  instruct 
in  the  care,  preparation,  and  preservation  of  foods.  His 
knowledge  of  horses  must  be  more  than  amateurish.  He  must 
possess  a  practical  knowledge  of  sanitary  science.  He  should 
be  a  good  topographer  and  should  possess  an  intimate  knowl- 
edge of  the  scheme  of  nature  and  be  able  to  traverse  unknown 
country  by  day  or  night,  without  losing  his  direction,  or  over- 
looking, or  failing  rightly  to  interpret  the  signs  of  travel.  He 
frequently  must  perform  services  both  executive  and  judicial. 
In  time  of  war,  or  other  great  disturbance,  when  the  ordinary 
functions  of  government  are  suspended,  he  must  be  able  to 
step  in  and  administer  the  civil  affairs  of  his  own  or  an  alien 
people,  justly,  honestly,  and  intelligently. 

In  all  of  these  varied  duties  he  must,  for  the  honor  of  his  pro- 
fession, be  a  gentleman :  a  man  distinguished  for  fine  sense  of 
honor,  strict  regard  for  his  obligations,  and  consideration  for  the 
rights  and  feelings  of  others. 

The  officer  serves  a  long  probation  as  a  lieutenant,  and 
another  long  period  as  a  company  commander.  As  a  field 
officer — major,  lieutenant-colonel,  and  colonel — he  is  removed 
from  immediate  contact  with  the  enlisted  men,  and  usually  issues 
his  orders  to  officers  only. 

From  the  field  officers  the  general  officers  are  usually 
chosen.  They  are  still  farther  removed  from  the  rank  and 
file,  and  they  deal,  through  their  staff  officers,  only  with  the 
colonels  of  regiments,  or  commanders  of  brigades,  divisions, 
or  field  armies. 

It  is,  therefore,  to  be  seen  that  it  is  upon  the  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  of  the  company  that  the  real  re- 
sponsibility for  the  merit  of  the  army  rests.  Their  work  is 
planned  for  them,  and  they  are  held  to  it,  by  the  officers  in 
higher  grades,  but  it  is  only  when  they  themselves  are  well 
equipped,  industrious,  and  loyal  that  their  men  are  well  trained. 

Equally  important,  in  a  very  different  way,  to  the  efficiency 
of  the  army  are  the  officers  of  the  staff  corps  and  departments. 


OBJECTS  OF  A  MILITARY  TRAINING  11 

It  is  their  function  to  see  to  the  organization  and  administration 
of  the  army,  and  that  food,  clothing,  arms,  ammunition,  and 
transportation  are  at  hand  and  available  at  the  proper  times  for 
the  use  of  the  enlisted  men,  in  order  that  they  may  confront 
the  enemy,  vigorous  and  well  prepared,  in  every  way,  for  the 
work  before  them. 

An  army  properly  composed  includes  in  its  organization  all 
the  elements  necessary  for  its  defense,  offense,  transportation, 
and  maintenance:  infantry,  cavalry,  field  artillery  of  all  sorts, 
engineers,  signal  corps,  field  and  base  hospitals,  bridge  trains, 
rail,  water,  wagon,  and  pack  transportation,  ammunition  and 
supply  trains.  Stores  of  all  sorts  must  be  collected  at  depots 
convenient  of  access  to  the  army,  yet  sufficiently  remote  from  the 
actual  scene  of  hostilities,  or  strongly  enough  defended,  to  be 
guarded  against  attack  by  any  force  less  strong  than  the  mass 
of  the  enemy's  army  itself.  These  depots  are  called  bases  of 
supply. 

The  directing  head  of  the  armies  and  the  chiefs  of  the 
various  corps  and  departments  that  have  to  do  with  the  organ- 
izing, administering,  and  supplying  of  the  forces  in  the  field, 
are  located  at  the  capital  of  the  nation.  These  departments,  in 
time  of  peace,  besides  administering  the  affairs  of  the  army, 
lay  plans  and  provide  methods  to  meet  the  contingencies  of 
hostile  movements  on  the  part  of  any  nation.  Combined,  they 
form  the  War  Department,  whose  head  in  the  United  States, 
the  President,  ex-officio  the  Commander-in-Chief,  directs  and 
governs  through  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Chief  of  Staff. 

When  officers  receive  and  accept  their  commissions  in  the 
Army,  or  non-commissioned  officers  their  warrants,  they  are 
obligated  to  obey  faithfully  all  lawful  orders  of  their  superiors. 
At  the  same  time  all  persons  in  their  commands  are  warned  that 
they  must  be  obeyed.  The  private  soldier  subscribes  to  a  similar 
oath  on  his  enlistment  that  he  will  serve  honestly  and  faithfully 
the  United  States  of  America,  and  will  obey  the  orders  of  the 
officers  appointed  over  him. 

The  first  lesson  to  be  learned  by  any  military  person  is  that 
of  obedience  to  legitimate  authority.  Not  obedience  because  the 
thing  ordered  agrees  with  his  views  of  what  is  correct,  but  be- 


12  MILITARY  PRIMER 


cause  it  is  ordered.  This  is  discipline.  No  permanent  system 
of  discipline  can  be  built  up,  however,  that  is  not  based  upon  a 
proper  use  of  authority.  An  officer  who  is  capricious,  or  unrea- 
sonable, or  unjust,  cannot  maintain  it. 

The  art  of  making  war  has  kept  pace  with  the  progress  of 
civilization  since  the  earliest  times,  but  as  regards  the  necessity 
for  obedience  to  military  superiors,  and  its  battle  value,  the  les- 
son was  learned  centuries  ago.  Discipline  is  not  solely  the  pro- 
duct of  a  system  of  rules  for  the  government  of  soldiers;  it  is 
not  necessary  merely  to  control  them,  but  also  to  instill  into 
them  the  instinct  of  obedience  so  that  an  order  received  is 
executed  at  once,  unhesitatingly,  without  pausing  to  reason  out 
its  propriety  or  its  necessity. 

Why  is  discipline,  of  the  sort  striven  for  in  military  training, 
necessary?  To  understand  the  reason  you  must  consider  the 
purpose  of  military  establishments.  Armies  and  navies  are  to 
preserve  peace  in  the  world.  They  do  this  by  making  war  ter- 
rible. The  results  of  battles  are  obtained  by  killing  and  disabling 
men.  The  fear  of  death  is  the  most  demoralizing  influence  men 
can  be  subjected  to,  and  yet,  in  battle,  soldiers  must  face  death, 
and  overcome  its  fear.  Discipline  is  the  only  means  that  has 
been  discovered  by  which  this  fear  can  be  neutralized. 

The  uninformed  often  wonder  why  the  officer  is  placed  in 
his  unique  position ;  why  soldiers  must  rise  in  his  presence,  and 
salute  him;  why  so  much  formality  in  their  relations,  one  with 
another.  It  is  difficult  to  explain,  and  yet  there  are  many  rea- 
sons. Soldiers  are  usually  young  men,  fresh  from  the  restraints 
and  refining  influences  of  home.  Grouped  together  in  barracks, 
or  in  camp,  deprived  of  those  familiar  restraining  influences, 
the  ethical  reasons  for  being  good  are  not  sufficient  to  make 
young  men  subordinate,  orderly,  industrious.  A  positive  re- 
straining influence  must  be  felt,  or  the  military  group  becomes 
a  mob.  This  is  found  in  the  officer.  He  it  is  who  keeps  them 
at  work,  who  preserves  order  by  punishing  disorder,  impartially 
and  severely. 

The  men  look  to  their  officers  for  all  material  necessities — 
food,  shelter,  clothing.  The  officers  must  know  the  wants  of 
their  men  and  anticipate  them.  The  officer  represents  authority. 


OBJECTS  OP  A  MILITARY  TRAINING  13 

the  men,  obedience.  It  is  for  this  that  the  Articles  of  War  pre- 
scribe that  any  soldier  who  behaves  himself  with  disrespect 
towards  his  officers  shall  be  punished.  However,  an  officer  who 
is  capricious,  or  unreasonable,  or  unjust,  can  command  only  the 
husk  of  respect;  he  will  fail  utterly  to  enforce  discipline. 

A  soldier  should  be  made  to  understand  that  when  he  rises 
in  the  presence  of  an  officer,  when  he  salutes  him,  while  he 
stands  at  attention  while  addressing  him,  that  it  is  to  the  office 
he  is  paying  respect,  not  to  the  individual  man. 

An  English  officer  aptly  defines  discipline  to  be  "that  long 
continued  habit  by  which  the  very  muscles  of  the  soldier  in- 
stinctively obey  the  word  of  command,  so  that  under  whatever 
stress  of  circumstances,  danger,  and  death,  he  hears  that  word 
of  command,  even  if  his  mind  be  too  confused  and  astounded 
to  attend,  yet  his  muscles  will  obey."* 

There  is  no  example  of  a  successful  general  of  the  first  rank 
in  the  world's  modern  history  who  was  not  a  good  disciplinarian. 

In  the  character  of  an  officer  no  quality  is  so  important  as 
loyalty.  Without  it  he  loses  both  the  respect  of  his  superiors 
and  the  confidence  of  his  inferiors.  Loyalty  to  the  trust  im- 
posed upon  him  by  his  superiors  and  equal  loyalty  to  support  his 
subordinates  while  they  are  carrying  out  his  orders  are  de- 
manded of  the  officer  who  would  be  successful. 

Loyalty  and  discipline  go  hand  in  hand,  and  are  the  para- 
mount military  qualities.  Without  them,  genius,  high  courage, 
ability  to  seize  quickly  and  to  take  full  advantage  of  opportunities, 
and  thorough  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war,  avail  nothing  in  the 
career  of  an  officer.  Absolute  loyalty  and  sympathy  should  be 
given  to  the  company  commander  and  to  the  commanding  officer. 
It  is  rarely  that  their  efforts  are  not  honest  and  well  directed  and 
their  intentions  for  the  good  of  the  service  and  in  the  interest  of 
the  Government.  In  active  field  service,  not  one  officer  in  one 
hundred  can  succeed  without  the  loyal  and  sympathetic  support 
of  his  subordinates.  There  will  come  a  time  in  the  career  of 
every  officer  when  the  exact  importance  of  this  statement  will  be 
appreciated:  that  is  when  he  himself  becomes  a  commanding 

*  From  Discipline,  by  Lieut.  Stewart  Murray,  1st  Battalion  Gordon 
Highlanders,  British  Army. 


14  MILITARY  PRIMER 

officer.  Loyal  and  sympathetic  support  should  always  be  given 
by  subordinates  to  those  in  authority,  so  that  when  the  time 
comes  for  the  subordinate  to  become  the  commander  he  can 
demand  the  same  of  his  own  subordinates,  strengthening  his 
demand  by  his  own  example. 

Discipline  must  be  acquired;  loyalty  is  an  inherent  quality. 
That  tendency  that  leads  an  officer  to  disregard  the  orders  of  his 
superiors  in  minor  matters,  and  to  undermine  his  superior's 
authority  by  innuendo  or  disrespect,  renders  him  an  unsuitable 
person  to  command  others.  Such  a  quality  in  any  person  is  dis- 
loyalty. It  presents  many  aspects  in  different  natures.  In  one  it 
will  be  manifested  by  a  grudging,  sullen  unwillingness  to  perform 
his  ordinary  duties.  Nothing  that  he  does  is  done  cheerfully. 
He  surrounds  himself  with  an  atmosphere  of  discontent  and  dis- 
satisfaction. Instead  of  doing  things,  he  seeks  excuses  for  not 
doing  them.  Another  will  display  his  disloyalty  by  open  neglect 
of  his  duties,  doing  only  so  much  as  he  is  compelled  to  do,  and 
so  will  instill  a  spirit  of  worthlessness  and  neglect  into  the  com- 
mand. Another  will  be  defiant  of  authority,  disobeying  his  su- 
periors openly  before  his  men.  They  take  their  cue  from  him, 
and  are  themselves  defiant  of  him  and  of  his  authority. 

Officers  who  are  disloyal  subalterns  seldom  make  efficient 
commanders.  That  flaw  of  character  that  leads  them  to  disobey 
or  to  give  grudging  service  while  in  unimportant  stations  will,  in 
after  life,  prevent  them  from  taking  full  advantage  of  great 
crises.  On  the  other  hand,  the  officer  or  soldier  who  gives 
prompt,  faithful,  and  enthusiastic  service  in  all  his  duties,  how- 
ever small  and  unimportant  they  may  be,  may  be  sure  that  he  will 
be  sought  to  fill  spheres  of  wider  usefulness,  up  to  the  very  limit 
of  his  powers. 

From  the  moment  an  officer  enters  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  his  career  is  carefully  and  constantly  watched.  His  man- 
ner of  performing  his  duties,  his  abilities  in  special  fields  of  work, 
his  personal  habits,  are  frequently  reported  on  by  his  command- 
ing officers.  These  reports  are  kept  and  consolidated  in  the  War 
Department,  and  constitute  what  is  termed  the  record  of  the 


OBJECTS  OF  A  MILITARY  TRAINING  15 

officer.     It  is  in  the  highest  degree  important  to  his  career  that 
this  record  should  show  him  to  be  industrious,  loyal,  and  faithful. 


War  is  an  abnormal  situation.  It  is  only  through  the  arts  of 
peace  that  nations  are  built  up,  but,  to  preserve  that  peace,  armies 
are  as  necessary  to  nations  as  strength  of  character  and  courage 
to  resent  injury  are  to  individuals  to  protect  them  from  oppres- 
sion at  the  hands  of  aggressive  neighbors. 

A  good  army  commands  respect  and  insures  fair  treatment 
for  the  nation  possessing  it.  For  this  reason  it  is  essential  that 
the  officers  of  any  military  establishment  use  every  effort  to  keep 
in  the  highest  state  of  efficiency  the  troops  and  material  upon 
which  the  dignity  and  peace  of  the  nation  rest. 

Not  only  are  the  officers  of  the  army  responsible  for  the 
instruction  of  the  men  of  their  command,  but  they  are  equally 
responsible  for  their  health  and  comfort.  Food  must  be  of  a 
suitable  quality  and  well  prepared.  Camps  and  barracks  must  be 
kept  in  a  sanitary  condition.  To  keep  them  so,  cleanliness  must 
be  enforced,  among  the  enlisted  men  as  to  their  persons,  clothing, 
and  quarters.  In  barracks,  care  must  be  taken  as  to  their  heating 
and  ventilation,  the  distribution  of  the  men  in  the  squad-rooms 
without  overcrowding,  the  handling  of  the  company  kitchens,  the 
proper  disposition  of  slops  and  refuse,  the  cleanliness  of  water- 
closets  and  bathrooms. 

In  camp,  the  selection  of  the  sites,  their  proper  drainage,  the 
location  of  kitchens  and  sinks,  and  their  proper  care,  are  sanitary 
points  of  even  greater  importance  than  in  barracks.  All  of  these 
duties  are  but  few  of  the  many  which  must  be  supervised  by  the 
company  officers,  and  their  'details  must  be  learned  largely  by 
experience.  In  times  of  peace,  with  trained  non-commissioned 
officers  in  charge,  with  the  food  supply  bountiful,  of  good  quality 
and  never- failing,  with  clothing  and  equipment  ample  for  every 
need,  the  performance  of  these  duties  becomes  largely  automatic, 
and  the  serious  problem  of  supplying  men  in  the  field  under  war 
conditions  and  of  keeping  them  in  vigorous  health  is  apt  to  be  lost 
sight  of. 

The  heavy  loss  from  camp  diseases  at  the  outbreak  of  all  our 
wars  was  largely  the  result  of  the  ignorance  of  the  officers  who 


16  MILITARY  PRIMER 

were  suddenly  called  from  civil  pursuits  to  take  up  the  grave 
responsibilities  attached  to  the  care  and  command  of  men  new  to 
military  life. 

To  lose  men  in  battle  is  necessary  and  expected ;  to  lose  them 
of  disease,  in  large  numbers,  is  due,  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases, 
to  preventable  causes.  Discipline,  sanitation,  and  good  food  are 
the  preventives  of  disease.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  officer,  par- 
amount to  everything  else,  to  learn  how  to  enforce  discipline 
among  his  men,  how  to  secure  sanitary  surroundings,  and  how 
properly  to  prepare  food  for  troops  in  the  field. 

Milton  says :  "I  call  a  complete  and  generous  education  one 
which  fits  a  man  to  perform,  justly,  skilfully,  and  magnanimously, 
all  the  offices,  both  public  and  private,  of  peace  and  war."  This 
is  the  education  that  the  army  officer  should  aim  for ;  not  for  sel- 
fish reasons,  but  in  order  that  he  may  reflect  credit  on  that  pro- 
fession which  has  for  its  object  the  preservation  of  the  nation's 
dignity,  honor,  and  very  existence. 

In  preparing  himself  for  a  military  career,  every  young  man 
should  bear  in  mind,  and  strive  to  fulfill  as  his  ideal,  Alexander 
Hamilton's  definition  of  a  perfect  officer:  "He  who  combines 
the  genius  of  the  general  with  the  patient  endurance,  both  mental 
and  physical,  of  the  private;  who  inspires  confidence  in  himself 
and  in  all  under  him;  who  is  at  all  times  the  gentleman,  cour- 
teous alike  to  inferior,  equal,  and  superior;  who  is  strong  and 
firm  in  discipline,  without  arrogance  or  harshness,  and  never 
familiar  towards  subordinate,  but  to  all  is  the  soul  of  courtesy, 
kind,  considerate  and  just." 


During  peace  the  military  forces  of  most  nations  are  main- 
tained on  a  peace  footing,  with  numbers  greatly  smaller  than  is 
contemplated  for  a  war  footing.  Troops  are  scattered  widely 
over  the  country  in  large  or  small  garrisons,  while  the  reserves 
necessary  to  place  the  various  units  on  a  war  footing  are  at  their 
homes,  engaged  in  peaceful  pursuits.  At  the  outbreak  of  hostil- 
ities these  scattered  garrisons  are  assembled,  the  reserves  are 
called  out,  equipped  and  organized,  and  recruits  are  enlisted  and 
instructed. 


OBJECTS  OP  A  MILITARY  TRAINING  17 

At  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  two  nations,  troops  are 
hastened  towards  some  vulnerable  frontier  by  both  parties  to  the 
quarrel.  This  process  of  collecting  and  organizing  the  tactical 
units  of  large  armies  is  called  mobilizing.  When  the  mobilization 
is  completed,  the  armies  are  concentrated  at  suitable  points  and 
moved  towards  their  objective.  This  is  usually  the  army  of  the 
enemy. 

For  the  present  we  will  not  concern  ourselves  with  the  func- 
tions of  an  army  as  a  mass,  its  maintenance  and  transportation, 
or  the  methods  to  be  used  to  maneuver  it  in  the  presence  of  the 
enemy.  It  is  enough  at  this  stage  of  the  student's  training  to 
know  that  an  army  is  a  vast,  complicated  structure,  slow-moving, 
enormously  costly  to  keep  in  the  field,  and  absolutely  dependent 
upon  an  uninterrupted  supply  of  food. for  men  and  animals,  and 
a  constant  flow  of  recruits  and  remounts  to  fill  the  places  made 
vacant  by  casualties. 

The  mass  of  the  army,  with  its  line  of  communications,  is 
protected  by  groups  of  men  that  screen  its  operations  from  obser- 
vation by  small  parties  of  the  enemy,  and  give  warning  of  the 
approach  of  his  larger  forces.  Other  men  go  beyond  these 
groups  to  observe  the  enemy  as  far  as  possible,  and  to  report  on 
his  strength,  the  disposition  of  his  forces,  his  movements,  and  his 
probable  intentions. 

Men  engaged  in  the  former  duties,  the  service  of  security, 
are  called  advance,  rear,  or  flank  guards,  when  on  the  march — • 
outposts,  when  in  camp.  Those  engaged  in  the  latter  duties,  the 
service  of  information,  are  known  as  spies,  scouts,  or  patrols. 

Until  the  enemy's  army  is  encountered,  the  two  services  are 
more  or  less  distinct ;  when  it  is  met,  the  scouts  and  patrols  merge 
with  the  guards  or  outposts,  and  their  duties  are,  where  contact 
is  maintained,  identical.  Then,  as  the  masses  of  the  armies 
approach  more  nearly,  the  screening  groups  of  men  on  both  sides 
merge  with  the  lines  of  battle,  and  the  struggle  for  the  mastery 
goes  on  until  one  side  gives  way.  In  its  withdrawal,  unless  the 
defeat  is  overwhelming,  the  defeated  army  immediately  covers  its 
movements  and  hides  its  condition  behind  its  rear  guard.  Scouts 
and  patrols  are  sent  out  as  before,  to  feel  for  the  enemy,  and  to 
report  his  movements  and  probable  plans.  The  armies  are  rested, 


18  MILITARY  PRIMER 

recuperated,  and  strengthened  in  every  possible  way,  to  meet 
again  on  another  battlefield,  where  the  struggle  is  repeated. 

This  process  goes  on  until  one  or  the  other,  worn  out,  depleted 
of  men,  and  exhausted  of  resources,  gives  up  the  struggle,  and 
the  war  is  ended. 

All  other  things  being  equal,  the  advantage  will  lie  with 
that  general  whose  information  concerning  the  enemy's  army 
and  the  topography  and  resources  of  the  field  of  operations,  is 
most  complete. 

Much  of  the  last  named  information  can  be  obtained  and  made 
available  in  peace  times,  but  not  all  of  it,  by  any  means.  The 
greater  portion  of  the  information  concerning  the  enemy  must  be 
obtained  on  the  spot,  and  the  commanding  general  must  depend 
on  the  line  of  his  army — especially  on  his  cavalry  and  infantry — • 
to  obtain  it. 


CHAPTER  II. 

NOTES  ON  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES. 

During  peace  the  Regular  Army  of  the  United  States  consists 
of  regiments  of  infantry,  regiments  of  cavalry,  regiments  of  field 
artillery,  companies  of  coast  artillery,  and  regiments  of  engineers. 
These  constitute  the  line  of  the  Army,  and  form  the  nucleus  of 
the  nation's  land  forces.  To  administer  the  affairs  of  the  line  of 
the  Army,  to  supply  it  with  the  necessary  equipment,  pay,  food, 
clothing,  transportation,  shelter,  and  medical  attendance,  general 
officers  and  officers  of  the  staff  corps  and  departments  are  ap- 
pointed and  maintained. 

For  purposes  of  administration  and  supply,  the  country,  in 
time  of  peace,  is  divided  into  territorial  departments,  each  in 
command  of  a  major-general  or  a  brigadier-general.  Each  de- 
partment commander  has  a  staff,  composed  of  officers  of  the 
administrative  departments,  who  issue  his  orders  to  the  troops 
of  his  command,  and  who  supply  them  with  everything  necessary 
for  their  efficiency. 

The  troops,  organized  into  brigades  and  divisions,  are  quar- 
tered in  posts,  scattered  about  the  country,  and  their  duties  are 
limited  to  such  as  are  necessary  for  their  care,  maintenance,  and 
training. 

The  administrative  and  tactical  unit,  in  time  of  peace,  in  the 
mobile  part  of  the  Army,  is  the  regiment  of  infantry,  cavalry, 
field  artillery,  and  engineers. 

The  regiment  of  infantry  consists  of  one  headquarters  com- 
pany, one  machine  gun  company,  one  supply  company,  and  twelve 
infantry  companies.  The  twelve  infantry  companies  are  organ- 
ized into  three  battalions  of  four  companies  each.  The  regiment 
is  commanded  by  a  colonel  with  a  lieutenant  colonel  as  second 
in  command. 

The  headquarters  company  consists  of  certain  non-commis- 
sioned officers  who  have  duties  connected  with  the  administration 
of  the  headquarters  of  the  regiment,  the  band,  and  a  detachment 


20  MILITARY  PRIMER 

of  mounted  orderlies.  It  is  commanded  by  a  captain  (mounted) 
who  is  also  adjutant  of  the  regiment.  He  has  charge  of  the 
records  of  the  regiment,  and  is  the  person  through  whom  the 
colonel  communicates  his  orders. 

The  supply  company  has  two  officers,  a  captain  (mounted) 
in  command,  assisted  by  a  second  lieutenant  (mounted).  Belong- 
ing to  it  are  the  non-commissioned  officers,  saddler,  horseshoer, 
and  wagoners  whose  duties  are  concerned  with  the  supply  of  the 
regiment  with  clothing,  equipment,  armament,  shelter  and  food. 

The  machine  gun  company  is  charged  with  the  care  and  ser- 
vice of  the  machine  guns  belonging  to  the  regiment.  Its  per- 
sonnel consists  of  one  captain  in  command,  assisted  by  one  first 
lieutenant  and  two  second  lieutenants,  all  mounted,  and  fifty-three 
enlisted  men.  In  time  of  war  or  other  necessity,  this  number 
may  be  increased  by  order  of  the  President  by  twenty-one 
enlisted  men. 

The  infantry  battalion  has  four  companies.  It  is  commanded 
by  a  major  who  has  a  first  lieutenant  (mounted)  as  a  battalion 
adjutant.  The  major's  functions  are  purely  executive.  He  sees 
that  the  orders  of  the  colonel  are  carried  out,  superintends  the 
instruction  of  the  companies  of  his  battalion,  and  is  generally 
responsible  for  the  tactical  efficiency  of  his  command. 

The  infantry  company  has  three  commissioned  officers ;  a 
captain  in  command,  assisted  by  one  first  lieutenant  and  one 
second  lieutenant.  Its  enlisted  personnel  consists  of  one  hundred 
men,  which  number  may,  in  time  of  war  or  other  necessity,  be 
increased,  by  order  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by  fifty 
men. 

A  regiment  of  cavalry  has  practically  the  same  organization 
as  a  regiment  of  infantry,  except  that  the  companies  are  called 
troops  and  the  battalions  squadrons.  The  enlisted  personnel  of  a 
troop  consists  of  seventy  men,  which  number  may,  in  time  of  war 
or  other  necessity,  be  increased  by  order  of  the  President  by 
thirty-five  men. 

The  field  artillery  of  the  regular  army  includes  mountain 
artillery,  light  artillery,  horse  artillery,  and  heavy  artillery  (field 
and  siege  types);  and  consists  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-six 
gun  or  howitzer  batteries  organized  into  twenty-one  regiments. 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  U.  S.  21 

A  regiment  of  field  artillery  is  commanded  by  a  colonel,  with  a 
lieutenant  colonel  as  second  in  command.  It  has  a  headquarters 
and  supply  company,  organized  for  the  fulfillment  of  the  same 
functions  as  the  corresponding  companies  of  an  infantry  regi- 
ment. It  consists  of  such  number  of  battalions  as  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  the  President;  generally  two  or  three.  The  battalion 
consists  of  two  or  three  batteries  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  War 
Department,  depending  upon  the  kind  of  guns  and  nature  and 
requirements  of  the  service.  The  battery  of  field  artillery  cor- 
responds to  the  company  of  infantry.  Each  gun  or  howitzer  bat- 
tery has  five  commissioned  officers;  a  captain  in  command, 
assisted  by  two  first  lieutenants  and  two  second  lieutenants.  Its 
enlisted  personnel  consists  normally  of  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
six  enlisted  men.  This  number  may  be  varied  somewhat  to  obtain 
necessary  packers  in  the  mountain  artillery,  and  is  increased  by 
sixty-four  in  time  of  war  or  other  necessity,  when  so  directed 
by  the  President.  Each  battery  has  four  guns.  The  light  and 
horse  batteries  have  guns  of  three-inch  calibre.  The  cannoneers 
of  light  batteries  are  mounted  on  the  carriages.  The  cannoneers 
of  horse  batteries  are  mounted  on  horses.  Horse  batteries,  on  ac- 
count of  their  greater  mobility,  are  designed  especially  to  accom- 
pany cavalry  commands.  Mountain  batteries  have  lighter  guns 
that  can  readily  be  taken  apart.  They  are  carried  on  pack  mules. 
The  cannoneers  usually  march  on  foot.  Mountain  artillery  is  for 
use  in  rough  country,  where  the  lack  of  roads  prevents  the  use 
of  other  artillery.  The  heavy  artillery  consists  of  guns  of  a 
larger  calibre,  and  which  throw  a  heavier  projectile.  They  are, 
on  account  of  their  weight  and  size  more  dependent  upon  good 
roads  and  good  means  of  transportation,  and  consequently  lack 
the  mobility  of  the  other  types  mentioned. 

The  regiment  of  engineers  consists  of  two  battalions  of  three 
companies  each.  Otherwise  its  organization  with  that  of  the  bat- 
talions and  companies  is  quite  similar  to  that  of  the  correspond- 
ing units  of  infantry.  There  are  also  in  our  regular  army  two 
mounted  battalions  of  engineers,  consisting  of  three  companies 
each. 

Those  functions  of  a  commander  that  relate  to  the  instruc- 
tion of  his  command,  and  to  its  control  in  maneuver  and  in 


22  MILITARY  PRIMER 

battle,  are  termed  tactical.  An  administrative  unit,  as  distin- 
guished from  a  tactical  unit,  is  one  that  contains  among  its 
members,  officers  authorized  to  perform  all  necessary  govern- 
mental acts — one  that  is,  under  the  authority  of  the  next 
higher  administrative  commander,  self-supporting  and  self- 
governing. 

The  Field  Service  Regulations  (1914)  for  the  United  States 
Army  provide  that  "the  company  and  regiment  are  both 
administrative  and  tactical  units;  the  battalion  and  brigade 
are,  as  a  rule,  tactical  only.  The  division  is  the  great  adminis- 
trative and  tactical  unit,  and  forms  the  basis  for  army  organi- 
zation." 

An  infantry  brigade  normally  consists  of  its  headquarters 
and  three  regiments  of  infantry. 

A  cavalry  brigade  normally  consists  of  its  headquarters  and 
three  regiments  of  cavalry.  A  field  artilley  brigade  normally 
consists  of  its  headquarters  and  three  regiments  of  field  artil- 
lery. A  brigade  is  the  appropriate  command  of  a  brigadier 
general. 

An  infantry  division  normally  consists  of  its  headquarters, 
three  infantry  brigades,  one  regiment  of  cavalry,  one  field 
artillery  brigade,  one  regiment  of  engineers,  certain  signal  troops 
including  an  areo  squadron,  and  its  trains.  A  cavalry  division 
normally  consists  of  its  headquarters,  three  cavalry  brigades,  one 
regiment  of  field  artillery  (horse),  one  battalion  of  mounted  engi- 
neers, certain  signal  troops  including  an  areo  squadron,  and  its 
trains.  A  division  is  the  appropriate  command  of  a  major  gen- 
eral. 

A  still  larger  unit  is  the  army  corps,  which  normally  con- 
sists of  its  headquarters,  two  or  more  infantry  divisions,  one  or 
more  cavalry  brigades  or  a  cavalry  division,  one  field  artillery 
brigade,  certain  signal  troops,  and  its  trains. 

When  army  corps  and  separate  divisions  and  brigades  not 
organized  into  army  corps  are  grouped  together  under  one 
command  such  a  unit  is  called  a  field  army  or  an  army.  The 
President  may,  in  his  discretion,  increase  or  decrease  the  num- 


ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  U.  S.  23 

her  of  organizations  for  the  typical  brigades,  divisions,  and 
army  corps. 

An  infantry  division,  consisting  in  round  numbers  of  twenty 
to  twenty-five  thousand  men,  marching  on  a  single  road,  with- 
out allowing  for  elongation  due  to  imperfect  marching,  and 
including  its  combat  trains,*  occupies  in  road  space  over  ten 
miles.  With  its  field  trainsf  added,  it  will  occupy  about  twelve 
miles. 


*  Combat  trains  are  composed  of  those  wagons,  or  other  vehicles, 
used  for  carrying  the  extra  ammunition  and  entrenching  tools  that 
would  be  needed  at  once,  in  the  event  of  battle.  They  are  usually 
assigned  to  battalions,  or  squadrons,  and  at  all  times  march  as  near 
the  organizations  to  which  they  are  assigned  as  circumstances  will 
permit. 

f  The  field  train  includes  the  wagons,  etc.,  that  carry  the  rest  of 
the  stores  and  material  necessary  for  the  well  being  of  the  command. 
The  field  train  is  assembled,  usually  as  a  unit,  and  marches  where  it 
will  be  best  protected  and,  at  the  same  time,  where  it  will  be  avail- 
able when  the  command  goes  into  camp  or  bivouac.  The  stores  it 
carries  are  not,  usually,  needed  in  battle. 


CHAPTER  III. 
MAP  READING. 

"Map  reading  is  the  ability  to  grasp  by  careful  study  not  only 
the  general  features  of  the  map,  but  to  form  a  clear  conception  or 
mental  picture  of  the  appearance  of  the  ground  represented." — 
Sherrill,  Military  Topography,  Page  2. 

From  the  time  an  army  enters  the  scene  of  active  opera- 
tions, part  of  its  strength  must  be  devoted  to  getting  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy,  and  of  the  country  in  which  operations  are 
expected  to  take  place.  Beginning  at  the  same  time,  and  in- 
separably connected  with  this  work,  is  that  of  preventing  the 
enemy,  as  far  as  possible,  from  getting  similar  information,  and 
of  guarding  against  surprise  by  his  forces.  These  objects  are 
accomplished  by  the  use  of  spies,  scouts,  patrols,  and  covering 
detachments  of  various  kinds :  advance,  rear,  and  flank  guards, 
and  outposts,  the  special  duties  and  functions  of  which  are  to 
be  hereinafter  explained. 

Reconnoissance  by  areoplane  and  dirigible  balloon  has 
practically  replaced  distant  terrestrial  reconnoissance.  It 
cannot  replace  close  reconnaissance.  Since  there  are  many 
occasions  when  aerial  reconnoissance  cannot  be  made — at 
night,  in  fog,  and  during  storms — men  must  still  be  trained  for 
distant  reconnoissance,  to  supplement  or  replace  aero  scouts, 
The  subject  of  aerial  reconnoissance  will  not  be  considered  in 
this  book. 

The  commander  of  an  army  should  have  in  his  possession, 
before  beginning  an  active  campaign,  a  mass  of  information 
in  regard  to  the  enemy,  and  the  territory  the  army  proposes  to 
invade.  The  greater  part  of  this  information  will  be  in  the 
form  of  maps,  showing  in  a  general  way  the  geography  and 
topography  of  the  country,  where  the  routes  of  travel  are 
located,  where  natural  difficulties  will  assist  the  enemy,  and 
where  they  can  be  used  to  his  disadvantage.  Information  is 
also  secured  and  tabulated  showing  the  natural  resources, 
climate,  etc.,  of  the  country.  The  maps  will  necessarily  be  on 
a  compartively  small  scale,  and,  while  sufficient  to  be  used  as 


MAP  READING  25 

guides  for  the  movements  of  large  forces,  will  fail  utterly  to 
show  the  smaller  topographical  features  that  are  necessary  to 
be  known  for  the  proper  placing  troops  in  battle  formation. 

This  latter  information,  and  that  concerning  the  strength, 
dispositions,  and  movements  of  the  enemy  in  the  field,  must 
be  obtained  on  the  spot. 

To  secure  this  information,  and  at  the  same  time  to  provide 
for  the  security  of  the  army  from  day  to  day,  the  greatest 
use  is  made  of  the  maps  already  on  hand.  These,  made  by 
expert  surveyors  with  accurate  instruments,  form  the  basis 
for  special  maps,  useful  only  for  immediate  military  use.  The 
men  who  make  these  special  maps  are  the  scouts,  or  members 
of  the  patrols  and  guards  referred  to  above — officers,  non- 
commissioned officers,  and,  in  some  cases,  privates,  of  the  army 
itself.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  all  men  liable  to  be 
selected  for  such  duties  should  understand  what  maps  are,  and 
how  they  are  to  be  used. 

In  general,  a  map  is  a  proportionally  correct  representation 
of  some  part  of  the  earth's  surface.  Maps  are  of  many  kinds, 
and  show  varying  features,  depending  upon  the  purposes  for 
which  each  was  made.  A  map  for  military  purposes  shows 
features  of  military  importance :  roads,  mountains,  hills,  val- 
leys, streams  and  other  bodies  of  water,  woods,  houses,  bridges, 
etc.  Nearly  all  maps  have  some  military  value,  but  those  that 
are  the  most  useful  in  the  field  are  military  topographical 
maps,  maps  that  are  specially  made  to  show  things  of  military 
importance. 

The  civil  maps  that  we  ordinarily  find  lack  much  of  the 
information  necessary  to  a  good  military  map.  It  will  be 
found,  however,  that  they  frequently  indicate  roads,  villages, 
woods,  important  streams,  etc.,  and  in  the  field  may  be  used 
to  obtain  a  general  idea  of  the  country,  thus  making  an  invalu- 
able aid  in  the  construction  of  purely  military  maps. 

In  the  pocket  on  the  back  cover  of  this  book  will  be  found 
four  maps.  These  maps  are  named,  respectively,  Guide  Map, 
Strategic  Map,  Topographical  Map,  and  War  Game  Map. 


26  MILITARY  PRIMER 

Refer  now  to  the  Guide  Map.  It  is  known  to  be  thirty 
miles,  on  the  ground,  in  a  straight  line,  from  Middletown  to 
Hanover  (near  the  center  of  the  map).  The  line  connecting 
these  towns  on  the  map  is  three  inches  long,  and,  since  all  the 
places  on  a  correctly  made  map  are  shown  in  their  relative 
positions,  we  know  that  a  line  three  inches  long,  drawn  any- 
where on  the  map,  will  represent  thirty  miles  on  the  ground, 
and  from  this,  that  one  inch  on  the  map  represents  ten  miles 
on  the  ground.  This  definite  relation  between  distances  on 
the  ground  and  corresponding  distances  on  the  map  is  called 
the  scale  of  the  map. 

At  the  bottom  of  the  map  we  are  discussing  you  will  see : 
1  inch=lO  miles.  That  is  one  way  of  expressing  the  scale. 
Another  way  is  shown  directly  below  it,  where  a  line  is  divided 
into  equal  subdivisions  in  both  directions  from  a  point  marked 
0.  This  scale  shows  graphically  map  distances  in  miles,  and 
is  called  a  graphic  scale.  Its  use  is  apparent. 

A  third  scale,  called  the  fractional  scale,  is  sometimes 
used.  We  find  one  on  the  Strategic  Map :  1/62soo.  This  scale 
means  that  any  distance  on  the  ground  is  62500  times  as  long 
as  the  corresponding  ditsance  on  the  map.  The  fractional 
scale  is  of  use  only  in  reading  maps  of  foreign  countries  where 
the  measures  of  length,  that  the  person  reading  the  map  is 
accustomed  to,  are  not  used.  It  bears  the  same  relation  to  the 
graphic  scale  that  the  Latin  name  of  a  plant  or  animal  bears 
to  its  name  in  the  vernacular  of  the  place  where  it  is  found. 
In  the  case  of  the  Strategic  Map,  an  American  or  an  English- 
man reading  it  would  say :  "One  inch  on  this  map  is  equal  to 
62500  inches  on  the  ground;  that  is  (since  there  are  63360 
inches  in  a  mile)  one  inch  is  nearly  equal  to  one  mile.  It  will 
do  to  call  the  scale  one  inch  is  equal  to  one  mile  for  my  pur- 
poses." A  Frenchman  would  say:  "One  centimeter  on  this 
map  is  equal  to  62500  centimers  on  the  ground,"  and,  unless 
he  were  accustomed  to  thinking  of  distances  in  miles,  he  would 
probably  have  to  construct  a  graphic  scale  reading  meters  and 
kilometers,  bearing  this  relation,  before  he  could  use  the  map 
readily.  It  is  only  for  such  purposes  that  the  fractional  scale, 


MAP  READING  27 

or  representative  fraction — abbreviated  usually  to  R.  F. — is 
put  on  a  map.     The  graphic  scale  is  the  useful  one.* 

Another  essential  to  the  proper  understanding  of  a  map  is 
a  line  of  known  direction  with  reference  to  which  other  direc- 
tions may  be  detemined.  This  is  often  provided  for,  in  the 
construction  of  a  map,  by  drawing  a  north-and-south  line  on 
it,  the  north  end  of  its  being  indicated  by  an  arrowhead  and 
the  letter  N. 

Frequently,  especially  on  the  maps  of  the  Geological  Sur- 
vey, a  diagram  will  be  drawn,  near  the  scale,  as  in  the  Strat- 
egic and  Topographical  Maps,  showing  difference  between  the 
true,  or  astronomical,  north-and-south  line,  and  the  line 
marked  by  the  magnetic  needle.  This  has  a  wide  divergence 
in  the  United  States.  In  the  vicinity  of  Boston  the  needle 
points  about  12y2  degrees  west  of  the  true  meridian,  while  at 
Portland,  Oregon,  the  variation  is  about  19^  degrees  east.  It 
is  important,  for  military  purposes,  that  this  variation  (known 
as  the  declination  of  the  magnetic  needle)  be  known  for  the 
locality  where  operations  are  being  conducted. 

It  is  a  recognized  convention  that  the  top  of  the  map  is 
north,  unless  otherwise  specified,  and  in  maps  intended  for 
purely  non-military  purposes  the  north  point  is  seldom  indi- 
cated. The  sides  of  the  map,  in  such  cases,  are  recognized 
north-and-south  lines,  and,  if  the  magnetic  north  is  not  shown, 
the  variation  is  so  slight  as  to  be  negligible. 

Certain  signs  are  ordered  used  on  maps,  by  the  War  De- 
partment, to  represent,  arbitrarily,  natural  and  artificial  fea- 
tures of  the  landscape.  As  a  rule  these  signs  are  the  same  as 
those  used  by  the  map  makers  of  all  civilized  countries.  They 
are  known  as  conventional  signs. 


*  This  is  all  the  student  needs  to  know  of  scales  to  work  the 
problems  on  the  maps  that  accompany  this  book.  If  he  wishes  to 
investigate  this  important  subject  farther,  he  should  consult  Sher- 
rill's  Military  Topography,  pages  3  to  20,  inclusive,  or  any  other 
standard  text  book  on  the  subject. 

Instructors  should  require  students  to  measure  distances  on  the 
various  maps  herewith  until  certain  that  they  understand  the  use 
of  the  graphic  scale  thoroughly. 


28  MILITARY  PRIMER 

The  Guide  Map,  herewith,  should  be  very  easily  read  by 
everyone.  It  resembles  in  all  respects  the  ordinary  black  and 
white  maps  with  which  all  are  familiar. 

The  Strategic  Map  shows  a  few  departures.  Roads,  that 
on  the  Guide  Map  were  represented  by  single,  smoothly  drawn 
lines,  are  here  represented  by  parallel  lines.  Two  classes  of 
roads  are  recognized  in  this  map :  the  better  class  of  public 
roads  by  solid  lines,  and  the  poorer  public  roads  and  private 
roads  by  broken  lines.  Streams  are  colored  blue. 

Going  next  to  the  Topographical  Map  we  find  a  number  of 
new  signs.  Here  the  character  of  the  crops  grown  on  culti- 
vated areas  is  shown,  but  only  enough  to  tell  the  reader 
whether  or  not  the  crop  will  furnish  cover  for  troops.  Small 
grains — oats,  barley,  wheat,  and  the  like — that  give  no  cover 
for  horses  or  men  standing,  are  shown  by  rows  or  double 
dots.  Corn,  that  in  certain  seasons  does  give  cover,  is  repre- 
sented by  the  convention  surrounding  the  words  BERLIN 
JUNC.  in  the  southeast  corner  of  the  Topographical  Map. 
Grass,  or  pasture  land,  is  shown  in  white.  Orchards  are 
shown  by  drawing  the  tree  convention  regularly  spaced,  as 
shown  just  east  of  Brush  Run,  near  the  center  of  the  south 
edges  of  the  Topographical  Map.  Roads  are  colored  yellow 
and  streams  blue. 

Woods  that  have  been  cleared  of  their  underbrush  are 
shown  by  the  convention  just  west  of  the  words  BERLIN 
JUNC.  If  the  woods  have  not  been  so  cleared  it  is  indicated 
as  shown  \y2  inches  north  of  the  word  BERLIN. 

Land  forms  are  shown  by  the  smoothly  curved  lines  that 
cover  the  entire  map.  Here  we  touch  upon  the  most  important 
feature  of  a  military  map,  and  the  only  one  that  presents  any 
difficulty  to  the  student. 

An  observer,  looking  at  an  unfamiliar  stretch  of  country, 
is  limited  in  his  knowledge  of  it  to  what  he  can  see.  His  field 
of  view  is  interrupted  by  hills,  woods,  buildings.  He  can 
judge  the  distances  separating  any  two  spots  on  the  land- 
scape only  very  approximately.  He  can,  if  no  enemy  is  there 
to  prevent  and  he  has  the  time,  ride  or  walk  over  the  country, 


MAP  READING  29 

and  so  learn  its  configuration,  and  correct  his  estimate  of  the 
distances.  In  time  of  war,  however,  the  part  of  the  country 
he  is  most  anxious  to  know  about  is  the  part  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  and  to  learn  anything  about  this  by  inspection  is 
attended  by  difficulty  and  danger. 

The  observer  without  a  map  is  limited  to  the  small  area 
he  can  see,  or  to  his  memory  of  places  where  he  has  been, 
while  by  the  use  of  the  map,  if  by  study  and  practice  he  has 
become  proficient  in  an  understanding  of  what  is  represented 
by  it,  he  can  comprehend  a  much  larger  territory  than  he  can 
see,  and  where  he  has  never  been.  If  the  map  has  been  prop- 
erly made  for  military  purposes  he  can  know  absolutely  the 
relative  positions  of  objects  of  importance  too  far  apart  to  be 
comprehended  by  a  personal  inspection ;  he  can  get  an  idea  of 
the  means  of  communication ;  he  can  determine  elevations  and 
depressions,  and  can  select,  mentally,  possible  positions  of 
military  value.  In  general,  he  is  able  to  learn  much  of  the 
country  he  is  working  in  from  the  map,  while  in  a  secure 
place.  He  can  get  a  mental  picture  of  the  roads  and  trails, 
the  hills  and  valleys,  the  inaccessible  places,  where  to  post  his 
own  troops,  where  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  posting  his. 
He  can  select  those  spots,  on  the  map,  that  are  probably  the 
best  to  observe  the  working  out  of  his  plans,  or  to  verify  the 
estimate  he  has  made  of  their  military  value,  and  then,  with 
the  map  as  a  guide,  he  can  go  to  those  places,  unerringly, 
although  he  may  never  have  seen  them. 

It  is  not  on  level  plains  that  the  battles  of  the  future  will 
be  fought,  but  in  rough  places,  where,  under  cover  of  the 
woods  and  hills  and  folds  in  the  ground,  bodies  of  troops  and 
individuals  may  move,  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  protected 
both  from  his  view  and  from  his  fire.  Advantage  may  be 
taken  of  commanding  positions  to  deliver  an  effective  fire 
against  the  enemy,  and  at  the  same  time,  to  enjoy  protection 
from  his  fire.  The  steepness  and  length  of  the  hills,  as  well 
as  the  general  direction  of  the  slopes  on  the  roads,  have  an 
important  bearing  on  the  rate  of  progress  that  an  army  can 
make  in  maching,  and  they  may  prevent  altogether  the  passage 


30  MILITARY  PRIMER 

over  them  of  gun  carriages  and  heavily  loaded  wagons.  Hence 
the  paramount  importance  of  representing  clearly  all  irregu- 
larities of  the  ground  in  military  maps. 

This  is  accomplished  by  the  use  of  contours,  the  series  of 
smoothly  curving  lines  covering  the  Strategic  and  Topogra- 
phical Maps  that  accompany  this  book. 

To  appreciate  the  contour  idea  of  representing  variations 
in  the  surface  of  the  ground,  conceive  an  island  thirty-five  feet 
high,  rising  from  the  ocean.  The  surface  of  the  ocean  is  the 
level  from  which  all  land  heights  are  measured,  because  the 
sea  level,  except  for  tidal  variations  that  are  thoroughly  under- 
stood, is  invariable.  The  contours  indicate  those  points  that 
are  at  equal  heights  above  the  ocean. 

Our  island,  as  it  appears  at  the  average  sea  level,  might  be 
drawn  as  follows : 


FIG  l. 

It  has  been  said  that  this  line  represents  an  island,  but 
there  is  nothing  yet  to  show  it  in  the  map  itself.  Since  it  is 
assumed  that  the  line  represents  the  outline  of  an  island,  it 
simply  indicates  the  division  between  land  and  water  at  the 
average  sea  level ;  it  does  not  indicate  any  height  at  all.  Inside 
the  line  is  land ;  outside  is  water.  Nothing  more  is  expressed 
by  this  line. 

If  all  points  on  the  island  that  are  exactly  ten  feet  above 
the  water  were  connected  by  a  line,  its  representation  on  the 
map  would  be  as  shown  in  Fig.  2. 

The  shape  of  the  island  now  begins  to  show.  At  A  it  is 
a  very  short  distance,  relatively,  between  the  mean  water 


MAP  READING 


31 


mark  and  the  ten-foot  line;  the  land  rises  abruptly,  while  at 
B  it  is  much  farther  between  the  lines,  there  the  rise  is  much 
more  gentle. 


Pro  2. 


To  show  this  graphically,  draw  a  horizontal  line,  0,  to  rep- 
resent the  water  level.  Above  it  a  parallel  line,  10,  represents 
the  ten-foot  level.  Dropping  dotted  lines  perpendicularly 
from  each  contour  near  A  and  B,  and  stopping  the  dotted  line 
from  the  10- foot  contour  at  the  upper  horizontal  line,  and  the 
one  from  the  sea  level  contour  at  the  lower  one,  and  con- 
necting the  points  where  they  intersect  by  the  lines  A'  A"  and 
B'  B",  these  last  lines  will  show  the  relative  slope  of  the 
ground  at  A  and  B. 

All  that  is  known  of  the  shape  of  the  island  is  that  every- 
thing within  the  line  marked  10  is  more  than  ten  feet  above 
the  sea,  because  all  points  that  were  just  ten  feet  above  it  were 
connected  by  that  line.  It  is  also  known  that  everything  be- 
tween the  two  lines  is  land,  at  the  mean  tide,  and  is  less  than 
ten  feet  above  the  water. 

A  third  contour,  marking  all  points  twenty  feet  above  the 
water  shows  still  more  about  the  shape  of  the  island.  Treating 


32 


MILITARY  PRIMER 


the  added  contour  as  we  did  the  first  one,  we  see  that  the  gentle 
slope  is  still  maintained  at  B,  and  the  abrupt  slope  at  A. 


FIG  3. 

A  fourth  contour  shows  the  points  that  are  thirty  feet  above 
the  water,  and,  if  there  are  no  more  contours,  locates  the  highest 
part  of  the  island  within  that  contour,  and  limits  it  to  between 
thirty  and  forty  feet  above  the  water. 

Continuing  the  processes  begun  in  Figs.  2  and  3,  we  have 
Fig.  4. 

The  heavy  line,  uniting  the  intersections  of  the  horizontal  and 
vertical  lines  is  called  a  profile.  The  vertical  height  assumed  to 
separate  the  contours  is  called  the  vertical,  or  contour,  interval. 

At  the  bottom  of  the  Strategic  Map  we  find,  under  the  graphic 
scale  of  miles  :  "Contour  interval  20  feet."  That  means  that  for 
that  map  the  contours  represents  levels  separated  vertically  by 
twenty  feet.  Beneath,  again,  is  found:  "Datum  is  mean  sea 
level,"  meaning  that  the  elevations  marked  on  the  map  show  ver- 
tical heights,  in  feet,  above  the  sea.  Not  all  the  contours  are 
numbered.  The  hundred-foot  contours,  on  this  map,  are  drawn 


MAP  READING 


33 


with  heavier  lines  than  the  others,  and  their  elevations  are  given 
in  figures,  in  gaps  in  the  contours. 

In  the  Topographic  Map  the  contour  interval  is  5  feet,  and 
every  fourth  contour  is  drawn  heavier  than  the  others,  and  is 
numbered.  At  most  of  the  road  intersections  numbers  will  also 


FIG  4. 

be  found.  These  serve  a  double  purpose ;  they  not  only  give  the 
student  the  elevation  of  the  marked  spot,  but  they  serve  to  iden- 
tify it  on  the  map.  For  instance,  the  road  from  New  Oxford  to 
Newchester  (3*^  miles  northwest  from  New  Oxford),  would  be 
described  as  the  road  New  Oxford — 491 — 494 — 520 — 480 — 
Newchester. 

To  determine  in  a  general  way  what  points  are  visible  from 
any  point  on  a  contoured  map,  it  is  necessary  to  get  the  elevation 
of  the  point  in  question  and  then  to  search  for  higher  points  that 
will  cut  out  all  view  in  any  direction,  or  for  less  elevated  points 
that  will  hide  places  still  lower.  In  order  to  do  that  easily,  the 
student  must  practice  reading  contours,  at  first  by  making  pro- 


34 


MILITARY  PRIMER 


files.  Soon  he  will  become  sufficiently  familiar  with  them  to 
render  the  making  of  profiles  unnecessary. 

In  the  appendix  to  this  book  you  will  find  a  number  of  sheets 
of  paper  ruled  in  squares.  The  heavier  lined  squares  are  one  inch 
on  a  side ;  the  lighter  ones,  one-eighth  of  an  inch  on  a  side.  This 
paper  is  called  profile  paper. 

Its  use  is  as  follows:  You  wish  to  draw  a  profile  along  the 
line  AB  in  the  little  map,  Fig.  5. 


4fl 

; 

(i 

4 

5 

f 

3 

i 

'4v 

1 

\ 

tn 

3 

^ 

'0 

1 

1 

1 

?rt 

rt 

*0 

/< 

o 

7\ 

J 

/< 

0 

Jk 

f 

S. 

fa 

/i 

i 

^ 

& 

<x> 

^ 

^ 

s 

s^ 

X 

^ 

x 

*•* 

-_^ 

A 

•—  ^. 

-*, 

- 

- 

s 

^ 

/ 

- 

fa 

** 

••» 

**^ 

lc 

-^. 

-», 

s 

- 

U 

... 

- 

S 

/ 

- 

w 

5. 


Tear  out  a  sheet  of  profile  paper,  and  then  lay  its  edge  along 
the  line  AB,  and  check  off  the  places,  on  the  profile  paper,  where 
the  contour  lines  intersect  its  edge.  Write  the  number  of  each 


MAP  READING  3i 

contour  crossed  below  the  check  mark.  By  inspection  it  is  seen 
that  the  highest  contour  is  220,  the  lowest  120.  Now  mark  your 
vertical  scale  to  the  left,  on  the  profile  paper,  as  indicated. 

Beginning  at  the  right  of  the  profile  paper  it  is  seen  that  the 
first  contour— 200— is  checked  off  between  the  fourth  and  fifth 
vertical  lines  from  the  right  edge  of  the  paper.  Directly  under 
this  check  mark,  and  on  the  line  marked  200  in  the  vertical  scale 
to  the  left,  make  a  cross. 

In  the  second  space  to  the  left  is  the  check  indicating  where 
the  180  contour  was  cut  by  the  edge  of  the  profile  paper.  Make 
a  cross  directly  under  this  check  mark  on  the  180  line.  This  line 
is  not  marked  on  the  vertical  scale,  in  Figure  5,  because  the  letter 
A  happened  to  fall  in  the  spot  where  it  normally  would  be  placed. 
So  it  was  omitted  to  avoid  confusion. 

The  next  check  is  also  marked  180.  Its  cross  is  on  the  same 
horizontal  line  as  the  last  one.  Crosses  made  on  the  proper  hor- 
izontal lines,  directly  under  all  the  other  check  marks,  will  indi- 
cate the  intersections  of  the  horizontal  planes  of  the  contours, 
with  the  vertical  plane  of  the  profile.  By  connecting  these 
crosses  with  the  smoothly  curving  line,  A  B,  the  general  slope 
of  the  surface  along  the  line  A  B  is  approximated.  This  line 
is  called  a  profile. 

In  making  profiles  it  is  customary  to  regard  the  ground  as 
sloping  uniformly  between  the  contours — a  condition  that  rarely 
exists.  When,  as  happens  between  the  second  and  third  contours 
from  the  right,  and  again  when  the  fifth — 220 — contour  from  the 
right  is  twice  crossed  by  the  line  A  B,  the  depth  or  height  of  the 
slope  between  the  contours  can  only  be  estimated. 

The  top  of  the  little  hill  between  B  and  the  river  is  more  than 
220  and  less  than  240,  and  is  the  highest  point  on  the  profile.  The 
intersection  with  the  river  is  the  lowest  point,  and  it  is  more  than 
100,  because  that  contour  crosses  the  stream  lower  down  in  its 
course. 

To  distinguish  between  a  hill  and  a  valley,  when  the  valley 
is  not  marked  by  a  water  course,  it  should  be  remembered  that 
both  are  marked  by  a  concavity  in  the  contours,  but  that  the  con- 
tours of  a  watercourse  are  generally  the  more  pointed.  The  apex 


36 


MILITARY  PRIMER 


of  a  contour  that  points  towards  a  lower  contour,  points  down 
hill.  One  pointing  towards  a  higher  contour,  points  up  hill. 
For  example: 


FIG  6. 

The  sharper  curves  to  the  left  point  down  hill ;  those  to  the 
right,  up  hill.    The  formation  to  the  left  is  called  a  nose. 

If  the  contour  numbers  were  omitted  the  contours  would  be 
meaningless. 

A  profile  on  AB  would  show : 


/§o  — 


FIG  7. 

A  level  plain  is  marked  by  an  absence  of  contours,  or  by  wide 
spaces  between  them. 

Open  your  topographical  map.  You  will  find  the  village  of 
Hampton  straggling  along  a  slanting  crossroad  in  the  northeast 
corner  of  the  map.  I  am  going  to  describe  the  country  visible 


MAP  READING  37 

from  the  road  between  Hampton  and  Newchester,  nearly  three 
miles  to  the  southwest. 

The  village  is  near  the  crest  of  a  little  ridge  that  falls  away, 
gradually,  towards  the  south.  To  the  north,  a  hundred  yards 
or  so," is  a  small  cemetery,  and  beyond  it,  an  orchard.  West  of 
these  the  ground  slopes  to  the  westward,  cultivated  fields,  small 
grain  first,  then  corn.  As  you  leave  the  village  you  see,  250 
yards  to  the  right,  a  little  grove,  and,  beyond  it,  500  yards  away, 
a  much  larger  one ;  both  are  clear  of  underbrush.  To  the  left  the 
land  is  cultivated:  first,  small  grain,  as  far  as  Stevens'  private 
road,  then  corn  to  the  bend  in  the  road.  A  little  valley  is  in  front 
of  you,  with  a  brook  in  it.  The  road  drops  25  feet  from  the  last 
houses  in  the  village  to  the  brook.  A  road  leads  off  to  the  right, 
in  front  of  Stevens'  house.  A  farm  house,  with  a  little  orchard 
by  it,  is  a  hundred  yards  from  the  corner,  on  the  west  side  of  this 
road,  between  it  and  the  brook.  As  you  stand  at  the  corner  you 
can  see  the  road  sloping  gradually  down,  four  or  five  feet,  to  the 
brook,  then,  rising  abruptly  thirty  feet,  it  bends  to  the  right 
around  the  corner  of  the  woods  and  disappears  from  view. 

You  go  on,  cross  the  brook,  and  go  up  a  slight  rise,  between 
corn  fields  enclosed  in  wire  fences,  to  the  bend  of  the  road,  where 
you  stop.  A  little  grove,  with  underbrush,  is  up  the  little  valley 
to  your  right,  four  hundred  yards  away.  If  the  trees  in  the 
extreme  right  edge  of  this  grove,  as  you  face  it,  are  less  than  thirty 
feet  high  you  will  see  the  little  nose  the  road  leading  northwest 
from  Stevens'  is  on,  see  the  road  between  the  pasture  and  the 
woods,  see  the  two  barns,  and  the  farm  house  beyond  them,  and, 
if  you  can  see  between  the  buildings,  two  miles  to  the  north  you 
can  see  about  forty  feet  of  the  top  of  Round  Hill.  Four  hundred 
yards  to  the  southeast  is  a  large  pasture,  or  meadow,  with  a 
stream  bordered  with  trees  running  through  it.  Eight  hundred 
yards  to  the  south  is  a  long  strip  of  timber  that  hides  everything 
to  the  south  for  several  miles.  To  the  right  front  is  a  little 
valley,  trees  along  a  stream  at  the  bottom  of  it.  Looking  up  the 
ridge,  to  the  northwest,  is  a  clear  vista  for  about  1200  yards. 
The  barn  across  the  road  just  north  of  the  580  contour  stands 
out  on  the  sky  line,  and,  a  little  to  the  west  of  it,  the  tops  of  the 


38  MILITARY  PRIMER 

farm  buildings  and  the  trees  of  the  orchard  may  be  seen  above 
the  horizon. 

Going  on,  there  is  a  slight  drop,  to  the  little  brook,  across  that 
there  is  a  pasture  to  the  left,  small  grain  to  the  right.  In  the 
pasture  is  a  little  thicket — trees  with  underbrush — and  beyond 
the  grain  field  is  an  open  grove,  then  a  barn,  behind  it  an  orchard, 
and  a  farm  house  further  on,  by  another  little  brook.  Then  a 
corn  field  to  the  right,  small  grain  to  the  left  as  the  road  climbs  a 
steep  little  hill,  thirty  feet  high,  with  a  cut  at  the  top. 

Note  that  the  sign  for  a  cut  is  made  by  drawing  teeth  pro- 
jecting towards  the  road  from  a  line  drawn  parallel  to  it,  while 
a  fill  (see  along  the  railroad  northwest  of  Berlin  Junction,  in  the 
southeast  corner  of  the  map)  is  made  by  drawing  the  teeth  pro- 
jecting away  from  the  road.*  From  the  cut  the  road  drops  down 
a  side  hill  to  the  crossroad  at  Oakwood  School  House,  and  from 
there,  for  nearly  900  yards,  it  runs  along  a  ridge,  nearly  level. 
Note  the  contours,  numbered  alike  (520-525)  that  are  nearly 
parellel  to  the  road,  marking  the  ridge. 

At  the  western  end  of  this  level  stretch  the  road  turns  half 
right,  and  goes  down  a  hill,  dropping  65  feet  in  350  yards — a 
slope  of  about  one  to  sixteen,  not  a  very  steep  slope.  The  road 
crosses  the  river  on  a  bridge  with  a  single  span.  The  river  runs 
between  steep,  bluffy  banks.  A  dam  is  just  around  the  bend,  to 
the  north,  and  a  sluice  carries  the  water  to  a  mill  (probably) 
near  the  western  end  of  the  bridge.  The  road  rises  twenty  feet 
abruptly  (on  the  scale  this  map  is  drawn  it  is  difficult  to  estimate 
how  steep,  when  contours  are  as  close  together  as  shown  at  this 
spot),  and  then  runs  along  the  eastern  slope  of  the  little  ridge 
around  which  the  river  bends,  and,  reaching  the  top,  bends  along 
the  crest  of  the  ridge  to  the  village  of  Newchester. 

Under  the  graphic  scale  of  yards  on  this  map  is  a  scale  of 
slopes  for  20-foot  contours.  This  is  used  as  follows:  Cut 
out  the  scale,  and  paste  it  on  a  card,  with  the  horizontal  line 


*  Notice  an  error  in  the  map.  The  railroad  crosses  Brush  Run, 
near  the  south  edge  of  the  map,  west  of  the  center,  on  a  fill  and 
bridge.  It  is  carried  on  grade  from  the  515  to  the  525  contours,  west 
of  Brush  Run,  and  then  is  shown  crossing  the  ridge  west  of  that 
point  to  the  535  contour  on  a  fill  —  a  plain  absurdity.  There  must 
be  a  cut  there,  fifteen  or  twenty  feet  deep. 


MAP  READING  39 

at  the  edge  of  the  card.  Place  the  scale  at  right  angles  to  the 
20-foot  contours — the  heavy  ones — and  slide  it  along  until 
two  adjacent  vertical  lines  of  the  scale  prolong  the  contour 
lines.  The  reading  between  the  lines  will  tell  you  the  degree 
of  slope  at  that  spot,  and,  by  reference  to  a  table  of  natural 
sines,  the  actual  rise  per  horizontal  foot  can  be  got  directly. 

Consider  now  the  War  Game  Map,  the  fourth  map  in  the 
pocket  in  the  back  cover  of  this  book.  Its  scale  is  12  inches 
to  the  mile.  It  is  recommended  that  students  make  a  scale 
of  yards,  at  the  bottom  of  the  map.  For  your  purposes  it  will 
be  near  enough  to  make  your  scale  1  inch  equals  150  yards. 
The  scale  really  is  1  inch  equals  l462/3  yards. 

The  vertical  interval  is  5  feet,  and  the  20-foot  contours  are 
drawn  heavier  than  the  others,  as  in  the  Topographical  Map. 

The  highest  point — 620 — is  at  the  southeast  corner;  the 
lowest — 495 — is  at  the  southwest.  A  ridge  runs  from  the 
southeast  corner  to  New  Oxford. 

There  is  nothing  about  this  map  that  you  should  not  know 
from  your  study  of  the  other  maps. 

For  problems,  and  for  suggestions  to  instructors,  see  the 
Appendix  to  this  book. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
ORIENTATION. 

DO   NOT  GET  LOST! 

Orientation  is  the  process  of  determining,  in  the  field, 
direction  or  relative  position.  In  a  strict  sense  the  word 
means  the  determination  of  the  east  point,  but,  used  in  a 
military  sense,  it  means  the  process  of  keeping  track  of  one's 
movements  so  as  to  keep  from  getting  lost.  Technically, 
orientation  means  holding  a  map  so  that  a  point  thereon  is 
over  the  corresponding  point  on  the  ground,  and  the  lines  of 
the  map  are  parellel  to  the  corresponding  lines  on  the  gound. 

The  fundamental  pinciple  of  the  art  of  scouting  is :  do 
not  get  lost.  A  scout,  a  patrol,  a  raiding  party,  any  body  of 
troops,  large  or  small,  sent  out  with  instructions  to  go  to  a 
certain  place;  or  to  do  a  certain  thing,  must  keep  constantly 
oriented  with  respect  to  two  places :  the  starting  place  and  the 
objective.  This  orientation  must  be  preserved  at  all  times,  in 
daylight  or  dark,  in  fair  weather  or  foul,  when  in  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  and  when  far  from  him. 

The  simplest  and  surest  way  to  keep  oriented  is  by  means 
of  a  compass  and  a  map.  Every  officer  should  invariably  have 
a  pocket  compass  in  his  possession  when  campaigning,  in  peace 
or  in  war.  He  should  guard  it  as  carefully  as  he  does  his 
revolver  and  its  ammunition  or  his  watch.  Every  non-com- 
missioned officer  sent  on  patrol  duty,  not  under  an  officer,  and 
every  scout  and  the  leader  of  every  scouting  party  should  be 
issued  a  reliable  compass  before  starting  on  their  duty. 

If  the  leader  possesses  a  good  map  and  compass,  he  can 
preserve  his  orientation  perfectly  and  without  any  question, 
provided  he  uses  his  map  constantly.  He  should  have  it 
folded  to  convenient  size,  and  should  carry  it  in  an  outside 
pocket.  When  he  reaches  a  point  where  his  knowledge  of  the 
country  ceases  to  be  of  use  to  him,  he  looks  at  his  compass, 
establishes  the  direction  of  the  magnetic  north,  opens  his  map 


ORIENTATION  41 

and  refolds  it  so  that  the  part  of  it  he  is  to  use  is  in  sight, 
stands  so  that  he  is  facing  the  road  he  proposes  first  to  travel 
on,  and  then  turns  his  map,  holding  it  directly  in  front  of  the 
center  of  his  body,  so  that  the  magnetic  north  of  the  map  is 
towards  the  north  as  indicated  by  his  compass. 

He  then  locates  his  position  on  the  map,  looks  ahead  along 
the  direction  his  road  points,  on  the  map,  to  see  that  this 
direction,  prolonged,  follows  the  direction  of  the  real  road, 
looks  to  the  right  and  left  to  see  if  natural  or  artificial  features 
noted  on  the  map,  and  within  his  horizon,  are  as  represented 
on  the  map.  These  points  verified,  he  knows  that  he  is 
oriented.  He  goes  ahead,  sure  of  himself,  holding  the  map 
so  he  can  constantly  see  it,  and  turned  so  that  the  lines  indicat- 
ing the  road  on  the  map  point  towards  the  road  ahead  of  him. 
He  notes  the  distances  he  travels,  either  by  a  time  scale,  by 
counting  telephone  poles — about  40  to  the  mile — or  by  esti- 
mating with  the  eye.  He  finally  comes  to  a  turn  in  the  road, 
a  crossroad,  a  bridge,  a  railway  track — anything  of  import- 
ance enough  to  be  noted  on  his  map — where  he  re-orients 
himself  and  resumes  his  march,  sure  that  he  knows  where  he 
is,  and  where  he  has  come  from. 

To  illustrate :  A  mile  and  a  half  due  west  from  New 
Oxford,  on  the  Topographical  Map,  in  a  slanting  crossroad, 
marked  557.  A  patrol  leader  is  there,  with  his  patrol.  The 
country  is  strange  to  him.  He  is  directed  to  take  his  patrol, 
by  the  road  to  the  northeast,  to  491,  and  thence  to  Newchester, 
returning  by  the  School  House  (S.H.) — 530 — 568.  He  is 
given  a  copy  of  the  map  you  are  looking  at.  We  will  leave 
aside  all  consideration  of  his  mission,  and  his  method  of  lead- 
ing his  patrol,  and  discuss  simply  the  question  of  his  orienta- 
tion. 

He  stands  in  the  center  of  the  crossroad,  looking  up  the 
northeast  road.  He  opens  his  map,  folds  it  once,  backwards, 
across  the  middle,  from  east  to  west,  then,  bellows  fashion, 
into  four  north  and  south  folds.  He  opens  the  middle  fold, 
holds  it  flat  in  front  of  him,  the  top  of  the  map  to  the  north. 
The  road,  as  marked  on  the  map,  towards  the  northeast,  points 


42  MILITARY  PRIMER 

along  a  road  down  a  gentle  slope  to  a  bend  four  or  five  hun- 
dred yards  away,  where,  directly  in  front  of  the  road,  he  sees 
a  grove  of  trees,  without  any  underbrush.  A  barn  is  in  the 
angle  of  the  road  in  front  of  him,  and  to  his  left;  a  house  to 
his  right  front.  A  road  leads  off  to  the  left,  up  a  slight  incline, 
with  a  hedge  on  its  left  side.  Cultivated  fields,  small  grain 
growing  in  them,  are  on  both  sides  of  the  road  in  front  of 
him ;  a  wood,  with  underbrush  (note  the  dotted  lines  in  the 
tree  convention  there — that  means  underbrush ;  without  the 
dots,  you  read  an  open  grove),  is  beyond  the  fields,  to  the  right, 
and  cuts  off  his  view  in  that  direction.  Everything  in  the 
landscape  tallies  with  the  map.  He  is  oriented. 

He  goes  to  the  bend  of  the  road,  turns  the  map  in  his 
hands  to  the  left  as  his  road  turns  to  the  right.  A  hundred 
yards  or  so  farther  on,  the  road  bends  back  to  the  left  again, 
and  he  turns  his  map  to  the  right,  so  that  the  roads  in  front 
of  him,  on  the  map  and  on  the  ground,  both  point  in  the  same 
direction.  A  little  farther  on  and  he  is  out  of  the  woods. 
He  has  a  new  horizon.  He  stops,  sees  the  fields  of  small 
grain  to  the  right  and  left;  the  road  bordered  with  smooth 
wire  fences.  (If  they  had  been  barbed  wire  they  would  have 
been  drawn:  — x — x — ,  whereas  they  are  drawn:  — o — o — .) 
The  road  goes  down  a  gentle  slope.  Half  way  to  the  railroad 
the  small  grain  on  the  right  gives  way  to  a  pasture ;  to  the  left, 
to  a  cornfield.  Then  comes  a  railroad  crossing,  where  the 
road,  still  down  hill,  bends  to  the  left  and  is  lost  behind  a  little 
open  grove.  The  railroad  is  carried  for  two  to  three  hundred 
yards  on  a  fill  to  his  left  front,  and  through  a  cut  just  to  the 
right  of  the  road  in  front. 

He  resumes  his  march  and  reaches  the  T  in  the  road  near 
the  foot  of  the  hill.  Here,  exactly  as  drawn  in  the  map,  he 
sees  a  road,  little  used,  leading  to  the  left  into  the  woods.  A 
stream,  fringed  with  trees  and  underbrush,  is  in  front  of  him. 
His  own  road  goes  to  the  right,  down  a  side  hill,  and  he  fol- 
lows it,  passing  two  barns  to  the  right,  a  house  to  the  left,  a 
canal,  a  house  to  the  left,  across  the  canal,  and  then  he  crosses 


ORIENTATION  43 

the  creek  on  a  steel  truss  bridge,  with  a  single  span.  He  goes 
on,  up  a  steep  little  hill,  twenty-five  feet  up,  to  491. 

This  is  the  process.  He  may  have  studied  his  map  very 
carefully  before  starting,  at  557,  memorizing  the  turns  he  must 
take,  and  then,  having  returned  it  to  his  pocket,  he  may  have 
trusted  to  his  memory.  The  latter  method  is  all  right,  until 
a  mistake  is  made.  Then  the  magnitude  of  the  consequences 
of  the  mistake  will  depend  upon  the  importance  of  the  mission. 
Remember  this:  the  scout  or  patrol  leader  who  gets  lost,  de- 
stroys at  once  the  confidence  of  his  companions  and  of  his 
superiors.  It  is  the  unforgivable  offense. 

The  scout  is  not  always,  nor,  indeed,  often,  so  fortunate 
as  to  have  a  reliable  map  to  travel  by,  so,  while  the  use  of  the 
map  and  compass  is  the  best  way  to  keep  oriented,  they  are 
not  always  available,  and  other  ways  must  be  learned. 

If  the  scout  has  no  compass,  but  has  a  watch  (he  is  very 
negligent  if  he  does  not  have  both,  and  in  good  order),  he  can 
find  the  north  point,  when  the  sun  is  shining,  by  pointing  the 
hour  hand  towards  the  sun,  so  that  its  shadow  lies  directly 
under  itself.  A  line  drawn,  bisecting  the  angle  made  by  the 
hour  hand  with  a  line  drawn  through  twelve  and  the  center  of 
the  watch,  will  be  the  north-and-south  line.  Midway  between 
the  end  of  the  hour  hand  and  the  numeral  twelve  is  towards 
the  south. 

At  night,  if  it  is  clear,  the  north  star  gives  a  sure  indication 
in  the  northern  hemisphere.  This  star  is  found  midway  be- 
tween the  Great  Dipper  and  Cassiopeia's  Chair,  and  ought  to 
be  perfectly  familiar  to  everyone. 

The  Pointers  help  to  fix  the  position  of  the  star  as  indi- 
cated in  Figure  8. 

The  Great  Dipper  and  Cassiopeia's  Chair  should  be  well 
learned,  for,  in  southern  latitudes,  where  the  North  Star  is  near 
the  horizon  and  hard  to  distinguish,  one  or  the  other  of  these  con- 
stellations is  always  visible,  on  clear  nights. 


44 


MILITARY  PRIMER 


SWEAT 
0«PPCR 


POINTERS 


FIG  8. — THE  NORTHERN  SKY. 

The  Southern  Cross  is  nearly  as  far  from  the  south  pole  as 
the  Dipper  and  Cassiopeia's  Chair  are  from  the  north ;  it  is  not 
as  easily  found,  and  is  visible,  on  clear  nights,  only  half  the  time, 
in  the  tropics  north  of  the  equator.  The  two  stars,  the  Com- 
passes, are  as  bright  as  the  brightest  star  in  the  Southern  Cross, 
and  help  to  locate  it.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  stars  form  an 
oblique  cross. 

In  every  climate  the  keen  observer  will  find  indications  that 
serve  to  orient  him,  when  other  means  are  not  at  hand.  For 
example,  in  dry  countries  the  vegetation  is  usually  more  luxuriant 
on  northern  slopes  than  on  southern  ones.  In  cold  climates  shel- 
ters for  stock  usually  open  towards  the  south.  A  greenhouse  is 


ORIENTATION  45 

usually  placed  with  its  axis  east  and  west.  Moss  will  grow  better 
in  places  protected  from  the  sun,  as  on  the  north  side  of  stones 
exposed  to  the  sunlight. 

Weather  vanes  usually  have  the  points  of  the  compass  marked 
on  them.  They  should  be  used  with  caution,  however,  as  they  are 
very  apt  to  be  bent,  or  blown  out  of  adjustment,  by  the  wind. 

See  Appendix,  page  184- A,  for  instructions  to  instructors 
teaching  orientation. 


PIG  9. — THE  SOUTHERN  SKY. 


CHAPTER  V. 
THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS 

A  GENERAL  DISCUSSION 

"Give  me  news  of  the  enemy,  to  relieve  my  anxiety!"  —  Louis 
Napoleon. 

In  order  to  learn  of  the  wherabouts,  movements,  and  probable 
intentions  of  an  enemy,  small  groups  of  men,  or  more  rarely, 
single  soldiers,  are  often  sent  out  from  an  army,  as  far  as  it  is 
prudent,  or  possible,  who  endeavor  to  hide  their  own  movements, 
all  the  while  keeping  a  sharp  lookout  for  the  enemy,  and  keenly 
observing  every  indication  of  his  movements. 

These  men  are  called  spies  if  they  discard  their  own  uniform 
and  put  on  a  disguise,  endeavoring  thereby  to  gain  their  ends  by 
deceiving  the  enemy  as  to  their  identity.  A  spy,  by  the  law  of 
war,  if  captured  by  the  enemy  within  the  zone  of  their  operations, 
while  on  such  expeditions,  is  liable  to  suffer  death  by  hanging. 
This  extreme  penalty  is  not  imposed  because  the  offense  of  the 
spy  is  in  any  way  shameful,  but  in  order  to  discourage  the  obtain- 
ing of  information  in  that  way.  The  necessity  of  concealing  the 
condition  and  disposition  of  an  army,  and  the  more  vulnerable 
avenues  of  approach  to  its  position  is  so  great,  that  it  is  gen- 
erally recognized  by  all  the  leading  nations  of  the  world  that  this 
extreme  penalty  is  justifiable.  Nevertheless,  the  use  of  spies  is 
constant  and  universal.  The  methods  employed  by  spies  to  ac- 
complish their  purposes  are  so  varied  that  it  is  impossible  to 
attempt  to  even  outline  them.  The  duties  of  the  spy  cannot  be 
taught ;  they  must  be  instinctive  in  the  individual. 

Scouts  are  individual  officers  or  soldiers  who  seek  informa- 
tion of  the  enemy  by  approaching  his  position  while  in  proper 
uniform,  who  conceal  themselves  from  observation  as  much  as 
is  consistent  with  the  end  they  have  in  view,  and  who  should  be 
carefully  trained  in  peace  time  so  that  they  not  only  can  rightly 
interpret  what  they  see,  but  so  they  can  report  on  it  rapidly, 
clearly,  and  intelligently. 


ORIENTATION  47 

In  order  for  a  man  to  make  a  good  scout  he  must,  first  of  all, 
be  a  man  of  high  courage,  strong  self-reliance  and  common 
sense.  He  should  possess  excellent  sight  and  hearing.  He  should 
be  a  fine  marksman,  both  with  rifle  and  revolver.  He  must  pos- 
sess strength  and  endurance  of  a  high  order.  He  should  be 
equally  at  home  on  foot  or  horseback.  He  should  be  a  strong 
swimmer. 

Possessing  these  mental  and  physical  requisites,  the  scout 
must  first  learn  how  to  traverse  unknown  country  by  day  or  night, 
without  getting  lost.  In  a  strange  country  one  never  knows  what 
is  ahead,  beyond  the  horizon.  The  way  back  to  the  starting  point 
should  always  be  known.  The  faculty  of  being  able  to  return  to 
a  starting  point  by  a  sure  sense  of  direction,  is  sometimes  called 
the  "homing  instinct."  Some  of  the  lower  animals  possess  this 
to  a  surprising  degree,  but  men  accustomed  from  childhood  to  the 
conveniences  of  civilized  travel  rely  more  on  the  guidance  of 
time-tables  and  sign-posts  to  reach  their  destination  than  to  this 
sense  of  direction ;  they  have,  therefore,  to  learn  it  by  practice. 
It  is  the  most  essential  thing  in  the  training  of  a  scout. 

The  next  most  important  step  is  to  train  the  scout  to  use  his 
eyes  and  ears  to  good  purpose;  to  observe  everything  within 
sight  and  hearing,  to  interpret  what  he  observes,  and  to  remember 
it  correctly.  The  eye  and  ear  should,  for  any  military  man,  be 
in  constant  training.  A  mental  photograph  should  be  quickly 
taken  of  everything  seen.  A  good  practice  is  to  take  a  thirty 
seconds'  scrutiny  of  the  contents  of  a  room,  then  leave  it  and 
make  a  list  of  the  things  seen.  After  this  list  is  made,  go  back 
and  see  how  many  of  the  prominent  objects  in  the  room  have 
been  omitted.  Similar  practice  should  be  indulged  in  whenever 
practicable.  Another  good  practice  is  for  two  men  who  are  out 
walking  or  riding  together.  On  reaching  the  crest  of  a  hill,  each 
should  take  an  observation  of  as  much  of  the  country  as  he  can 
see  clearly,  independently  of  the  other.  After  a  limit  of  time 
agreed  upon,  they  withdraw  behind  the  crest,  and  each  makes  a 
list  of  the  things  seen,  noting  what  might  be  termed  military  fea- 
tures— roads,  rivers,  houses,  hills,  valleys,  forests,  pastures,  cul- 
tivated fields,  and  the  like.  It  is  amazing  how  many  important 


48  MILITARY  PRIMER 

details  will  be  overlooked  at  first,  and  how  rapidly  this  faculty  can 
be  cultivated. 

An  officer  or  soldier  should,  whenever  he  is  in  the  open,  be 
constantly  glancing  about,  noting  the  features  of  the  landscape, 
and  especially  noting  every  moving  thing  in  order  to  cultivate 
quickness  of  eye.  It  is  not  enough  to  look  ahead  and  to  the  right 
and  left;  the  scout  must  frequently  glance  to  the  rear,  in  order 
that  he  may  recognize  the  landscape  when  he  retraces  his  steps. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  every  landscape  looks  entirely  dif- 
ferent when  viewed  from  different  directions. 

Practice  in  observing  things  by  day  is  of  little  value  after 
dark.  Darkness  changes  almost  every  condition.  Quickness  of 
ear  is  now  of  first  importance.  During  the  day  the  eye  is  relied 
upon  almost  exclusively.  Sounds  multiply  so  that  it  is  difficult 
to  locate  the  origin  of  any  particular  sound.  At  night  there  is  a 
general  stillness;  noises  that  would  be  indistinguishable  by  day, 
sound  loud  and  clear  over  considerable  distances.  Efforts  have 
been  made  to  formulate  scales  for  estimating  distances  at  night, 
but  never  satisfactorily  to  many  persons  other  than  the  one 
making  the  estimate.  Each  scout  should  make  his  own  scale; 
verifying  his  estimate  whenever  possible,  and  never  missing  a 
chance  to  practice  the  art.  The  most  valuable  work  of  good 
scouts  is  done  at  night,  and  if  we  remember  that,  other  things 
being  equal,  victory  lies  with  the  best-informed  general,  the  im- 
portance of  night  training  can  be  seen. 

There  is  no  sport  that  develops  quickness  of  ear,  and  the  sense 
of  position  and  direction  better  than  hunting  coons  or  'possums. 
This  is  always  done  at  night,  in  the  timber;  and  since  the  quarry 
sets  the  pace  and  lays  the  course,  it  requires  much  skill  to  keep 
from  losing  one's  way.  The  baying  of  the  dogs  is  often  difficult 
to  locate,  and  excellent  practice  in  estimating  distance  and  direc- 
tion in  the  forest  is  the  result.  In  the  excitement  of  the  chase, 
especially  if  it  ends  in  a  kill,  one  need  not  be  surprised  to  find 
one's  self  in  a  strange  spot,  with  all  idea  of  direction  gone.  Then 
comes  the  skill  of  the  woodsman  to  find  some  object  to  orient  on, 
and  to  get  home  by  the  least  fatiguing  route.  After  a  few  long, 
roundabout  walks  home  the  coon-hunter  learns  to  keep  oriented, 


THE  DUTIES  OP  PATROLS  49 

and  to  study  the  scheme  of  nature  as  it  appears  at  night.  This 
also  is  something  that  cannot  be  taught  from  books,  but  must  be 
worked  out  by  each  individual  for  himself. 

In  the  training  of  the  scout  there  should  be  at  least  as  much 
work  done  at  night  as  in  the  daylight.  For  the  enthusiastic  sol- 
dier this  practice  is  no  hardship ;  it  entails  no  special  preparation ; 
it  is  so  easy  to  find  opportunities,  and  it  seems  so  simple  that  most 
men  neglect  it  altogether. 

Having  learned  not  to  get  lost,  and  how  to  observe  everything 
by  day  or  night,  the  next  thing  for  the  scout  to  learn  is  to  do  this 
without  being  observed  by  others.  We  must  remember  that,  if 
seen,  the  enemy  will  do  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  him  from 
making  his  observations,  to  capture  or  to  kill  him. 

To  this  end,  all  the  scout's  movements  must  be  under  cover 
whenever  it  does  not  interfere  with  his  mission.  The  most 
direct  way  is  no  longer  the  best  way.  -  The  scout,  when  he  has 
reached  a  good  position  for  observation,  as  soon  as  he  has 
comprehended  the  landscape  and  its  features,  must  select  the 
next  observation  point  and  how  to  get  there.  Between  the 
two  points  his  progress  should  be  as  rapid  as  possible,  consis- 
tent with  his  remaining  hidden.  If  between  these  two  points, 
he  finds  a  place  well  adapted  for  observation,  he  should  go  to 
it,  repeat  his  scrutiny  of  the  landscape,  note  carefully  his  sur- 
roundings, see  if  a  better  place  than  the  one  selected  before  is 
available,  and  in  general,  use  every  safe  means  to  obtain  com- 
plete knowledge  of  the  country  he  is  scouting  over.  If  he 
discovers  the  enemy,  and  believes  himself  not  discovered,  he 
should  redouble  his  precautions,  carefully  plan  his  own  line 
of  retreat,  and  take  every  advantage  of  their  ignorance  of  his 
being  there,  remembering  that  they  will  exhibit  real  conditions 
much  more  perfectly  if  they  believe  they  are  not  watched.  If 
he  is  satisfied  that  they  have  discovered  his  position,  he  should 
act  as  if  he  did  not  think  himself  seen  and  so  increase  his 
chance  of  getting  away  altogether,  or  of  gaining  a  new  posi- 
tion without  being  seen,  where  he  can  go  on  wth  his  observa- 
tions. 

Scouting  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  is  a  hazardous 
undertaking;  it  should  not  be  hurried  or  ill-considered.  It 


SO  MILITARY  PRIMER 

must  be  constantly  borne  in  mind  that  the  scout  is  of  no  value 
unless  he  returns  to  his  commander,  and  although  he  should 
not  return  without  making  every  effort  to  accomplish  his  mis- 
sion, extra-hazardous  risks  should  be  taken  only  when  infor- 
mation can  be  obtained  in  no  other  way. 

Intelligent  hunting,  of  big  game  preferably,  is  the  best 
peace-time  training  to  develop  the  faculty  of  keeping  out  of 
sight.  The  greatest  patience  and  self-possession  and  abso- 
lutely steady  nerves  are  necessary.  It  was  their  development 
of  the  art  of  scouting  that  enabled  a  few  thousand  Boer 
farmers  to  tax  to  their  utmost  the  military  resources  of  the 
British  Empire  for  three  years. 

The  scout  does  not  play  to  the  gallery;  his  work  is  done 
under  cover,  alone,  in  the  midst  of  danger.  No  one  is  near 
him  to  help  him  out  of  difficulties,  no  one  to  know  the  heroism 
he  has  displayed.  After  his  work  is  done,  he  comes  in  with 
his  report,  quietly,  without  parade  of  any  sort;  after  his  rest 
is  taken  he  disappears  to  again  take  up  his  dangerous  trade. 
To  make  a  first-class  scout,  courage,  pluck,  and  enthusiasm  of 
the  highest  order  must  be  combined  with  resourcefulness,  self- 
reliance,  and  steady  nerve. 

So  far,  the  scout  has  been  trained  to  travel  by  night,  or 
day,  without  getting  lost,  and  hidden  from  observation.  He 
is  to  observe  narrowly  the  country  and  its  occupants  as  he 
passes  over  it.  In  order  to  be  fully  able  to  inform  his  supe- 
riors concerning  this  country,  he  should  learn  to  interpret  the 
signs  of  travel,  and  here  he  undertakes  a  task  that  will  require 
long  practice  and  the  use  of  all  the  faculties  he  possesses. 
Trailing  is  the  highest  application  of  the  art  of  scouting,  and 
includes  not  merely  the  connecting  of  the  trail  made  by  any 
moving  thing  with  the  thing  itself,  but  the  deducing  there- 
from the  reasons  why  the  thing  moved,  its  rate  of  motion,  how 
long  since  the  trail  was  made,  and  where  next  to  look  for  it. 

Trailing  is  much  more  easily  accomplished  in  less  fre- 
quented places  than  in  populous  districts.  In  a  city,  or  along 
a  public  highway  during  the  working  hours,  tracks  multiply 
so  that  it  is  out  of  the  question  to  follow  anything  by  the 


THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS  51 

tracks  left  by  it  in  the  dust  or  on  the  pavements.  In  less  fre- 
quented districts,  in  the  forest,  and  in  the  fields,  and  especially 
in  the  regions  near  the  operations  of  great  armies  hostile  to 
each  other,  tracks  mean  much  more,  and  quite  accurate  deduc- 
tions can  be  made  from  them  by  those  who  have  learned  to 
read  them. 

If  a  scout,  well  out  in  front  of  his  own  forces,  finds  roads 
devoid  of  fresh  foot-prints,  or  wagon-tracks,  or  the  like,  he 
at  once  knows  that  no  one  has  recently  preceded  him,  and  if 
he  is  wise,  he  will  avoid  going  where  his  own  tracks  will  tell 
of  his  having  been  there.  If  he  comes  to  a  road  crossing  the 
direction  of  his  march,  and  finds  many  tracks  of  men  and 
horses,  mules,  wagons,  and  the  like,  all  pointing  in  the  same 
direction,  he  reasons  that  a  body  of  troops  has  passed  in  that 
direction,  and  that  his  own  path,  in  his  search  for  informa- 
tion, should  be  in  their  wake.  If  the  marks  are  fresh,  and 
point  towards  both  directions,  he  must  search  farther  to  see 
what  sort  of  tracks  predominate,  and  what  made  them,  and 
so  determine  whether  they  were  made  by  troops,  or  by  their 
trains,  going  to  or  returning  from  some  temporary  base  of 
supplies,  or  simply  by  the  people  of  the  country. 

Once  a  scout  has  discovered  a  trail  that  seems  to  indicate 
the  passage  of  an  enemy,  he  should  try  to  follow  it,  and  to 
learn  from  it  as  much  as  possible  about  the  person  or  persons 
making  it. 

The  reading  of  trails,  and  the  following  of  them,  is  an 
education  in  itself  that  requires  long  practice.  Everywhere 
are  opportunities  to  practice  it,  and  officers  and  non-commis- 
sioned officers  should  take  advantage  of  them  frequently.  It 
is  a  study  that  admits  of  easy  practice.  One  does  not  need 
to  go  out  of  one's  way  to  find  signs  of  travel.  It  is  only  by 
the  constant  cultivation  of  the  faculties  of  observation  and 
deduction  that  it  is  possible  to  become  a  good  scout. 

Scouts  often  work  in  pairs,  and  with  good  results.  Two 
men,  however,  can  keep  concealed  less  easily  than  one. 

The  scout,  if  mounted,  should  have  a  good  horse,  better 
than  the  average,  and  trained  to  stand  without  being  tied. 


52  MILITARY  PRIMER 

He  should  carry  a  set  of  shoes  for  him,  the  tools  and  nails 
necessary  to  replace  them,  and  he  should  know  how  to  put 
them  on,  to  be  perfectly  independent  and  of  maximum  value. 
He  should  also  carry  a  revolver  with  plenty  of  ammunition,  a 
watch,  a  compass,  a  pair  of  good  field-glasses,  a  pair  of  wire- 
nippers,  and  the  best  map  of  the  country  that  is  available.* 

He  should  have  a  poncho,  or  raincoat,  and  his  clothing 
should  be  strong  and  serviceable.  He  should  carry  concen- 
trated rations  of  some  sort,  and,  if  possible,  ten  or  fifteen 
pounds  of  grain  for  his  horse. 

While  scouting  he  should  give  his  horse  every  opportunity 
to  feed,  if  only  two  or  three  nibbles  at  a  time.  This  is  man- 
datory. His  horse  should  be  watered  whenever  he  will  drink, 
if  cool.  The  scout  should  fill  his  canteen  whenever  he  can. 
He  can  never  tell  how  far  it  may  be  to  the  next  good  water, 
nor  how  badly  it  may  be  needed. 

All  officers  and  soldiers  should  study  the  capabilities  of 
horses,  and  how  to  care  for  them,  so  that  they  can  get  the 
best  results,  when  needed,  from  their  horses,  without  disabling 
them. 

These  remarks  concerning  scouts  apply  equally  to  cavalry 
or  infantry  scouts.  The  horse  is  of  value,  in  scouting,  merely 
on  account  of  the  mobility  gained  by  his  use  and  because  the 
scout's  eyes  are  about  three  feet  higher  than  when  on  foot. 


PATROLS 

A  patrol  is  a  small  group  of  soldiers  sent  on  any  special 
purpose  connected  with  the  service  of  security  or  informa- 
tion. While  the  patrol  should,  and  usually  does,  accomplish 
its  purpose  without  resorting  to  offensive  tactics,  still  it 
should  be  strong  enough,  in  numbers  and  equipment,  to  do 
so  if  necessary  to  carry  out  its  mission.  In  addition,  it  pos- 


*  Nearly  all  parts  of  the  civilized  world  are  now  mapped  fairly 
well,  and  the  best  roads  indicated  plainly,  for  the  use  of  automo- 
bilists  and  bicylists;  these  maps  are  everywhere  available. 

i 


THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS  53 

sesses  the  ability  of  examining  the  ground  it  passes  over  more 
thoroughly  than  a  single  scout  could  do,  and  its  formation 
should  be  such  that,  if  surprised,  at  least  one  member  of  it  is 
able  to  get  away. 

A  single  scout  moves  rapidly,  keeping  hidden,  or  not, 
depending  on  his  surroundings,  and  his  mission,  preserving 
always  his  orientation  and  a  line  of  retreat.  A  small  patrol 
moves  less  rapidly,  and  its  mobility  decreases  as  the  patrol 
increases  in  size. 

Cavalry  and  infantry  are  the  arms  used  for  patrolling; 
cavalry  preferably  in  open  country,  or  on  roads,  where  greater 
mobility  is  demanded,  infantry  in  close  country  or  when 
resistance  is  to  be  more  stubborn.  The  commander  of  a  small 
patrol  should  be  where  he  can  best  control  the  movements  of 
his  men.  In  small  patrols  with  a  narrow  front,  this  would  be 
at  the  head,  and  here  he  should  be  when  the  patrol  has  four 
men,  or  less ;  and  when  it  is  moving  with  its  flanks  protected  by 
natural  obstacles  only,  or  with  one  flank  so  protected. 

In  very  open  country  a  large  patrol  may  open  out  very 
extensively,  preserving  contact  and  communication  as  ex- 
plained, and  so  cover  a  wide  front,  with  little  danger  of  all 
being  cut  off.  As  the  country  becomes  rougher,  or  more  tim- 
bered, and  provides  more  hiding  places  for  hostile  detach- 
ments, the  necessity  for  diminishing  the  front  and  increasing 
the  depth  of  the  formation  increases,  until,  in  very  close  situa- 
tions indeed,  the  formation  becomes  very  nearly  that  of  a 
column  of  files,  strengthened  by  a  central  group. 

Whether  cavalry  or  infantry  is  to  be  used  depends  entirely 
upon  the  extent  of  the  country  to  be  patrolled,  and  its  charac- 
ter. In  open  country,  cavalry  can,  on  account  of  its  greater 
mobility,  and  its  increased  field  of  vision,  investigate  very 
much  more  ground  than  infantry  could  in  the  same  time,  and 
they  can  take  chances,  when  having  a  good  line  of  retreat,  that 
would  be  suicidal  for  infantry  to  assume.  In  close  country, 
timbered,  or  rocky,  or  marshy,  the  horses,  from  being  a  help, 
become  a  hindrance,  and  infantry  is  much  to  be  preferred. 
The  cavalryman's  advantage  lies  only  in  his  horse's  speed,  and 


54  MILITARY  PRIMER 

the  fact  that  his  eyes  are  higher  above  the  ground  than  the 
infantryman's. 

The  function  of  a  patrol  is,  usually,  to  get  information. 
When  this  is  the  case,  the  commander  should  always  bear  in 
mind  that  at  least  one  man  of  the  patrol  must  get  back  with 
the  information  secured,  and  he  must  so  dispose  his  men  as 
to  make  this  possible. 

Distances  between  members  of  a  patrol  cannot  be  laid 
down,  except  that,  in  the  case  of  infantry  patrols,  they  should 
not  often  exceed  one  hundred  yards.  (Paragraph  611,  Infan- 
try Drill  Regulations.)  Cavalry  patrols  can  separate  much 
farther,  the  limit  being  that  of  easy  communication  by  pre- 
arranged signals. 

Since  the  chief  duty  of  small  patrols  is  to  get  information 
concerning  the  enemy,  and  to  transmit  it  to  their  commander, 
they  habitually  seek  safety  in  concealment  or  flight,  fighting 
only  when  their  mission  demands  it.  The  most  skillful  recon- 
noissance  patrolling  is  where  the  patrols  accomplish  their 
mission  without  being  discovered  by  the  enemy. 

Reconnoitering  patrols  are,  habitually,  small.  Small  patrols 
have  greater  mobility  than  larger  ones,  and  are  more 
easily  concealed.  In  hostile  territory,  small  patrols,  whose 
mission  requires  them  to  go  several  miles  from  the  main  body, 
are  usually  supported  by  larger  bodies,  nearer  to  them  than 
the  main  body.  These  supports  give  confidence  to  the  patrols, 
and  add  to  the  probability  that  information  about  the  enemy, 
secured  by  the  patrols,  will  be  transmitted  to  the  main  body, 
where  only,  in  the  general  case,  is  it  of  value. 

When  a  commander  decides  to  send  a  patrol  for  any  pur- 
pose, he  first  decides  on  its  strength.  This  should  be  large 
enough  to  insure  that  its  mission  will  be  accomplished,  and  no 
larger.  The  rule  is:  "Detach  for  a  patrol  as  few  men  as 
can  be  made  to  serve  its  purpose."  He  then  selects  its  leader. 
This,  in  certain  cases,  is  of  much  importance. 

When  a  patrol  is  given  a  mission  that  requires  it  to 
go  quite  a  distance  from  the  body  that  sent  it  out,  it  is  some- 
times called  a  distant,  or  strategic  patrol.  A  strategic  patrol 


THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS  55 

is  usually  a  mounted  patrol  that  is  sent  out  to  gain  informa- 
tion of  the  hostile  main  body.  Its  commander,  always  an  officer,  is 
given  as  much  information  as  is  known  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
plans  of  the  commander  sending  him  out.  The  members  of 
such  a  patrol  are  specially  selected  as  to  men  and  horses.  The 
patrol  will  avoid  all  conflict  not  essential  to  its  own  safety.  It 
is  charged  with  one  mission — that  of  obtaining  important  in- 
formation of  the  enemy,  and  of  transmitting  it  at  the  earliest 
moment  to  the  commander  who  sent  it  out.  It  neglects  all 
other  considerations. 

The  aeroplane,  or  dirigible  balloon,  is  now  used  to  do  most 
all  of  this  distant  reconnoissance. 

Other  patrols,  whose  missions  do  not  carry  them  so  far 
afield,  are  given  many  names,  each  descriptive  of  the  mission 
demanded  of  the  patrol.  They  are  called  visiting,  connecting, 
combat,  exploring,  reconnoitering,  flanking,  harassing,  pursu- 
ing patrols,  etc.,  but  their  mission,  in  any  case,  is  either  pro- 
tective, or  is  to  seek  information.  Patrols  that  seek  informa- 
tion, by  far  the  greatest  number  of  all  patrols  do  this,  are  called, 
generally,  reconnoitering  patrols. 

Reconnoitering  patrols,  while  seeking  information  of  the 
main  body,  in  a  general  way,  also  seek  all  information  that 
may  be  of  value  to  the  larger  bodies  in  their  rear.  A  strategic 
patrol,  sent  out  by  the  supreme  commander,  sends  its  reports 
rapidly  and  directly  to  him.  It  is  seldom  possible  for  such  a 
patrol  to  send  more  than  one  or  two  reports  a  day,  while  an 
ordinary  reconnoitering  patrol  sends  its  information  to  the 
particlar  officer  who  sent  it  out,  and  who,  being  generally  not 
far  from  the  patrol,  may  receive  frequent  messages.  Such  a 
commander,  if  of  no  more  rank  than  captain,  often  has  out  sev- 
eral patrols.  He  tabulates  the  reports  received  by  him,  from 
all  his  patrols,  and  sends  the  consolidated  report  to  his  imme- 
diate commander. 

The  information  sent  in  by  a  strategic  patrol  is  usually  not 
received  by  the  commander  early  enough  to  be  used  by  him 
the  day  it  is  collected.  Several  strategic  patrols  usually  pre- 
cede an  army  that  seeks  an  engagement  with  its  enemy.  The 


56  MILITARY  PRIMER 

commander  bases  his  plans  for  each  day,  as  a  rule,  on  the  in- 
formation received  by  him  from  all  sources  up  to  ten  or  eleven 
o'clock  the  night  before,  when  he  issues  his  order  for  the  fol- 
lowing day's  movements. 

The  information  sent  in  by  ordinary  reconnoitering  patrols 
is,  on  the  other  hand,  often  used  immediately  by  the  com- 
mander getting  it. 

The  leader  of  a  strategic  patrol  is  always  an  officer;  the 
leader  of  a  reconnoitering  patrol  may  be  an  officer,  a  non- 
commissioned officer,  or,  in  many  cases,  a  private  soldier. 
Efficient  reconnoisance  can  only  be  secured  by  skillful  patrol- 
ling, hence  the  leader  and  members  of  each  patrol  should  be 
selected  with  care,  consideration  always  being  taken  of  the 
mission  of  the  particular  patrol.  The  qualifications  described 
for  the  scout  are  necessary  for  the  members  of  all  important 
patrols — good  health,  strong  physique,  keen  eyesight,  good 
judgment,  presence  of  mind  and  courage,  combined  with  mili- 
tary experience  and  training,  are  the  essential  qualities.  Patrol 
leaders,  especially,  must  be  able  to  read  maps  accurately  and 
rapidly,  and  to  prepare  clear  and  concise  reports  and  messages. 

The  leader  of  the  patrol  should  be  equipped  with  a  map, 
watch,  field  glass,  compass,  message  blanks,  and  pencils. 

The  officer  sending  out  a  patrol  should  be  very  clear  and 
explicit  in  his  instructions,  and  should  be  certain  that  the 
leader  of  the  patrol  understands  them  fully.  These  instruc- 
tions should  state,  first,  what  is  known  of  the  whereabouts  of 
the  enemy,  and  of  neighboring  friendly  troops.  This  infor- 
mation is  necessary  for  the  patrol  leader  to  possess  in  order  to 
allow  him  to  work  with  intelligence  and  confidence.  The 
leader  must  know  his  own  mission — that  is,  what  it  is  expected 
he  will  do,  what  information  is  desired,  what  duty  performed, 
the  general  direction  to  be  followed,  when  he  is  to  return  to 
his  command,  and  where  he  will  find  it.  He  is  also  told  un- 
mistakably where  he  is  to  send  his  messages. 

His  instructions  should  be  general,  not,  except  in  special 
cases,  limiting  his  conduct  too  much.  He  is,  in  general,  told 
what  he  is  expected  to  do,  not  how  to  do  it. 


THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS  57 

In  general,  a  patrol  should  be  sent  out  for  one  definite  pur- 
pose only. 

Having  thoroughly  understood  his  mission — and  it  is 
always  wise  to  require  a  patrol  leader  to  repeat  his  mission 
to  the  officer  who  sends  him  out — the  leader  then  should 
thoroughly  inspect  the  members  of  his  patrol,  to  see  that  they 
are  fully  equipped  for  the  duty  required  of  them,  and  that,  in 
the  case  of  mounted  patrols,  each  horse  is  in  fit  condition  for 
the  work  expected  of  it. 

The  patrol  leader,  satisfied  with  the  personnel  and  equip- 
ment of  his  patrol,  next  should  orient  his  map,  assemble  his 
men  around  it,  and  go  over  the  situation  and  his  orders,  so 
that  each  man  may  go  about  his  task  intelligently. 

No  rules  can  be  laid  down  as  to  how  the  march  of  a  patrol 
should  be  conducted.  Each  situation  must  be  solved  as  it 
arises,  but,  whatever  formation  adopted,  it  should  favor  the 
escape  of  at  least  one  man  in  case  of  surprise. 

No  normal  formation  can  be  prescribed,  nor  should  an 
attempt  be  made  to  prescribe  one.  Every  patrol  should  march 
so  as  to  guard  against  surprise,  however,  and  to  insure  this  a 
certain  amount  of  dispersion  must  be  obtained.  Men  marcji- 
ing  in  front  of  a  deployed  patrol  are  termed  the  point.  Men, 
or  groups,  marching  to  the  right  or  left,  are  called  flankers. 
Those  following  in  rear  constitute  the  rear  point. 

As  stated  before,  the  distances  separating  the  parts  of  a 
dismounted  patrol  should  ordinarily  not  exceed  fifty  yards — 
seldom  a  hundred.  If  it  is  necessary  to  investigate  a  place 
more  distant  than  this  it  is  best  to  send  at  least  two  men  for 
the  duty. 

In  small  patrols  the  commander  usually  leads,  the  men 
following  at  such  distances  as  he  prescribes. 

Small  patrols  usually  avoid  cities  and  the  larger  villages. 
They  enter  small  villages  and  even  farm  enclosures  with  great 
caution.  To  reconnoiter  such  places,  the  patrol  usually  halts 
outside  the  village,  or  enclosure,  at  a  commanding  point,  and 
a  man  or  two  is  sent  to  investigate  the  place.  If  it  is  occupied 
the  whole  patrol  is  not  involved ;  if  empty  of  hostile  troops, 


58  MILITARY  PRIMER 

the  reconnoissance  of  the  place  can  be  completed  by  the 
smaller  patrol,  and,  afterwards,  the  entire  patrol  can,  by  a 
detour,  completely  avoid  the  possibility  of  an  ambuscade. 

When  it  becomes  necessary  for  a  patrol  to  be  scattered, 
the  leader  should  designate  a  place  of  assembly,  or,  in  certain 
cases  a  second  rendezvous,  when  the  first  is  found  impossible 
to  be  reached.  The  members  should  be  instructed  that,  in 
case  the  patrol  becomes  badly  scattered,  they  should  attempt 
to  rejoin  their  command  as  best  they  can ;  AT  LEAST  ONE  MAN 

SHOULD  GET  BACK  WITH   THE  INFORMATION  OBTAINED. 

While  advancing,  the  patrol  halts  on  commanding  points, 
and  scans  the  country  closely  in  all  directions.  The  map 
should  be  oriented,  and  important  landmarks  located.  It  is 
especially  important  to  look  frequently  to  the  rear,  so  that  the 
way  back  may  be  found  without  difficulty.  A  mounted  patrol, 
having  greater  mobility  than  a  dismounted  one,  often  finds  it 
advisable,  in  making  rapid  reconnoissance,  to  gallop  from  one 
high  point  to  another,  approaching  each  crest  with  caution, 
and  examining  each  succeeding  valley  carefully,  with  the  field 
glasses,  before  crossing  it.  Such  a  patrol  will  usually  find  it 
safer  to  return  by  a  different  route.  This  route  should  be 
determined  on  during  the  forward  movement. 

It  frequently  becomes  necessary,  when  approaching  the 
hostile  troops  more  nearly,  for  the  leader  of  the  patrol  to  con- 
ceal the  bulk  of  his  patrol,  and  continue  the  reconnoissance 
alone,  or  with  one  or  two  companions.  A  new  leader  for  the 
men  concealed  is  then  designated,  and  general  instructions  are 
given  him  what  to  do  in  case  the  leader  does  not  come  back 
by  a  specified  time;  whether  to  continue  the  reconnoissance, 
to  return  to  his  command,  or  to  go  to  an  appointed  rendezvous. 
These  instructions  must  be  given  liberally,  and  the  new  leader 
must  be  allowed  to  use  his  judgment  freely.  Any  instructions 
given  in  such  cases  must  always  be  given  subject  to  interfer- 
ence by  the  enemy. 

If  a  patrol  finds  it  necessary  to  remain  out  over  night,  it 
should  select  the  place  of  bivouac  before  dark,  but  should  go 
to  it  after  dark. 


THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS  59 

A  mounted  patrol  must  never  neglect  opportunities  for 
watering  and  feeding  the  horses.  During  a  campaign,  under 
the  best  conditions,  a  horse  remains  serviceable  but  a  short 
time.  His  well-being  should  be  his  rider's  greatest  concern. 
So,  at  each  halt,  allow  the  horse  to  graze.  Water  him  fre- 
quently. One  never  knows  how  far  it  may  be  to  the  next 
watering  place.  Hay  or  grain  taken  is  always  receipted  for 
to  the  owner,  so  that,  if  loyal,  he  may  recover  its  value  later  on. 

In  questioning  civilians,  in  hostile  country,  members  of  a 
patrol  must  be  careful  to  give  no  correct  information  concern- 
ing their  own  forces.  In  friendly  territory  care  must  be  taken 
to  disclose  nothing  that  it  would  be  of  advantage  to  the  enemy 
to  learn. 

All  military  persons  are  authorized  to  make  arrest  of  per- 
sons, during  actual  hostilities,  whenever  necessary,  reporting 
the  facts  at  the  earliest  opportunity.  Mail  matter  and  tele- 
grams may  be  seized,  examined,  and  even  destroyed,  if  it  is 
believed  that  such  a  course  will  be  of  benefit  to  the  State  or 
will  injure  the  enemy. 

When  returning  to  their  own  command,  and  if  there  is  no 
immediate  reason  for  haste,  patrols  march  quietly,  not  only  to 
avoid  causing  alarm  to  their  own  forces,  but  on  the  general 
principle  that  the  strength  of  men  and  horses  should  never  be 
needlessly  wasted. 

"INDICATIONS  OF  THE  ENEMY. — Nothing  should  escape  the 
observation  of  the  patrol.  The  slightest  indication  of  the 
enemy  should  be  reported  to  the  leader  at  once.  On  roads 
and  in  abandoned  camps,  signs  are  often  found  which  indicate 
the  number,  character,  and  condition  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
direction  in  which  he  is  marching.  Abandoned  clothing  or 
equipage  may  bear  marks  indicating  organizations. 

"A  thick  and  low  cloud  of  dust  indicates  infantry;  a  high 
and  thin  cloud,  cavalry;  a  broken  cloud,  artillery  or  wagon 
trains.  The  size  of  the  command  and  direction  of  march  may 
be  roughly  estimated  by  the  dust,  but  the  effect  of  wind  must 
be  considered. 


60  MILITARY  PRIMER 

"The  strength  of  a  body  of  troops  may  be  estimated  from 
the  length  of  time  it  takes  to  pass  a  given  point.  Assuming 
that  infantry  in  column  of  squads  occupies  half  a  yard  per  man, 
cavalry  1  yard  per  trooper,  and  artillery  in  single  column  20 
yards  per  gun  or  caisson,  a  given  point  would  be  passed  in 
one  minute  by  about — 

"175  infantry. 
"110  cavalry,  at  walk. 
"200  cavalry,  at  trot. 
"     5  guns  or  caissons. 

"For  troops  in  column  of  twos,  take  one-half  of  the  above 
estimates."* 

The  number  of  camp  fires  and  the  area  over  which  they 
are  spread  affords  an  estimate  of  the  strength  and  position  of 
the  enemy.  An  increase  in  the  number  or  area  of  fires  indi- 
cates new  arrivals.  Much  smoke  at  unusual  hours  indicates 
movement.  Such  signs,  however,  are  accepted  with  caution. 

Tracks  in  the  road  indicate  the  number  and  kind  of  troops 
and  the  direction  of  march.  Broad  trails  parallel  to  the  roads 
or  across  country  indicate  a  concentrated  march. 

The  following  rule  is  emphasized  in  our  Field  Service 
Regulations:  "When  it  is  certain  that  the  enemy  has  been 
discovered,  that  fact  is  promptly  reported."  This  does  not 
mean  that  at  the  first  sight  of  a  hostile  soldier  a  messenger  is 
at  once  dispatched  with  the  information  that  an  enemy  has 
been  seen.  On  the  contrary.  When  such  a  discovery  is 
made,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  patrol  leader  to  determine  the 
strength  of  the  immediate  party  to  which  the  man,  or  men, 
belongs — whether  a  single  scout,  a  reconnoitering  patrol,  a 
foraging  party,  a  patrol  of  an  advance,  rear,  or  flank  guard ; 
a  patrol  from  an  outpost,  etc.  The  patrol  leader  should 
exhaust  every  effort  to  learn  all  he  can  about  the  other  forces 
that  may  be  in  the  vicinity.  The  time  consumed  in  making 
this  investigation  is  well  spent,  if  he  can  inform  his  com- 
mander with  certainty  on  the  points  mentioned.  Information 
about  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  is  what  is  especially  desired. 


*  Paragraph  27,  Field  Service  Regulations,  U.  S.  Army,  1914. 


THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS  61 

When  a  hostile  party  is  discovered  approaching  a  patrol, 
it  is  necessary  to  withdraw  to  a  flank  of  his  line  of  advance, 
to  be  able  to  observe  what  is  following  him.  To  gain  this 
information  it  is  necessary  to  remain  concealed.  If  the  patrol 
leader  is  convinced  that  part  of  his  patrol  has  been  seen,  but 
not  all  of  it,  it  may  be  good  tactics  to  withdraw  the  part  he 
feels  sure  has  been  seen,  and  to  try,  with  the  remainder  of  the 
patrol,  to  continue  the  reconnoissance  unseen.  It  is  on  such 
occasions  that  the  ingenuity  and  skill  of  the  leader  is  especially 
tested. 

The  following  signals  are  prescribed  in  Paragraph  29,  F.  S. 
R.,  1914. 

"In  addition  to  the  usual  signals  prescribed  in  drill  regu- 
lations, the  following  should  be  clearly  understood  by  members 
of  a  patrol : 

"Enemy  in  sight  in  small  numbers,  hold  the  rifle  above  the 
head  horizontally;  enemy  in  force,  same  as  preceding,  raising 
and  lowering  the  rifle  several  times ;  take  cover,  a  downward 
motion  of  the  hand. 

"Other  signals  may  be  agreed  upon  before  starting,  but 
they  must  be  familiar  to  the  men;  complicated  signals  are 
avoided."  Signals  must  be  used  cautiously,  so  as  not  to  con- 
vey information  to  the  enemy. 

A  wood,  if  open  enough,  is  reconnoitered  by  passing 
through  in  line  of  skirmishers,  with  as  wide  intervals  as  pos- 
sible. If  the  underbrush  is  very  dense,  the  patrol  will  go 
through  the  woods  by  a  path,  or  a  road,  in  column  of  files : 
If  a  cross-road  is  met  in  the  wood,  the  patrol  is  halted,  and  the 
lateral  branches  are  examined  before  proceeding. 

In  approaching  the  crest  of  a  hill,  one  man  only,  usually 
the  leader,  creeps  up  to  the  crest,  and  looks  over  it,  while  the 
others  remain  concealed.  He  decides  on  his  line  of  action,  and 
then  signals  his  instructions  to  the  rest  of  the  patrol. 

Enclosures  surrounded  with  high  walls  should  be  very 
cautiously  reconnoitered  by  a  small  part  of  the  patrol,  the  rest 
coming  up  when  the  reconnoissance  is  completed.  Houses 


62  MILITARY  PRIMER 

should  be  reconnoitered  by  surrounding  them,  and  approach- 
ing them  from  opposite  directions.  Only  one  man  should 
enter. 

The  terrain  in  the  vicinity  of  an  army  should  be  constantly 
and  thoroughly  patrolled,  whether  the  enemy  is  at  hand  or 
not.  Vigilance  should  be  redoubled  when  contact  with  the 
enemy  is  lost. 

Patrolling  by  night  should  be  undertaken,  as  a  rule,  only 
with  special  objects  in  view.  Information  is  secured  with 
difficulty  in  the  dark,  and  is  apt  to  be  distorted  and  unreliable. 
While  the  danger  of  discovery  is  less  than  by  day,  the  results 
secured  are  also  less. 

Night  work,  in  the  service  of  information,  is  usually  con- 
fined to  traversing  country  where  discovery  by  day  would  be 
certain,  in  order  to  obtain  information  when  daylight  comes. 

Night  patrolling  over  ground  that  has  been  patrolled  by 
day,  should  be  done  by  the  same  men  that  patrolled  it  in  the 
daytime.  In  general,  the  men  should  be  selected  for  patrol- 
ling who  are  most  familiar  with  the  ground  to  be  patrolled. 

If  a  patrol  has  gone  as  far  as  its  orders  contemplate,  and 
discovers  nothing  of  the  enemy,  it  should  return,  and  the 
leader  should  report  fully  the  result  of  his  reconnoissance. 
Patrol  leaders  must  remember  that  this  is  expected  of  them  by 
their  commanders,  who  might  infer,  if  a  patrol  stayed  out 
too  long,  due  to  the  anxiety  of  its  leader  not  to  return  without 
definite  news  of  the  enemy,  that  he  had  met  the  enemy  and 
been  captured,  or  otherwise  prevented  from  returning.  There 
are  many  patrols  out  exploring  at  the  same  time,  and  it  is 
often  of  more  importance  to  a  commander  to  know  that  the 
enemy  is  not  in  a  certain  place,  than  to  get  no  report  because 
the  patrol  leader  was  hunting  for  the  enemy  farther  out  than 
he  was  expected  to  go. 

Patrols  should  exercise  the  same  caution  in  returning  as  in 
going  out. 

Members  of  small  reconnoitering  patrols  must  remember  that 
their  function  is  to  get  information  for  their  commander,  not  to 
fight ;  that  a  few  men  killed  by  them  will  not  affect  the  issue  of 


THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS  63 

the  war,  one  way  or  the  other,  and  unless  ordered  to  the  contrary, 
they  should  avoid  engagements.  Their  duty  is  best  performed 
when  information  is  secured  without  letting  the  enemy  know  of 
their  existence. 

The  information  secured  by  members  of  a  patrol  must  be  put 
in  shape  so  that  it  can  be  used  by  other  persons.  This  is  their 
report,  and,  if  possible,  it  should  be  in  writing,  and  accompanied 
by  a  map. 

A  patrol  leader,  during  the  course  of  his  reconnoissance,  may 
have  occasion  to  send  several  messages  to  his  commander,  keep- 
ing him  informed  of  his  movements,  and  of  the  results  of  his 
observations.  After  he  has  returned  from  his  reconnnoissance, 
he  should,  in  the  general  case,  make  his  report  at  once,  describing 
in  detail  everything  of  importance  that  he  has  learned. 

An  excellent  and  comprehensive  memorandum  for  the  use  of 
cavalry  scouts  and  vedettes  (outpost  sentinels)  is  printed  on 
waterproof  faced  linen,  "to  be  carried  inside  the  head-dress"  of 
the  British  soldier.  It  reads  as  follows : 

MEMORANDA  FOR 

CAVALRY  SCOUTS  AND  VEDETTES 

BY 

MAJOR-GENERAL  R.  S.  S.  BADEN-POWELL,  F.  R.  G.  S. 

SCOUTS 

When  scouting  alone,  or  as  one  of  the  patrol,  always  (1) 
notice  the  direction  in  which  you  are  to  work  (by  compass,  watch, 
sun,  stars,  wind,  or  landmarks)  ;  (2)  see  that  a  proper  lookout  is 
kept  for  enemy  near  and  far,  footprints  or  dustclouds  and  (3) 
remember  your  way  back  by  noticing  landmarks,  making  marks, 
etc. 

When  ordered  to  report  on  any  point,  give  the  information 
about  it  as  stated  below.  Make  your  report,  1st,  as  short  as  if  it 
were  a  telegram;  2nd,  full  information  as  for  an  officer  who 
has  never  seen  the  object  you  are  reporting  on. 

AMBUSH — Place  for  ambush  should  be  near  road,  well  hidden, 
with  line  of  escape.  BIVOUAC — Ditto,  ditto,  ditto. 


64  MILITARY  PRIMER 

BRIDGE — State  material,  length,  breadth,  height,  parapet,  num- 
ber of  arches,  repairing  materials. 

BUILDING — State  situation,  height,  size,  material,  roof,  en- 
closures. 

COUNTRY — State  open,  close,  or  wooded;  flat,  undulating,  or 
hilly;  fences,  cultivation. 

ENEMY — State  number,  arm,  what  doing,  whereabouts. 

FERRY,  FORD — State  width,  depth,  bottom,  banks,  boats. 

LAKE  OR  POND — State  width  and  length,  depth,  boats. 

LOOK-OUT — Note  look-out  places,  good  signalling  stations,  etc. 

HILLS  OR  MOUNTAINS — State  height,  steepness,  surface. 

POSITIONS  for  defense,  open  ground  to  front,  cover  for  de- 
fenders' line  of  retreat. 

RAILWAY — State  single  or  double,  width,  embanked  or  sunk, 
sleepers,  etc. 

RIVER  OR  STREAM — State  width,  depth,  bottom,  banks,  current, 
bridges,  boats. 

ROAD — State  whether  metalled,  fenced,  condition,  width,  sur- 
rounding country. 

STATIONS — State  length  and  number  of  platforms,  coal,  water, 
rolling  stock,  stores,  telegraphs. 

SUPPLIES — State  amount  of  food,  forage,  cattle,  crops,  ovens, 
carts,  and  horses. 

TELEGRAPH — State  number  of  wires,  height  and  material  of 
posts. 

TOWN  OR  VILLAGE — State  size,  situation,  defensibility,  large 
buildings,  supplies. 

WATER — State  how  obtained,  how  much  in  dry  weather,  size 
of  watering  places. 

WOODS — State  size,  density,  undergrowth,  height  of  trees, 
roads  through. 


These  memoranda  are  very  much  condensed,  and  are  to  be 
used  to  remind  the  scout  of  what  is  expected  in  his  report.  He 
has,  of  course,  been  thoroughly  taught,  in  school,  and  on  the  drill 
ground,  what  these  abbreviated  suggestions  mean. 

All  reports  should  be  clearly  stated,  "as  short  as  if  it  were  a 
telegram,"  but,  like  a  telegram,  with  no  necessary  word  left  out. 


THE  DUTIES  OF  PATROLS  65 

The  art  of  scouting  can  be  outlined  only,  in  books.  It  cannot 
be  learned  from  them,  but  must  be  learned  in  the  open  air,  each 
man  for  himself.  The  principles  are  few,  and  can  be  quickly 
stated ;  their  application  will  show  their  elasticity,  and  the  impos- 
sibility of  confining  them  to  definite  terms. 

A  lecture  on  Patrolling,  delivered  several  years  ago,  by  Gen- 
eral J.  F.  Morrison,  U.  S.  Army,  concludes  as  follows : 

"Bear  in  mind  that,  as  a  general  rule,  patrols  are  sent  out  to 
gain  information — not  to  fight.  Little  combats  between  individ- 
uals, or  patrols,  can  have  no  real  effect  on  the  greater  issue;  so 
as  a  rule  you  should  avoid  fighting.  But  don't  apply  this  rule  too 
generally;  it  has  numerous  exceptions. 

" Patrols,  sent  out  to  gain  some  specific  and  important  infor- 
mation, should,  as  a  rule,  avoid  fighting.  The  enemy's  patrols, 
however,  cannot  be  allowed  to  roam  without  danger,  but  even  so 
it  will  generally  be  better  to  entrust  their  intimidation  to  others 
than  the  special  patrols  sent  out  after  information. 

"A  patrol,  seeking  some  special  and  important  information, 
comes  near  to  a  point  where,  from  a  certain  position,  it  can  see 
and  gain  the  information  desired,  but  the  position  is  found  to  be 
occupied  by  the  enemy.  Careful  reconnoissance  leads  the  patrol 
leader  to  believe  he  is  at  least  equal  to  the  enemy  in  this  locality. 
A  vigorous  attack  is  justified  in  order  to  gain  the  view. 

"A  great  number  of  situations  can  be  drawn  but  it  is  not  neces- 
sary. For,  after  you  have  had  them  all  presented,  it  is  probable 
that  the  first  o$£  coming  up  in  the  field  would  be  different.  But 
if  you  have  grasped  the  principles,  you  can  solve  it.  Practice  is 
the  only  sure  help.  Make  problems  for  yourself  and  reason  out 
what  you  should  do  and  why,  and  soon  you  will  acquire  facility. 
Practice  on  the  ground  with  men  is  still  more  valuable. 

"One  important  point  I  want  to  impress  upon  you.  Get  in- 
formation back  to  headquarters  if  you  get  any.  At  many  maneu- 
vers, I  have  known  patrols  to  go  out,  see  the  enemy  and  never 
report  the  fact  until  long  after.  There  is  no  good  in  a  patrol 
gaining  information  if  it  is  not  sent  in  or  is  sent  in  after  th« 
enemy  attacks. 


66  MILITARY  PRIMER 

"The  necessity  and  importance  of  efficient  patrolling  and  re- 
connoissance  are  taught  by  the  history  of  war.  In  the  Civil  War 
it  was  neglected  in  many  cases  at  heavy  cost. 

"Such  was  the  case,  not  alone  in  this  war,  but  in  many  others. 
\Ye  have  not  been  the  only  offenders. 

"The  problems  presented  are  varied  and  require  for  their 
solution  men  varying  in  capacity,  from  the  average  private  to  the 
best  trained  staff  officer. 

"For  the  higher  class  of  patrol  leading  the  requirements  can- 
not be  learned  entirely  from  books.  The  leader  must  be  cool, 
determined,  and  persistent.  He  must  grasp  the  situation,  under- 
stand the  significance  of  what  he  sees  and  hears,  must  be  pos- 
sessed of  good  judgment  and  not  afraid  to  take  responsibility. 

"For  the  greater  part  of  the  many  patrols  required,  only  phys- 
ical strength  and  good  average  intelligence  are  necessary." 


CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  SOLUTION  OF  TACTICAL  PROBLEMS 

Before  you  commit  your  troops  to  any  definite  action,  make  up 
your  mind,  what  is  to  be  done,  what  obstacles  there  are  to  its  fulfill- 
ment, and  the  best  way  to  overcome  these  obstacles.  Then  push  it 
for  all  you  are  worth.  The  Japanese  Field  Service  Regulations  say:\ 
"To  act  resolutely  even  in  an  erroneous  manner  is  better  than  to 
remain  inactive  and  irresolute" 

In  war  every  commander,  from  the  leader  of  a  patrol  to  the 
general  commanding  an  army  is  compelled  to  go  through  certain 
mental  processes  as  he  advances  from  step  to  step  in  the  solution 
of  his  problems. 

These  mental  processes  may  be  concisely  stated  to  be  three 
in  number — first  comes  the  estimate  of  the  situation,  sizing  up 
the  situation  you  are  in,  viewed  from  all  its  angles.  This  pro- 
cess is  like  that  of  the  physician  who  visits  a  patient  for  the  first 
time.  He  wishes  to  know  all  that  can  be  learned  about  the  con- 
dition of  the  patient  before  he  attempts  to  prescribe  for  him. 
This  preliminary  survey  the  physician  calls  his  diagnosis ;  the 
soldier,  his  estimate  of  the  situation. 

The  next  mental  process  is  the  commander's  decision — what 
he  decides  to  do  to  overcome  the  forces  opposed  to  him  by  the 
enemy  in  the  situation  in  which  he  finds  himself. 

The  final  step  is  the  issuing  of  an  order  carrying  this  decision 
into  effect. 

This  seems  to  be  a  formidable  process,  but  it  is  not,  except  to 
the  beginner.  At  first  it  will  require  time  and  what  would  seem 
to  be  considerable  laborious  thought  to  work  out  a  solution  along 
these  lines.  It  is  good  practice  for  the  student,  inexperienced  in 
solving  problems,  to  actually  write  out  his  estimate,  his  decision, 
and  finally  his  order  to  put  the  decision  into  effect.  This  of  course 
will  require  much  more  time  than  will  ordinarily  be  at  a  com- 
mander's disposal  in  solving  a  problem  presented  by  actual  war 
conditions.  But  the  value  is  in  the  training  it  gives  in  thinking 
along  the  right  lines,  and  toward  the  correct  objectives.  What  at 
first  seems  to  be  difficult  and  to  consume  a  prohibitive  amount  of 
time  comes  with  practice  to  be  an  action  quickly  and  effectively 


68  MILITARY  PRIMER 

consummated,  and  an  estimate  of  the  situation,  instead  of  being 
a  long  drawn  out  written  process,  becomes  a  rapid  turning 
over  in  the  mind,  trained  to  do  that  very  thing,  of  the  proper  con- 
siderations in  the  proper  order.  After  solving  a  few  simple  prob- 
lems following  this  sequence,  it  becomes  evident  to  the  student 
that  this  is  the  logical  and  natural  way  to  go  about  it.  This 
sequence  is  that  laid  down  for  its  students  by  the  Department  of 
Military  Art,  at  the  U.  S.  Service  Schools,  Fort  Leavenworth, 
Kansas,  and  applies,  as  said  above,  with  equal  force  to  the  single 
scout,  the  leader  of  a  patrol,  or  the  commander  of  army. 
In  this  mental  process  consider : 

1.  YOUR    MISSION — What    special    thing    are    you    to    do? 
What  does  your  superior  expect  of  you?    You  must  have  a  mis- 
sion, and  it  must  be  kept  clearly  in  your  mind. 

2.  FORCES — The  strength  and  location  of  your  own  and  the 
enemy's  forces,  and  all  that  you  can  learn  of  the  latter. 

3.  CONDITIONS — Consider    all    the    conditions    surrounding 
your  problem.     The  weather  and  condition  of  the  roads;  the 
morale,  activity  and  aggressiveness  of  the  enemy;  the  state  of 
efficiency  of  your  own  command ;  in  short,  everything  that  will 
affect  your  problem  either  favorably  or  unfavorably. 

4. — WHAT  WILL  THE  ENEMY  PROBABLY  Do? — What  would 
you  do  if  you  were  in  his  place,  under  existing  circumstances? 

5.  THE  TERRAIN — How  does  the  terrain  you  must  work  over 
affect  your  problem  ? 

6.  COURSES  OPEN — In  how  many  and  what  different  ways 
may  you  accomplish  your  mission?    Go  over  them  all,  considering 
the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  each. 

THEN  COME  TO  YOUR  DECISION — Decide  which  of  the  courses 
considered  is  best  calculated  to  enable  you  to  successfully  execute 
your  mission,  and  having  come  to  a  decision,  do  not  change  it; 
forget  all  the  other  courses  open  to  you,  and  concentrate  all  your 
energies  on  the  one  adopted. 

AND  THEN  ISSUE  YOUR  ORDERS  TO  CARRY  OUT  THE  PLAN  YOU 
HAVE  ADOPTED. 

The  art  of  war  may  be  studied  in  several  ways.  By  the  care- 
ful study  of  military  history  you  can  learn  how  wars  in  the  past 


THE  SOLUTION  OF  TACTICAL  PROBLEMS        69 

have  been  lost  and  won ;  what  tactical  combinations  have  been 
successful  and  what  have  failed.  But  no  student  will  ever  arrive 
at  a  correct  knowledge  of  tactics  by  this  sort  of  study  alone.  It 
must  be  supplemented  by  practical  applications  of  the  principles 
of  tactics  to  concrete  cases. 

These  practical  applications  may  be  in  the  form  (a)  of  map 
problems,  where  certain  situations  are  imposed,  as  to  the  strength 
and  location  of  troops,  the  weather,  and  so  forth.  The  student, 
with  these  data  in  mind,  is  given  a  mission,  and,  with  the  help  of 
a  map,  he  writes  his  solution  of  the  problem. 

(b)  The  application    may    take    the    form  of  a  war  game, 
where  the  solutions  are  made  directly  on  the  map,  using  bits  of 
colored  paper  to  represent  the  troops  involved  in  the  problem, 
moving  them  under  the  supervision  of  a  director,  who  acts  also 
as  an  umpire. 

(c)  Another  application  takes  the  form  of  a  tactical  walk 
or  ride,  where  the  terrain  for  the  problem  is  real,  but  the  troops 
are  all  imaginary. 

(d)  The  field  maneuver  is  the  completest  practicable  form 
of  applying  tactical  principles  to  concrete  cases.     Here  not  only 
the  terrain,  but  the  troops  employed  as  well,  are  real. 

In  all  these  applicatory  methods  of  studying  tactics,  certain 
situations  are  imagined.  These  are  called  general  and  spe- 
cial situations. 

General  situations  contain  only  such  information  as  would 
naturally  be  in  the  possession  of  both  sides  in  a  war,  while 
special  situations  give  out  such  information  as,  in  war,  would 
ordinarily  be  possessed  by  only  one  side. 

To  illustrate  this  method  of  estimating  a  situation,  consider 
the  following  problem : 

GENERAL  SITUATION  : 

Guide  Map. 

The  Susquehanna  River  separates  two  warring  States.  Blue, 
Eastern,  forces  have  invaded  Red,  Western,  territory.  Blue  main 
forces  are  in  the  vicinity  of  Carlisle.  The  main  Red  advance  is 


70  MILITARY  PRIMER 

from  Chambersburg  on  Carlisle,  but  the  country  is  intensely 
hostile ;  partisan  and  guerrilla  bands  are  hanging  on  the  flanks  of 
the  Blue  army. 

SPECIAL  SITUATION 
Guide,  Strategic,  and  Topographical  Maps. 

You  command  a  Blue  officer's  patrol  (strategic)  of  eight  men. 
Your  mission  is  to  locate  the  main  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
reported  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of  Hanover,  to  inform  your  com- 
mander at  York  Springs  (Guide  Map)  when  you  have  located 
him,  and  to  keep  in  touch  with  him  until  relieved.  You  sent  two 
identical  messages  to  York  Springs  last  night,  by  two  pairs  of 
messengers,  that  you  had  located  a  large  cavalry  command  that 
camped  last  night  near  McSherrytown,  on  the  south  branch  of  the 
Conewago  river  (Strategic  Map). 

From  a  hidden  spot  on  the  ridge  southwest  of  Centennial  you 
saw  them  break  camp  this  morning,  and  march  north  towards 
Irishtown.  You  started  to  follow  along  their  flank,  in  an  effort 
to  keep  in  touch  with  them.  Their  flanking  groups  were  very 
active,  and  kept  pushing  your  patrol  to  the  west.  A  large  Red 
patrol  has  pursued  you  to  593,  one  mile  southeast  of  Cedar  Ridge, 
where  you  shake  off  pursuit,  and,  by  the  roads  to  the  north,  you 
reach  584,  one-half  mile  east  of  Brush  Run  on  the  York  Turn- 
pike, where  all  trace  of  the  enemy  is  lost.  It  is  8  :00  a.  m.,  July 
llth. 

Now  to  estimate  the  situation : 

1.  MISSION — You  have  accomplished  the  first  part  of  your 
mission — you  have  located  the  hostile  cavalry,  and  have  notified 
your  commander.     There  is  left  of  your  original  mission  to  re- 
gain touch  and  to  keep  it  until  you  are  relieved. 

2.  FORCES — You  are  ten  miles  south  of  your  own  command ; 
you  have  eight  men,  and  can  count  on  no  help  nearer  than  York 
Springs.     The  enemy  is  in  force  near  you,  and  is  well  screened 
(witness  how  his  patrols  forced  you  away  from  his  flank  this 
morning),  the  country  is  bitterly  hostile,  and  overrun  with  par- 
tisan and  guerrilla  bands.    It  is  a  fair  presumption  that  they  are 


THE  SOLUTION  OF  TACTICAL  PROBLEMS        71 

nearer  the  main  Blue  forces  than  your  'vicinity,  but  it  is  possible 
that  you  may  meet  hostile  forces  anywhere.  You  know  of  no 
other  Red  forces  anywhere  near. 

3. — CONDITIONS — Few  conditions  favorable  to  your  mission 
exist.  Assume  the  day  to  be  bright,  the  roads  not  very  dusty, 
and  that  you  have  a  copy  of  the  Strategic  Map.  The  enemy  is 
aggressive  and  apparently  in  good  morale.  Your  own  patrol  has 
been  out  all  night,  and  men  and  horses  are  not  as  fresh  and  vig- 
orous as  they  should  be.  The  country  is  'pen  and  unfavorable 
for  concealment ;  this  works  more  in  your  favor  than  in  the 
enemy's,  because  there  is  so  much  more  of  him  to  be  seen. 

4.  WHAT  WILL  THE  ENEMY  PROBABLY  Do  ? — He  knows  all 
about  the  Blue  forces  and  movements  because  the  people  of  the 
country  will  tell  him ;  he  is  looking  for  a  fight,  and  your  main  body 
is  at  York  Springs.    So  he  is  probably  headed  for  that  place,  and 
probably  by  the  New  Oxford — Newchester  road,  or  by  the  Car- 
lisle and  Baltimore  Pike. 

5.  TERRAIN — The  country  is    generally    rolling,    with  two 
stream  valleys — the  Conewago  and  Little  Conewago — cutting  it 
at  right  angles  to  each  other.    There  are  small  patches  of  timber 
here  and  there,  and  the  roads  generally  run  along  the  higher 
ground. 

6.  COURSES  OPEN — (a)     You  may  go  back  towards  Irish- 
town,  by  the  road  to  the  southeast.    Just  east  of  532  is  an  open 
nose,  between  540  and  560  elevation.    Here  you  would  get  a  view 
of  the  roads  leading  towards  New  Oxford  from  the  south.    You 
could  cross  the  Little  Conewago,  but  your  line  of  retreat  would 
then  lie  back  over  the  road  you  came,  or  else  through  New  Ox- 
ford.   Considering  the  temper  of  the  people,  would  it  be  wise  to 
enter  New  Oxford  with  so  small  a  patrol  ? 

(b)  You  may  go  to  546,  six  hundred  yards  to  the  east  of 
your  present  position,  on  the  military  crest.  Here  you  would  get 
a  view  of  the  valley  of  the  Little  Conewago,  and  of  the  roads 
leading  from  the  south  into  New  Oxford,  and  of  the  roads  from 
New  Oxford  to  Newchester  and  to  the  Carlisle — Baltimore  Pike. 
Your  line  of  retreat  is  open.  But  here  you  would  have  to  wait 
for  the  Red  column  to  appear.  This  would  be  a 'passive  recon- 
noissance.  Suppose  the  Red  cavalry  did  not  come  to  New  Oxford 


72  MILITARY  PRIMER 

at  all,  but  swung  off  to  the  northeast  from  Irishtown,  by  the  Red 
Hill  School,  and  thence  paralleling  the  East  Berlin  Railway  ? 

(c)  You  might  go,  by  568 — 520,  to  the  north,  cross  the  Con- 
ewago  at  the  ford  at  the  mouth  of  the  Little  Conewago,  and  take 
a  position  of  observation  on  the  high  ground  near  by — a  place 
with  a  good  view  to  the  south  and  southeast.  If  the  Reds  go  by 
Newchester  you  can  observe  them  easily — if  by  the  Baltimore 
Pike  you  can  follow  by  the  roads  to  the  north.  But,  suppose 
they  did  not  go  north  of  Irishtown  at  all,  but  swung  northwest 
by  Cedar  Ridge  towards  Hunterstown,  or  to  the  northeast  along 
the  East  Berlin  Railway?  You  would  miss  them  altogether  in 
that  case. 

PROBLEM — What  would  be  your  decision  ? 

NOTE:  Before  proceeding,  the  student  should  come  to  a  decision 
as  to  what  plan  he  would  pursue,  under  the  conditions  existing  at 
this  moment. 

At  8  :10  a.  m.,  just  as  the  patrol  leader  had  made  the  decision 
that  he  would  go  southeast  to  532,  and,  if  he  saw  nothing  of  the 
enemy  from  there,  would  go  to  Kohler  School  and  then  to  the 
shelter  of  some  woods  near  596,  a  Blue  patrol  of  a  lieutenant 
and  six  men  was  seen  coming  from  Brush  Run.  The  lieutenant 
made  this  report :  "Your  message  of  last  night  reached  the  Gen- 
eral at  about  11  o'clock.  He  ordered  me  to  assist  in  the  recon- 
noissance  of  the  Blue  cavalry.  He  will  move  with  his  entire  com- 
mand to  the  vicinity  of  Round  Hill,  where  he  should  be  now.  I 
came  by  Guernsey  and  crossed  the  Conewago  at  the  Bridge 
School,  avoiding  Hunterstown  to  the  north,  and  saw  no  Red 
troops." 

The  commander  of  the  first  patrol  was  the  senior  of  the  two 
officers.  He  now  had  a  command  large  enough  to  split,  and  so 
should  be  able  to  decide  on  a  sure  plan  to  regain  touch  with  the 
Red  cavalry.  This  plan  he  would  express  to  the  other  officer  in 
the  form  of  an  order. 

We  are  expressly  warned  by  all  authoritative  military  writers 
to  avoid  adherence  to  fixed  forms  in  issuing  orders.  General  von 
Schellendorf,  German  Army,  on  pages  566  and  567  of  his  book, 
The  Duties  of  the  General  Staff,  says : 

"Though  in  peace  the  adherance  to  'approved  models'  does  not 
lead  to  any  very  serious  or  irreparable  mistakes,  there  is  always 


THE  SOLUTION  OF  TACTICAL  PROBLEMS  73 

the  danger  of  acquiring  habits  which  are  unsuitable  on  active  ser- 
vice, and  of  discouraging  originality  of  thought.  For  this  reason 
the  'normal  orders,'  'normal  formations'  and  'normal  forms  of 
attack'  which  are  to  be  found  in  many  textbooks  and  pocketbooks 
for  every  possible  case  which  may  arise,  should  be  expressly  dis- 
couraged, for  the  right  form  to  meet  any  particular  case  will  only 
be  lighted  on  by  chance. 

"A  commander  will  only  issue  satisfactory  orders  when  he 
sees  clearly  the  objective  required  by  the  situation,  and  when  he 
has  made  up  his  mind  how  the  objective  can  be  attained  in  the 
simplest  and  best  way.  But  the  duties  to  be  carried  out  in  war 
are  often  full  of  responsibility,  usually  the  most  difficult  which 
fall  to  the  lot  of  mortal  man.  For  it  is  not  the  weal  or  woe  of  the 
individual  which  is  at  stake,  but  the  lives  of  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  men,  and  the  fate  of  the  nation.  The  man  who  attempts 
to  remember  the  model  which  he  has  so  often  tested  in  peace  will 
surely  fail  in  the  hour  of  trial. 

"The  ceaseless  progress  of  the  Art  of  War  in  all  its  aspects 
is  continually  rendering  it  necessary  to  discard  as  obsolete  and 
impracticable  many  methods  which  but  a  short  time  before 
seemed  to  guarantee  success.  Every  fresh  campaign  brings  with 
it  astonishing  phenomena  not  previously  dreamt  of,  in  face  of 
which  a  commander  who  is  not  accustomed  to  think  for  himself 
in  peace  stands  confounded.  But  the  man  who  has  learnt  by 
ceaseless  toil  in  time  of  peace  to  rely  upon  his  own  judgment,  and 
has  altogether  abstained  from  the  use  of  'normal  formations'  and 
'models,'  will  be  able  to  deal  effectively  in  war  with  unexpected 
and  unprecedented  incidents." 

To  the  campaigns  of  the  great  war  which  began  in  August  of 
1914  does  this  last  paragraph  particularly  apply.  Commanders 
have  met  new  weapons,  new  methods  of  fighting,  new  conditions 
of  warfare,  and,  in  times  of  greatest  stress  and  danger,  have  had 
to  devise  the  means  to  contend  with  them  or  go  down  to  defeat. 
There  has  been  no  place  for  those  who  have  been  trained  to  rule 
of  thumb. 

However,  it  has  been  agreed  that  certain  things  are  essential 
to  an  intelligent  comprehension  of  an  order,  and  it  has  become  a 
common  practice  to  establish  the  sequence  of  these  things  in  a 


74  MILITARY  PRIMER 

certain  way,  so  that  none  of  the  essentials  shall  be  left  out  of  the 
order,  and,  as  you  shall  see,  this  sequence  of  expression  in  no  way 
violates  General  von  Schellendorf's  rule.  All  orders  can  be  ex- 
pressed in  five  paragraphs. 

Paragraph  1  should  give  what  information  is  in  the  possession 
of  the  officer  issuing  the  order  about  the  enemy  and  his  own 
supporting  troops. 

Paragraph  2  gives  the  plan  of  the  commander. 
Paragraph  3  indicates  what  troops  are  to  execute  this  plan, 
and  the  mission  of  each  unit. 

Paragraph  4  concerns  the  baggage  trains  and  such  other  aux- 
iliaries as  do  not  accompany  the  combatant  troops. 

Paragraph  5  contains  directions  where  to  send  messages  or  to 
ask  for  farther  orders  or  instructions — usually  where  the  com- 
mander can  be  found. 

Fixing  this  sequence  in  mind  it  soon  becomes  automatic,  and 
correctly  worded  orders  follow  naturally,  once  a  decision  is 
reached. 

Now  to  go  back  to  our  situation :  The  senior  lieutenant  said 
to  the  other  one,  in  the  hearing  of  the  whole  patrol — paragraph 
1  of  his  order — "A  large  Red  cavalry  command  camped  list 
night  near  McSherrystown."  (Indicating  on  the  map  the  spot 
where  he  saw  them.)  "They  moved  north  towards  Irishtown  this 
morning.  I  lost  track  of  them  an  hour  ago — was  chased  from 
here"  (pointing)  "to  here,  where  I  escaped  through  these  woods. 
You  say  our  main  body  is  near  Round  Hill  now. 

"I  shall"  (paragraph  2  of  the  order)  "seek  to  regain  touch 
with  the  Red  cavalry  at  once. 

"Go"  (paragraph  3)  "south  along  this  ridge"  (pointing  along 
the  ridge  towards  Square  Corner)  "keeping  a  sharp  lookout  for 
traces  of  the  enemy.  I  shall  swing  around  to  the  northeast  with 
the  same  object  in  view.  Do  not  attempt  to  rejoin  me." 

There  are  no  impedimenta,  so  no  paragraph  4  concerning 
them. 

"Send  messages"  (paragraph  5)  "to  the  main  body  near 
Round  Hill." 


THE  SOLUTION  OF  TACTICAL  PROBLEMS        75 

It  is  necessary  to  learn  the  sequence  of  this  order  thoroughly. 
It  is  a  device  to  insure  that  all  the  essentials  of  an  order  are  in- 
cluded in  it.  It  has  been  seen  that  the  form  is  appropriate  for 
use  in  directing  the  movements  of  a  patrol ;  it  is  equally  appro- 
priate to  direct  a  field  army.  Learn  it  well. 

See  Applied  Minor  Tactics,  p.  184-C,  and  Estimating  the  Sit- 
uation, page  189,  Appendix,  for  a  continuation  of  this  subject. 


76  MILITARY  PRIMER 


SEQUENCE  OF  ORDERS 

Paragraph  1 

Give  what  information  you  wish  your  subordinate  to  have 
concerning  the  enemy  and  your  own  supporting  troops. 
Usually  you  will  give  him  all  the  information  you  have. 

Paragraph  2 

Give  your  plan  of  operations. 

Paragraph  3 

Indicate  what  troops  are  to  carry  out  this  plan,  and  the 
mission  of  each  unit. 

Paragraph  4 

Tell  what  is  to  be  done  with  the  baggage  trains  and  non- 
combatant  troops. 

Paragraph  5 

Tell  where  to  send  messages  or  to  ask  for  future  orders  or 
instructions.  This  is  usually  done  by  indicating  where  the 
commander  may  be  found. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

MESSAGES. 

"The  first  contact  with  the  hostile  infantry  must  always  be  re- 
ported."— Von  Bernhardi,  Cavalry  in  War  and  Peace^  page  60. 

Not  only  must  a  scout  or  patrol  leader  collect  information 
desired  by  the  officer  who  sends  him  out,  but  he  must  get  that 
information  to  that  officer  in  time  for  him  to  use  it  in  the  de- 
velopment of  his  plans. 

Information  is  transmitted  in  the  form  of  a  message,  either 
verbal  or  written,  sent  by  messenger,  by  visual  signals,  by  tele- 
phone or  telegraph. 

The  message  itself  must  be  brief  and  clear.  The  source  of 
the  information  contained  in  it  must  always  be  stated,  and  the 
sender  must  carefully  separate  what  he  has  actually  seen  from 
that  he  has  received  second  hand. 

"Written  messages  must  be  clear  and  definite.  Expres- 
sions depending  upon  the  viewpoint  of  the  observer,  such  as 
right,  left,  in  front  of,  behind,  on  this  side,  beyond,  etc.,  are 
avoided,  reference  being  made  to  points  of  the  compass  instead. 
The  terms  right  and  left,  however,  may  be  applied  to  indi- 
viduals or  bodies  of  men,  or  to  the  banks  of  a  stream ;  in  the 
latter  case  the  observer  is  supposed  to  be  facing  down  stream. 
The  terms  right  flank  and  left  flank  are  fixed  designations. 
They  apply  primarily  to  the  right  and  left  of  a  command 
when  facing  the  enemy  and  do  not  change  when  the  command 
is  retreating.  The  head  of  a  column  is  its  leading  element, 
no  matter  in  what  direction  the  column  is  facing;  the  other 
extremity  is  the  tail. 

"To  minimize  the  possibility  of  error,  geographical  names 
are  written  or  printed  in  ROMAN  CAPITALS;  when  the  spelling 
does  not  conform  to  the  pronunciation,  the  latter  is  shown 
phonetically  in  parentheses,  thus:  BICESTER  (Bister),  GILA 
(Hee-la). 


7S  MILITARY  PRIMER 

"When  two  or  more  places  or  features  on  the  map  have 
the  same  name  they  are  distinguished  by  referene  to  other 
points. 

"A  road  is  designated  by  connecting  two  or  more  names 
or  places  on  the  road  with  dashes,  thus :  LEAVENWORTH — LOWE- 
MONT — ATCHISON  road. 

"Write  all  messages  in  a  clear,  round  hand,  so  distinct  as 
to  be  clearly  legible  even  in  a  bad  light. 

"When  a  message  is  to  be  sent  by  telegraph  it  should  be 
written  and  handed  to  the  operator,  not  dictated  to  him. 
When  a  telephone  is  used,  the  person  to  whom  the  message  is 
addressed  should,  if  possible,  be  called  to  the  receiving  end  of 
the  wire.  The  telephone  is  less  reliable  than  the  telegraph, 
and,  on  a  busy  wire,  the  receiving  operator  is  apt  to  distort  the 
message. 

"Messages  carried  by  messenger  are  usually  enclosed  in 
envelopes,  properly  addressed.  When  the  message  is  regarded 
as  confidential  it  is  sealed,  marked  confidential,  and  hastened 
directly  to  its  destination.  If  not  a  confidential  message,  it 
should  be  unsealed,  the  messenger  should  know  its  contents, 
verbatim,  and  it  is  proper  that  commanders  along  the  line 
should  know  its  contents., 

"Upon  the  envelope  is  written  the  name  of  the  messenger, 
his  time  of  departure  and  rate  of  speed.  The  latter  is  indi- 
cated as  follows:  Ordinary,  rapid,  urgent.  Ordinary  means 
about  five  miles  an  hour  for  a  mounted  man;  rapid,  about 
seven  or  eight  miles  an  hour;  and  urgent,  the  highest  speed 
consistent  with  certainty  of  arrival  at  destination. 

"Important  information  is  sent  by  two  or  more  messengers, 
depending  on  the  dangers  of  the  road.  A  single  messenger  is 
not  so  confident,  and  something  may  happen  to  him,  or  to  his 
horse.  It  may  also  be  advisable  to  send  duplicate  messages 
by  different  routes.  Messengers  are  informed,  before  start- 
ing, of  the  purport  of  the  message,  and  where  they  are  to 
report  after  it  is  delivered.  A  messenger  need  not  alter  his 
pace  when  passing  superiors." 


MESSAGES  79 

The  above  quotations  are  taken  from  the  Field  Service 
Regulations,  and  are,  like  everything  else  in  that  manual,  much 
condensed.  Certain  very  important  matters  are  not  touched 
on  at  all.  The  patrol  leader  who  has  to  send  a  message  should 
answer  these  two  questions  before  he  writes  it:  "What  is  it 
that  my  chief  wants  to  know?  How  can  I  write  the  knowl- 
edge that  I  possess  briefly  and  yet  make  it  unmistakably 
clear?" 

Return  now  to  the  situation  discussed  in  the  last  Chapter. 
Consider  the  message  sent  the  night  before  the  problem  opens, 
when  the  camp  of  the  Red  cavalry  near  McSherrystown  had 
been  discovered. 

To  simplify  the  discussion,  the  student  will  now  consider 
himself  the  leader  of  this  patrol. 

You  have  discovered  a  "large  cavalry  command"  in  camp. 
You  want  to  tell  your  chief,  at  York  Springs,  about  it.  He  is 
a  busy  man,  and  does  not  want  to  waste  time  over  your  mes- 
sage. So,  in  the  first  place,  you  must  write  your  message  in  a 
clear,  round  hand.  He  may  be  awakened  from  a  profound 
sleep  by  your  messenger,  and  may  have  only  a  match  or  a 
candle  to  read  it  by,  so  use  large  characters,  making  each  letter 
distinct  and  ALWAYS  WRITE  GEOGRAPHICAL 
NAMES,  IN  MESSAGES  OR  ORDERS,  IN  ROMAN 
CAPITALS.  If  two  places  near  by  have  the  same  or  similar 
names,  identify  the  one  you  mean  by  some  other  neighboring 
place. 

Give  the  location  where  the  message  was  written  unmis- 
takably, and  the  date  and  hour  the  messenger  started  with  it. 
Put  nothing  in  the  message  that  will  not  be  of  value  to  your 
chief. 

Certain  of  the  details  of  the  things  you  have  seen  may  be 
of  tremendous  interest  to  you — you  may  have  had  a  fight; 
perhaps  some  of  your  men  and  horses  were  killed ;  you,  your- 
self, may  have  been  wounded — but  unless  these  incidents  have 
a  direct  bearing  on  your  mission,  do  not  recount  them  in  your 
message.  Limit  that  to  such  facts  as  will  be  of  value  to  your 
chief  in  the  development  of  his  plans. 


80  MILITARY  PRIMER 

What  is  it,  in  this  instance  that  your  chief  wants  you  to 
find  out?  It  is  this:  "Where  is  the  Red  cavalry?  How 
strong  are  they?  Where  are  they  going?"  You  have  found 
them.  Then  went  into  camp  this  afternoon  at  McSherrys- 
town. 

"Where  did  they  come  from  ?"  That  is  not  material. 
"How  many  of  them  are  there?"  That  is  most  material. 
How  are  you  going  to  find  it  out?  Their  outposts  prevent  you 
from  getting  any  nearer.  You  must,  since  you  cannot  count 
them,  find  out  how  large  their  camp  is,  tell  him,  and  let  your 
chief  estimate  their  numbers.  Assume  that  they  are  camp- 
ing in  the  fields  on  both  sides  of  the  McSherrystown-Centen- 
nial  road,  along  the  South  Conewago,  and  that  their  camps 
stretch  along  the  river  for  a  mile.  You  can  see  and  be  sure  of 
that  much.  Their  wagons  were  coming  in  at  dark;  you 
counted  some  of  them,  but  they  were  still  coming  when  it 
became  too  dark  to  see  more,  so  your  count  is  worth  little.  In 
the  last  sentence  of  your  message  tell  your  chief  your  own 
plans. 

Your  message  would  then  read : 

From  Lieut.  A 's   patrol. 

At  hill  1  mile  southwest  of  CENTENNIAL. 
Date:  14  Nov.,  1912.    5:15  P.  M.    No.  1 
To:    C.  O.  Blue  Detachment. 

YORK  SPRINGS,  PA. 

There  is  a  Red  cavalry  camp  on  the  right  bank  of  the  SOUTH 
CONEWAGO  River,  one  mile  northwest  of  McSHERRYSTOWN.  Camp 
extends  along  the  stream  for  about  one  mile.  I  remain  in  observation 

(Signed)  A , 

Lieutenant. 

This  is  enclosed  in  an  envelope,  addressed  to  the  Com- 
manding Officer,  Blue  Detachment,  York  Springs,  and  the 
name  of  the  messenger,  the  hour  he  left,  and  the  authorized 
rate  of  speed — ordinary,  rapid,  or  urgent — are  noted  on  the 
envelope. 

In  order  that  this  very  important  message  may  surely 
reach  your  chief,  you  send  it  in  duplicate,  by  two  pairs  of 
messengers.  You  direct  one  pair  to  use  the  Carlisle  and  Bal- 
timore Pike;  the  other  to  take  the  roads  to  the  west  of  New 


MESSAGES  81 

Oxford  and  Newchester.     All  the  messengers  are  told  what 
the  message  contains. 

Here  is  another  problem. 

GENERAL  SITUATION. 

The  boundary  between  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  (Guide 
Map)  is  the  frontier  between  two  nations  at  war.  Blue 
forces  coming  from  the  south  are  approaching  this  frontier.  Red 
forces  of  considerable  strength  are  advancing  on  Gettysburg 
from  the  north. 

SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 

Desiring  to  locate  the  main  Red  forces,  and  to  determine 
their  strength,  the  Blue  commander  sends  out  a  number  of 
strategic  patrols.  One  such  patrol  is  ordered  to  go  by  Lit- 
tlestown  (the  northern  edge  of  Littlestown,  is  cut  by  ths  south- 
ern edge  of  the  Strategic  Map,  four  miles  from  its  southeast 
corner)  towards  Round  Hill  (on  the  northern  edge  of  the 
Topographical  Map)  with  instructions  'to  seek  for  informa- 
tion of  movements  of  Red  troops  in  that  vicinity." 

To  support  these  strategic  patrols,  the  Blue  commander 
followed  them  up  with  a  squadron  of  cavalry  that  was  ordered 
to  go  to  Littlestown.  The  patrol  leaders  were  directed  to  send 
all  messages  to  the  commander  of  this  squadron. 

The  patrol  consists  of  eight  men.  The  leader  is  an  officer. 
The  patrol  has  reached  584,  Topographical  Map,  on  the  York 
Turnpike,  without  incident.  The  weather  is  fine,  clear,  and 
warm.  It  is  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  a  summer  day. 
The  York  Turnpike  is  the  main  road  between  York  and 
Gettysburg.  In  approaching  it  the  patrol  has  been  led  from 
532,  and  the  ridge  running  a  little  west  of  south  from  584  was 
the  western  horizon  until  just  before  the  crossroad  was 
reached.  Here  the  orchards  obstruct  the  view  to  the  west, 
except  along  the  road  itself.  The  road  to  the  east  is  in  plain 
view,  except  that  a  part  of  the  valley  of  the  Little  Conewago 
is  hidden  by  the  military  crest,  which  should  be  found  (by 
profiling,  see  page  35)  about  the  540  contour.  New  Oxford 
is  entirely  in  view. 


82  MILITARY  PRIMER 

The  leader  dismounts  his  patrol,  except  three  men,  one  of 
when  he  takes  to  the  western  edge  of  the  orchard,  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  away,  for  an  inspection  of  the  country  to  the  west. 
After  a  careful  survey  in  that  direction  he  leaves  the  man  there 
to  give  warning  of  the  approach  of  hostile  parties,  directs  him 
to  rejoin  the  patrol  at  the  walk  in  ten  minutes,  and  then 
returns  to  584.  The  other  two  men  had  trotted  to  the  north- 
eastern corner  of  the  northern  orchard,  when  the  patrol  halted. 
They  inspected  the  country  to  the  north,  then  dismounted, 
removed  their  horses'  bridles  to  permit  them  to  graze,  loosened 
the  cinchas,  and  remained  in  observation,  one  man  holding  the 
horses,  the  other  standing  at  the  end  of  the  hedge,  where  he 
had  a  good  view  to  the  north. 

The  leader,  at  584,  studies  his  Strategic  Map,  sees  that  the 
next  important  east  and  west  road  is  the  one  through  Hamp- 
ton, Newchester,  and  Hunterstown,  and  decides  to  go  next 
to  568,  on  the  long  ridge  to  the  north,  across  the  railroad  and 
about  a  mile  away. 

After  a  rest  of  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes,  during  which  time 
the  horses  had  been  unbridled,  cinchas  loosened,  watered  at  a 
trough  in  the  farmyard  near  by,  and  then  allowed  to  graze, 
the  patrol  prepared  to  go  ahead  with  its  mission.  The  man 
posted  to  the  west  came  in.  The  patrol  was  mounted,  and,  as 
soon  as  they  appeared  on  the  road  to  the  northeast,  the  two 
men  in  observation  there  bridled  their  horses,  tightened  the 
cinchas,  mounted,  and  remained  in  observation.  As  the  patrol 
came  up  they  joined  it.  The  patrol  leader  took  out  his  glasses, 
swept  the  country  in  his  front  with  them,  oriented  himself,  and 
then  gave  the  following  instructions : 

"We  will  proceed,  at  the  trot,  to  the  knoll  over  there." 
(Pointing  to  the  knoll  573,  to  the  north.)  "I  will  take  the 
lead  with  Trooper  Burns.  As  long  as  we  ride  boot  to  boot, 
follow  us  at  about  a  hundred  yards  distance.  When  we  sepa- 
rate, halt.  One  of  us  will  ride  forward  at  each  halt.  When 
the  other  one  rides  forward,  you  will  advance  without  other 
instructions.  If  I  wave  my  hat,  come  up  at  top  speed.  If  I 


MESSAGES  83 

spread  my  arms,  take  cover."     These  signals  are  improvised 
ones — any  agreed  upon  would  do  as  well. 

In  this  manner  they  advanced ;  when  a  hundred  yards 
from  the  crossroad  557,  the  pair  in  front  separated.  The  man 
on  the  right  halted,  the  other  trotted  forward  to  the  cross- 
road, inspected  it,  saw  nothing  suspicious,  and  waved  his  right 
hand,  low  down — a  signal  to  his  partner  to  come  up.  This  he 
did ;  the  rest  of  the  patrol  followed. 

The  man  on  the  right  halted,  when  near  557,  because  the 
cover  was  better  on  the  left  side  of  the  road,  and  the  other 
man  advanced  near  the  left  side  of  the  road.  This  is  a  good 
rule :  Advance  under  cover,  but  observe  from  where  the  best 
view  can  be  had.  With  the  arrangement  described,  the  patrol 
advances  without  signals.  The  point  does  not  need  to  look 
back  at  all,  but  can  concentrate  on  its  particular  duty.* 

Arrived  at  the  farmyard  near  568  the  patrol  was  led  into 
shelter  of  the  buildings,  and,  from  an  upper  window  of  the 
house,  the  leader  had  an  excellent  view  to  the  west,  north- 
west, north,  and  east.  His  view  to  the  northeast  was  stopped 
at  the  grove,  half  a  mile  away.  The  valley  of  Swift  Run  was 
hidden. 

A  movement  in  the  road  just  west  of  the  orchard  near  594, 
two  miles  to  the  northwest,  attracted  the  leader's  attention. 
Observing  closely  with  his  glasses,  he  saw  that  a  column  of 
infantry  was  marching  towards  the  west.  He  did  not  see  the 
head  of  it,  but  it  passed  while  he  watched  it,  for  eight  minutes. 
Then  came  an  artillery  column  that  took  fifteen  minutes  to 
pass,  and  it  was  followed  by  infantry  for  twenty-two  minutes 
Then  a  column  of  wagons.  Their  tops  were  easily  seen ;  there 
were  89  of  them,  and  they  were  eighteen  minutes  in  passing. 
They  were  followed  by  a  short  infantry  column — about  a  com- 
pany. 


*  I  saw  a  patrol  of  a  corporal  and  three  troopers  of  the  Tentfe 
Cavalry  work  in  this  way  during  the  Danbury  maneuvers  of  1911. 
I  watched  their  work  for  several  miles,  and  it  was  perfect — rapid, 
silent,  without  a  hitch.  I  questioned  the  officers  of  the  regiment 
afterwards,  but  could  not  learn  that  this  method  had  been  a  matter 
of  instruction.  It  seemed  to  have  been  worked  out  by  the  corporal 
and  the  members  of  the  patrol. — P.  C.  M. 


»4  MILITARY  PRIMER 

The  patrol  leader  then  wrote  this  message : 

From  Lieut.  N 's  patrol. 

AT    SWIFT    RUN,    S.    H.,    2    miles    northwest    of 

NEW  OXFORD. 

July  17,  1912.    10:27  A.  M.    No.  1. 
To:     The  C.  O.,  1st  Sq.,  1st  Blue  Cavalry, 
LITTLESTOWN,  PA. 

Just  saw  column  Red  troops  on  road  NEWCHESTER — HUNTERS- 
TOWN,  at  crosscroad  594  about  1%  miles  west  of  NEWCHESTER, 
marching  west.  Did  not  see  the  head  of  it,  but  saw  about  one  infantry 
regiment  followed  by  a  battalion  of  field  artillery,  two  regiments  of 
infantry,  and  89  field  wagons.  I  shall  keep  in  touch  with  them. 

(Signed)N , 

Lieutenant. 

This  was  enclosed  in  an  envelope  addressed  to  C.  O.,  1st 
Sq.,  1st  Blue  Cav.,  Littlestown,  Pa.  Sent  at  10:30  a.  m.,  17 
July,  1912.  Rate  of  speed :  rapid.  Names  of  messengers : 
Burns  and  Stephens. 

It  was  read  to  the  two  messengers,  repeated  back  by  them, 
and  they  were  directed  to  proceed  to  Littlestown  at  once,  by 
the  most  direct  road,  and  not  to  attempt  to  rejoin  the  patrol 
unless  ordered  by  the  commanding  officer  there. 

The  patrol  leader  then  assembled  his  patrol,  told  them  what 
he  had  seen,  and  said  that  his  plan  was  to  follow  the  Red 
command,  keeping  on  its  left  flank,  until  relieved.  He  decided 
to  go  across  Swift  Run  at  466  W,  then  around  the  hill  571  to 
506  and  606  and  thence  west,  guided  by  circumstances.  He 
used  the  same  formation  as  before.  The  horses  had  been  fed 
well  rested  by  the  hour's  wait  on  the  hill  and  could  be  relied 
on  for  fast  work  until  contact  with  the  Red  troops  was  ob- 
tained. They  went  rapidly  into  Swift  Run  Valley.  At  the 
bend  in  the  cut  just  across  the  bridge  the  point  halted  sud- 
denly and  dropped  back  under  the  crest ;  the  leader  waved  his 
hat  and  the  patrol  came  up  rapidly.  The  leader  cried :  "The 
enemy !  Draw  saber !  Charge  !"  and  they  dashed  around  the 
turn,  surprising  a  Red  mounted  patrol  of  four  troopers, 
charged  through  them,  killing  or  wounding  two  and  captur- 
ing the  others.  They  were  quickly  disarmed,  the  wounded 
men  cared  for  by  one  of  the  Blue  troopers,  while  the  two  cap- 


MESSAGES  85 

tured  men  were  separated  at  once,  and  questioned  one  by  one, 
each  out  of  hearing  of  the  other,  by  the  lieutenant.  One  man 
rode  to  the  north,  beyond  the  edge  of  the  woods  to  guard 
against  surprise. 

The  lieutenant  learned  that  this  patrol  was  sent,  from  the 
infantry  command  they  had  seen,  to  go  to  New  Oxford,  but 
could  not  learn  their  mission  there.  They  (the  patrol)  had 
stopped  at  the  farmhouse  near  by  to  get  some  food.  They  said 
that  the  command  was  a  brigade  of  infantry,  a  battalion  of 
field  artillery,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry  that  was  acting  as 
advance  guard  for  a  division  of  infantry  that  should  be  pass- 
ing through  Newchester  now.  This  last  information  was 
given  by  only  one  member  of  the  Red  patrol.  The  other 
denied  all  knowledge  of  any  other  Red  troops  in  the  vicinity. 

It  should  be  observed  here  that  had  the  Red  patrol  been 
properly  led,  it  would  not  have  been  possible  for  the  Blue  men 
to  have  captured  and  put  out  of  action  the  entire  patrol.  One 
man  at  least  should  have  been  on  watch  to  prevent  just  exactly 
what  happened,  and  the  Red  patrol  should  have  been  so  dis- 
posed that,  in  case  of  attack  at  this  place,  at  least  one  man 
would  stand  some  chance  of  getting  away.  Unless  Lieutenant 
N—  -  discovered  the  Red  patrol  without  his  own  men  being 
seen,  and  he  was  quite  sure  that  he  could  get  away  with  the 
whole  patrol,  his  action  in  this  case  would  have  been  of 
doubtful  advisability.  In  the  fight  to  occur,  shots  were  likely 
to  be  fired,  and  if  the  Red  patrol  were  properly  handled,  one  or 
more  of  its  members  were  likely  to  escape ;  either  of  which  con- 
tingncy  might  give  warning  to  other  hostile  t  roops  in  the 
vicinity,  of  the  proximity  of  the  Blue  patrol,  resulting  in  a 
hampering  of  its  efforts  to  fulfill  its  mission,  i.  e.,  to  obtain  in- 
formation. The  only  advantages  to  be  obtained  by  this  action 
were  the  destruction  of  the  Red  patrol,  thus  preventing  it  from 
obtaining  information  of  the  Blues — which  was  not  the  mission 
of  the  Blue  patrol,  and  the  obtaining  of  such  information  of  the 
Reds  as  might  be  disclosed  by  the  questioning  of  the  prisoners 
and  by  the  indications  as  to  the  organizations  to  which  they 
belonged.  The  information  to  be  obtained  from  the  prisoners 


86  MILITARY  PRIMER 

if  they  are  trained  men,  will  be  of  doubtful  value,  as  they  may 
give  false  information  or  refuse  to  give  any  at  all.  However, 
the  situation  here  given  is  not  impossible  nor  improbable. 
The  enemy's  patrols  will  not  always  be  properly  conducted — 
and  a  patrol  leader  must  always  be  on  the  alert  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  his  adversary's  errors.  By  skillful  handling  of  the 
prisoners,  he  may  be  able  to  obtain  valuable  information  from 
them;  and  if  it  is  his  judgment  that  the  possible  results  of 
attacking  the  enemy's  patrol  are  worth  the  risks,  he  should 
not  hesitate  to  do  so  vigorously. 

The  thing  to  be  done  by  Lieutenant  N immediately 

upon  the  completion  of  the  questioning  of  his  prisoners  was 
to  write  a  message. 

This  might  be  done  as  follows : 

From  Lieut.  N 's  patrol. 

At  SWIFT  RUN,  1M>  miles  southwest  of 

NEWCHESTER. 
17  July.     10:50  A.  M.     No.  2. 

To:     The  C.  O.,  1st  Sq.,  1st  Blue  Cavalry, 
LITTLETOWN,  PA. 

The  body  of  troops  reported  to  be  on  the  NEWCHESTER — 
HUNTERSTOWN  road  by  me  in  my  message  No.  1*  is  said  by  some 
prisoners  just  captured  to  be  a  reinforced  brigade  acting  as  advance 
guard  to  a  Red  division.  Prisoners  belong  to  Troop  H,  6th  Red 
Cavalry.**  I  remain  in  observation. 

(Signed)  N , 

Lieutenant. 

This  message  was  given  to  two  well-mounted  troopers, 
with  these  instructions :  "You  know  what  has  occurred.  It  is 
twelve  miles  to  Littlestown,  and  you  should  reach  there  in  an 
hour.  Spare  your  horses  on  the  steep  hills,  but  make  good 
time  on  the  level  places.  Unless  directed  to  do  so,  do  not  at- 
tempt to  rejoin  me.0 


*  It  is  always  a  good  plan  to  repeat  the  contents  of  previous  mes- 
sages in  later  ones.  This  helps  to  an  understanding  of  the  ones  re- 
ceived if  others,  sent  before,  are  intercepted. 

**  This  information  is  valuable  to  your  commander,  who,  from  his 
information  of  the  Red  organizations,  can  find  out  what  division  the 
6th  Red  Cavalry  is  attached  to,  its  strength,  who  is  its  commander, 
and  much  other  data  of  great  value. 


MESSAGES  87 

What  would  be  the  patrol's  next  move?  It  would  be  folly 
to  attempt  to  get  nearer  to  the  Newchester-Hunterstown 
road.  In  fact  it  would  be  well  for  it  to  get  out  of  its  present 
position  as  quickly  as  possible.  It  appears  that  the  best  thing 
to  do  is  to  go  back  to  Hill  573,  and  for  these  reasons:  The 
patrol  that  was  captured  was  undoubtedly  either  a  flank  patrol, 
that  attempted  to  mislead  its  captors  by  claiming  a  mission 
towards  New  Oxford,  or  a  connecting  patrol,  sent  with  verbal 
instructions  (since  no  writing  was  found  an  any  of  them),  or 
information  for  a  second  column  marching  west,  possibly  on 
the  York  Turnpike. 

This  would  be  natural,  because  a  division  would  never 
execute  a  flank  march  across  a  hostile  front  without  a  flank 
guard,  and  a  strong  one.  Hill  573  affords  a  good  position  to 
watch  the  roads  leading  west  and  south  from  Newchester,  and 
an  extra  line  of  retreat  could  be  made  by  cutting  gaps  in  the 
fences  west  of  568  to  the  brook.  From  there  hiding  places 
might  be  found  in  the  dense  fringe  of  trees  bordering  Swift  Run. 
This  line  of  retreat  would  be  used  only  in  case  retreat  by  any  of 
the  roads  leading  from  568  became  impossible. 

How  to  get  there  ?  By  the  road  ?  Hardly.  It  would  be  better 
to  take  a  little  longer  and  follow  the  cover  to  Swift  Run  and 
Brush  Run,  thence  up  the  little  wooded  valley  to  Swift  Run 
School  House. 

What  shall  be  done  with  the  prisoners?  Make  the  wounded 
as  comfortable  as  possible  in  the  very  few  minutes  you  can  spare 
for  such  a  duty.  Turn  their  horses  loose.  Take  the  other  two 
prisoners,  and  their  horses  along.  Humanitarian  impulses  must 
be  controlled  at  certain  times  in  warfare.  It  is  hard  to  leave 
wounded  men  suffering  for  lack  of  attention,  along  the  road  side, 
but,  if  the  success  of  your  mission  depends  on  it,  you  must  do  it. 

After  the  reconnoissance  from  Hill  573  is  completed  the  pris- 
oners might  be  got  rid  of  by  dismounting  them,  and  directing 
them  to  go  in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  the  patrol  intends 
taking.  If  their  horses  are  better  than  those  of  the  patrol,  they 
should  be  exchanged.  The  extra  horses  should  be  led  for  a  dis- 
tance, far  enough  to  be  sure  that  the  prisoners  will  not  get  them 
again,  and  then  turned  loose.  They  may  be  shot. 


88  MILITARY  PRIMER 

When  this  patrol  reached  568  the  leader  dismounted  it  in  the 
farmyard,  as  much  out  of  sight  as  possible.  He  took  one  man 
and  climbed  to  the  cupola  of  the  barn,  a  sort  of  ventilator  with 
openings  on  all  sides.  From  there  he  saw  a  column  of  Red  cav- 
alry entering  New  Oxford  from  the  north,  some  Red  infantry 
on  the  road  near  520,  to  the  northeast,  and  about  a  platoon  of 
Red  infantry  approaching  the  bridge  at  466W,  coming  from  the 
north. 

As  will  be  shown  later  on,  an  advance  guard  consists  of  ad- 
vance cavalry,  a  support  and  a  reserve.  The  advance  cavalry 
precedes  the  column  by  enough  distance  to  protect  it  from  artil- 
lery fire — about  two  miles  in  advance  of  the  support.  That  body, 
in  turn,  is  in  the  neighborhood  of  a  mile  in  front  of  the  leading 
elements  of  the  main  body. 

Only  fragments  of  the  Newchester — New  Oxford  road  can 
be  seen  from  the  cupola  of  the  barn  near  568,  but  the  leader  of 
the  patrol  there  can  see  enough  to  convince  him  that  a  body  of 
cavalry,  marching  south  into  New  Oxford,  is  followed  at  a  dis- 
tance of  about  two  miles  by  infantry.  Also  that  an  infantry  col- 
umn— at  least  a  platoon — is  marching  towards  him  at  a  rate  of 
about  88  yards  a  minute,  and  that  it  is  not  much  more  than  a 
thousand  yards  away.  In  twelve  or  thirteen  minutes  they  will 
be  where  he  is  now,  but  he  can  afford  to  wait  at  his  post  of  obser- 
vation, provided  he  has  the  other  members  of  his  patrol  mounted 
and  ready  to  start,  until  the  approaching  infantry  reaches  the 
orchard  400  yards  away.  So  he  tells  the  man  with  him  to  go 
down  and  have  everything  ready  for  a  sudden  start,  while  he 
remains  watching  New  Oxford,  the  bit  of  road  he  can  see  near 
520,  to  the  northeast,  and  the  approaching  infantry. 

Looking  across  Swift  Run  he  now  sees  masses  of  infantry 
filling  the  road  from  530  to  Snyder's,  and  beyond  to  the  horizon. 
The  head  of  another  column  of  infantry  is  nearing  520,  to  the 
northeast.  The  cavalry  is  raising  a  cloud  of  dust  south  of  New 
Oxford;  his  nearer  danger — the  infantry  platoon — has  reached 
the  orchard.  He  hurries  down  from  his  post  of  observation, 
mounts,  and,  galloping  at  top  speed,  leads  his  patrol  by  557  and 
584  to  the  farmhouse  just  west  of  the  word  YORK,  on  the  York 


MESSAGES  89 

Turnpike,  from  which  place  he  has  a  good  view  of  the  roads 
leading  to  New  Oxford,  and  can  watch  the  Red  cavalry. 

It  keeps  on  marching  towards  the  south.  He  infers  from  that 
that  the  infantry  following  it  is  going  on,  and  he  resumes  his 
march  south,  paralleling  their  march,  to  search  for  some  point 
where  he  can  afford  to  wait  to  see  if  the  Red  infantry  is  really 
following.  Such  a  place  might  be  found  near  the  Kohler  School 
(Strategic  Map).  When  he  has  verified  the  fact  that  the  infantry 
is  really  marching  south  of  New  Oxford  is  the  time  to  send 
another  message.  He  has  not  enough  men  left  to  send  any  in- 
complete mssages. 

Two  messages  have  been  sent,  one  when  the  first  large  body 
of  Red  troops  was  seen,  the  second  when  information  had  been 
discovered  concerning  their  identity,  and  the  larger  Red  forces 
near  by.  If  a  message  were  sent  from  568  it  could  add  but  little 
to  the  information  already  sent  in.  By  waiting  until  it  is  pos- 
itively known  where  the  bodies  of  approaching  troops  are  going, 
the  patrol  leader  will  have  more  important  news  to  send,  and  he 
cannot  afford  to  deplete  his  patrol  entirely  of  messengers. 

Before  the  subject  of  messages  is  carried  any  farther,  it  is 
necessary  to  consider  the  duties  of  those  protective  groups — 
outposts,  advance,  rear,  and  flank  guards — that  all  bodies  of 
troops  throw  out,  to  keep  off  hostile  patrols,  and  to  prevent 
surprise.  See  Messages,  p.  198,  Appendix. 


90  MILITARY  PRIMER 

MESSAGES 

A  MESSAGE  CONTAINS  FOUR  PARTS: 

1.  The  Heading 

This  should  indicate,  clearly  and  unmistakably : 

a.  From  whom  it  is  sent. 

b.  The  place  from  which  it  is  sent. 

c.  The  date  and  hour  of  starting. 

d.  Its  number  in  the  sequence  of  messages  for  that  day. 

2.  The  Address 

This  should  include: 

a.  The  title  of  the  commander  for  whom  the  message 
is  intended. 

b.  The  place  where  he  will  probably  be  found. 

3.  The  Body 

This  should  be  framed  in  answer  to  these  two  questions : 

a.  What  is  it  that  my  chief  wants  to  know  ? 

b.  How  can  I  write  any  desired  knowledge  that  I  pos- 
sess briefly,  and  yet  make  it  unmistakably  clear? 

After  writing  the  message,  it  should  be  submitted  to  these 
tests : 

a.  Does  it  contain  all  the  information  that  I  have  col- 
lected that  is  of  use  to  my  commander? 

b.  Does  it  contain  anything  that  will  not  be  of  use  to 
him? 

c.  Is  it  limited  to  facts  that  I  have  verified?     If  any 
unverified  reports  are  included,  does  it  clearly  show  the 
source  of  such  reports  and  the  fact  that  they  have  not 
been  verified? 

d.  Is   it  legibly  written,   and  without  ambiguities,   so 
that  it  may  be  quickly  read  and  instantly  and  accurately 
comprehended  ? 

4.  The  Signature 

This  should  be  legible  and  in  some  sure  way  indicate  the 
authenticity  of  the  message. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
OUTPOSTS 

"The  outpost  is  a  covering  detachment  detailed  to  secure  the 
camp  or  bivouac  against  surprise,  and  to  prevent  an  attack  upon  it 
before  the  troops  can  prepare  to  resist!' — Paragraph  678,  In- 
fantry Drill  Regulations. 

Troops  marching  are  protected  by  advance,  rear,  and  flank 
guards,  but  when  a  halt  is  made,  in  addition  to  these  groups,  the 
commanding  points  near  the  column  are  at  once  occupied  by  other 
groups,  sent  out  from  each  unit,  to  add  to  its  protection  while  it 
rests.  These  groups  are  called  march  outposts. 

An  example  of  a  march  outpost  for  a  patrol  was  given  on 
page  82,  ante.  In  that  case  the  patrol  had  come  from  the  south, 
on  the  east  side  of  a  ridge  that,  on  that  side,  was  open  to  the 
patrol's  view.  The  leader  decided  to  rest  on  the  top  of  this  ridge 
for  a  few  minutes,  to  water  his  horses  and  to  let  them  graze.  It 
would  not  be  safe  to  do  this  without  first  inspecting  the  country 
he  had  not  been  over,  so  the  leader,  and  one  man  with  him,  went 
to  the  west,  while  two  men  went  to  the  north,  in  which  latter 
direction  the  leader  planned  to  go  on  resuming  his  march. 

He  selected  for  his  halt  a  ridge  with  a  wide  view  on  every 
side  and  roads  available  for  retreat  leading  in  all  directions.  The 
orchards  limited  his  view  to  the  west  and  north ;  if  they  had  not 
been  there  there  would  have  been  no  need  of  march  outposts  at 
all,  as  these  groups  are  only  sent  to  places  threateningly  near 
the  command  that  hide  routes  by  which  an  enemy  might 
come  up  unobserved. 

When  he  halts  at  568  he  will  need  no  march  outposts  at  all ; 
at  594  he  will  need  them  on  all  the  roads,  in  case  he  decides  to 
stop  there,  for,  although  on  top  of  a  ridge,  the  cross-road  happens 
to  be  in  a  small  depression  screened  by  trees  or  higher  ground 
in  every  direction  except  the  northwest. 

So  with  a  larger  body  having  out  advance,  flank  and  rear 
guards.  For  all  those  units  that  happen  to  halt  where  hiding 
places  are  near  by,  and  not  occupied  by  any  of  the  groups  of  the 


92  MILITARY  PRIMER 

protective  bodies,  march  outposts  should  be  at  once  sent  out  to 
occupy  them  during  the  halt. 

In  the  French  system  of  tactics  it  is  provided  that  certain 
units  of  every  marching  body  shall  be  designated  to  provide 
march  outposts  for  that  body  at  each  halt.  The  commander, 
when  ordering  a  halt,  to  rest  during  the  march,  commands: 
"Halt!  March  Outposts!"  Then  the  officers  commanding  the 
designated  march  outpost  units  at  once  become  responsible  for 
the  protection  of  the  portion  of  the  command  his  unit  is  selected 
from.  Field  Service  Regulations  and  Drill  Regulations  are  silent 
on  this  point. 

When  a  halt  for  the  night  is  made,  or  a  camp  is  pitched  for 
a  longer  period  than  a  single  night,  the  command  is  surrounded 
by  protective  groups  also  called  outposts,  that  remain  on  the  alert 
in  order  that  the  bulk  of  the  command  may  get  its  necessary  rest. 

The  size  of  the  outposts  and  the  extent  of  country  they  cover 
should  depend  entirely  on  the  proximity  and  character  of  the 
enemy.  When  the  enemy  is  known  to  be  a  full  day's  march  away 
or  more,  and  the  people  of  the  country  are  friendly,  a  few  senti- 
nels, more  for  police  purposes  than  for  any  other  reason,  usually 
can  give  sufficient  protection. 

If  the  enemy  is  retreating,  or  is  in  bad  morale,  an  outpost  is 
needed,  to  be  sure,  but  not  necessarily  a  strong  one.  But  when 
the  forces  opposing  each  other  are  nearly  equal  in  strength, 
and  are  getting  within  striking  distance  of  each  other,  then  the 
outposts  must  be  strong,  well  posted,  and  ably  commanded.  With 
the  modern  arms  of  precision  and  rapidity  of  fire,  after  opposing 
forces  come  together,  and  before  the  superiority  of  one  over  the 
other  has  been  determined,  they  cannot,  in  many  cases,  advance 
over  open  ground  in  the  day  time,  but  must  do  so  at  night.  Then 
it  is  that  the  outpost  reaches  almost  its  greatest  value. 

But  each  separate  body  of  troops  in  war  time  must  have  its 
outposts.  Three  men,  on  patrol  duty,  when  overtaken  by  night 
away  from  their  command  and  compelled  to  bivouac,  should  have 
one  man  on  watch  while  the  others  sleep,  and  this  man  is  an  out- 
post. A  company  of  infantry  guarding  a  bridge  or  a  railway 
station  on  the  line  of  communications  must  have  its  outposts, 
to  warn  it  of  threatened  raids,  standing  off  the  hostile  body  while 


OUTPOSTS  92 

the  rest  of  the  company  prepares  to  defend  its  charge.  Day  and 
night  and  week  after  week,  during  the  conduct  of  hostilities,  every 
military  group  in  the  theater  of  operations  must  be  protected  by 
outposts.  No  duty  is  more  important,  no  duty  requires  greater 
fidelity,  greater  courage,  better  judgment. 

The  principles  governing  the  posting  of  outposts  are  the  same 
as  those  that  govern  the  formation  of  all  protective  bodies. 
"There  is  (1)  the  cavalry  covering  the  front;  next  (2)  a  group 
or  line  of  groups  in  observation;  then  (3)  the  support  or  line  of 
supports,  whose  duty  is  to  furnish  the  observation  groups,  and 
check  the  enemy  pending  the  arrival  of  reinforcements ;  still  far- 
ther in  the  rear  is  (4)  the  reserve."  (Paragraph  37  Field  Service 
Regulations. ) 

The  advance  cavalry  of  the  outpost  is  in  front,  reconnoitering 
towards  the  enemy.  Its  patrols  cover  the  front,  and,  in  fact,  all 
directions  from  which  the  enemy  might  come,  far  enough  to 
protect  the  camp  from  possibility  of  surprise  by  artillery  fire. 

But  it  is  not  only  to  protect  its  main  body  from  artillery  fire 
that  the  advance  cavalry  goes  out,  but  to  give  ample  warning  of 
the  approach  of  all  dangerously  large  hostile  bodies.  Artillery 
must  not  be  allowed  to  come  within  its  extreme  range — about 
three  miles — but  even  if  there  were  no  artillery  to  be  reckoned 
with,  the  advance  cavalry  would  still  be  sent  out  to  watch,  from 
commanding  points,  all  the  directions  from  which  the  enemy 
might  possibly  come. 

The  advance  cavalry  can  not  be  expected  to  exclude  all 
reconnoitering  patrols  of  the  enemy,  especially  in  country  that 
is  at  all  rough  or  where  cover  for  those  small  groups  is  abun- 
dant. It  can,  and  must,  be  so  posted  as  to  give  warning  of  the 
approach  of  all  considerable  bodies  of  the  enemy.  Incidentally 
it  drives  away  all  small  patrols  that  are  seen,  provided  that,  in 
so  doing  it  is  not  drawn  entirely  away  from  the  commanding 
points  it  is  set  to  watch. 

The  outpost  consists  essentially  of  two  parts :  the  advance 
cavalry,  just  described,  which  protects  the  larger  units  behind  it 
from  surprise  by  artillery  fire,  and  warns  them  of  the  dangerous 
nearness  of  large  hostile  bodies,  and  the  infantry  of  the  outpost, 
the  reserve,  supports,  and  outguards,  that  protects  the  large  units 


94  MILITARY  PRIMER 

of  the  army  from  surprise  by  infantry  fire,  and  which  must  hold, 
at  all  cost  to  itself,  the  ground  selected  for  the  defensive  position 
to  be  occupied  in  the  event  of  a  serious  attack.  This  line  is  called 
the  line  of  resistance. 

"The  reserve  constitutes  the  main  body  of  the  outpost  and  is 
held  at  some  central  point  from  which  it  can  readily  support  the 
troops  in  front  or  hold  a  rallying  position  on  which  they  may 
retire.  The  reserve  may  be  omitted  when  the  outpost  consists 
of  less  than  two  companies. 

"The  reserve  may  comprise  one-fourth  to  two-thirds  of  the 
strength  of  the  outpost. 

"The  supports  constitute  a  line  of  supporting  and  resisting 
detachments,  varying  in  size  from  a  half  company  to  a  battalion. 
They  furnish  the  line  of  outguards. 

"The  supports  are  numbered  consecutively  from  right  to  left. 
They  are  placed  at  the  more  important  points  on  the  outpost  line, 
usually  in  the  line  on  which  resistance  is  to  be  made  in  case  of 
attack. 

"As  a  general  rule,  roads  exercise  the  greatest  influence  on 
the  location  of  supports,  and  a  support  will  generally  be  placed 
on  or  near  a  road.  The  section  which  it  is  to  cover  should  be 
clearly  defined  by  means  of  tangible  lines  on  the  ground  and 
should  be  such  that  the  support  is  centrally  located  therein. 

''The  outguards  constitute  the  line  of  small  detachments 
farthest  to  the  front  and  nearest  to  the  enemy.  For  convenience 
they  are  classified  as  pickets,  sentry  squads,  and  cossack  posts. 
They  are  numbered  consecutively  from  right  to  left  in  each 
support. 

"A  picket  is  a  group  consisting  of  two  or  more  squads,  ordi- 
narily not  exceeding  half  a  company,  posted  in  the  line  of  out- 
guards to  cover  a  given  sector  .  It  furnishes  patrols,  and  one  or 
more  sentinels,  double  sentinels,  sentry  squads,  or  cossack  posts, 
for  observation. 

"Pickets  are  placed  at  the  more  important  points  in  the  line  of 
outguards,  such  as  road  forks.  The  strength  of  each  depends 
upon  the  number  of  small  groups  required  to  observe  properly 
its  sector. 


OUTPOSTS  95 

"A  sentry  squad  is  a  squad  posted  in  observation  at  an  indi- 
cated point.  It  posts  a  double  sentinel  in  observation,  the  remain- 
ing men  resting  near  by  and  furnishing  the  reliefs  of  sentinels. 
In  some  cases  it  may  be  required  to  furnish  a  patrol. 

"A  cossack  post  consists  of  four  men.  It  is  an  observation 
group  similar  to  a  sentry  squad,  but  employs  a  single  sentinel. 
At  night  it  will  sometimes  be  advisable  to  place  some  of  the 
outguards  or  their  sentinels  in  a  position  different  from  that  which 
they  occupy  in  the  daytime.  In  such  case  the  ground  should  be 
carefully  studied  before  dark  and  the  change  made  at  dusk. 
However,  a  change  in  the  position  of  the  outguard  will  be  excep- 
tional. 

"Sentinels  are  generally  used  singly  in  daytime,  but  at  night 
double  sentinels  will  be  required  in  most  cases.  Sentinels  fur- 
nished by  cossack  posts  or  sentry  squads  are  kept  near  their 
group.  Those  furnished  by  pickets  may  be  as  far  as  one  hundred 
yards  away. 

"Every  sentinel  should  be  able  to  communicate  readily  with 
the  body  to  which  he  belongs. 

"Sentinel  posts  are  numbered  consecutively  from  right  to  left 
in  each  outguard.  Sentry  squads  and  cossack  posts  furnished  by 
pickets  are  counted  as  sentinel  posts." 

The  paragraphs  quoted  from  the  Field  Service  Regulations, 
above,  describe  in  general  terms  the  duties  of  these  bodies,  and 
the  general  aspect  of  the  outpost  fabric. 

The  line  of  outguards  occupies  what  is  called  the  line  of 
observation.  They  are  the  real  antennae  of  the  outpost.  Sen- 
tinels from  the  outguards  are  posted  to  observe  every  avenue 
of  approach,  covering  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  main  body,  giv- 
ing warning  of  the  approach  of  hostile  forces,  and  resisting  their 
advance  to  the  limit  of  their  ability.  When  resistance  ceases  to 
avail  farther,  these  observing  groups,  called  outguards,  fall  back 
on  larger  groups  in  their  rear,  the  supports.  These  supports 
usually  supply  two  or  more  outguards.  Numerically  they  are 
usually  twice  as  large  as  all  the  outguards  that  are  detached 
form  them,  and  they  are  posted  in  good  defensive  positions. 

These  support  positions  are,  when  possible,  the  strongest,  tac- 
tically, to  be  found  near  the  camp  of  the  main  body,  and  as  a  rule 


96  MILITARY  PRIMER 

are  selected  as  the  place  where  the  main  body  expects  to  make  its 
greatest  resistance.  The  line  of  supports  is  therefore  frequently 
called  the  line  of  resistance. 

For  small  commands  these  two  lines  usually  give  sufficient 
protection,  but  larger  commands  may  add  a  third  group,  or  line 
of  groups,  posted  between  the  support  and  the  main  body,  called 
the  reserve. 

In  the  case  of  a  marching  body  that  halts  for  the  night,  the 
advance  guard  of  the  day  becomes  the  outpost  for  that  night 
It,  as  will  be  seen,  is  more  familiar  with  the  situation  than  any 
other  part  of  the  command.  It  is  already  in  position,  or  nearly 
so.  On  the  day  following,  the  outposts  remain  at  their  posts 
until  the  new  advance  guard  passes  them,  when  the  march  is  re- 
sumed. Then  they  usually  fall  in  with  the  main  body,  as  it  comes 
up. 

The  advance  cavalry  of  the  outpost  remains  out,  a  mile  or 
more,  beyond  the  outguards,  in  observation  of  the  country  until 
dark,  when  it  comes  in  and  goes  into  camp  between  the  supports 
and  the  main  body.  If  there  is  a  reserve  to  the  outposts,  the 
advance  cavalry  may  spend  the  night  near  it. 

Cavalry  is  less  useful  at  night  than  in  the  daytime.  Horses 
must  have  rest,  and  they  rest  better  at  night  than  in  the  daytime. 
The  outpost  of  a  cavalry  command  is  usually  dismounted  at  night, 
and  the  horses  sent  to  the  rear  as  soon  as  darkness  closes  in. 

A  few  mounted  men,  when  available,  are,  however,  frequently 
attached  to  the  supports  for  night  patrolling  beyond  the  out- 
guards,  when  such  patrolling  is  thought  to  be  necessary  or 
effective. 

The  cossack  post,  consisting  of  three  men  and  a  non-commis- 
sioned officer,  is  the  smallest  outguard.  This  group,  placed  in 
concealment,  posts  a  sentinel  near  it — ten  to  twenty  yards 
away.  He  watches  for  a  while,  not  longer  than  two  hours,  and 
then  is  relieved  by  one  of  the  others,  who  watches  for  the  same 
period  in  his  turn,  when  he  is  relieved  by  the  third.  The  senti- 
nel gets  moral  support  from  the  proximity  of  the  others  of  the 
group. 

The  sentry  squad  is  the  next  in  size.  It  consists  of  an  infantry 
squad,  eight  men,  one  of  whom  is  a  corporal.  The  sentry  squad 


OUTPOSTS  97 

usually  furnishes  one  double  sentinel  post,  with  its  two  reliefs. 
These  sentinels  should  be  posted  near  the  rest  of  the  squad,  which 
is  concealed.  They  too  are  relieved  every  two  hours,  in  the  usual 
case ;  six  of  the  seven  privates  being  used  in  this  way,  the  seventh 
being  available  for  use  as  a  messenger,  or  to  replace  any  man  who 
is  incapacitated  for  any  reason. 

The  picket  may  post  its  sentinels  as  far  away  from  it  as  one 
hundred  yards ;  its  cossack  posts  and  sentry  squads  may  be  even 
farther  away. 

Whether  a  picket,  a  sentry  squad,  or  a  cossack  post  shall  be 
used  to  observe  any  sector  of  the  line  of  observation  will  always 
depend  on  the  answer  to  this  question :  What  is  the  smallest 
number  of  men  that  can  be  safely  depended  on  to  watch  this 
sector  efficiently? 

The  reserve,  on  outpost  duty,  may  stack  its  arms;  the  men 
may  remove  their  equipments  and  fall  out  of  ranks.  Cooking  is 
usually  done  at  the  reserve  for  the  rest  of  the  outpost.  Commu- 
nication from  the  reserve  to  the  supports  is  usually  maintained 
by  visiting  patrols  and  by  messengers.  When  allowed  at  the 
support  meals  are  prepared  there  for  the  outguards.  Except 
when  the  camp  is  attacked,  duty  with  the  reserve  consists  simply 
in  being  ready  and  available  to  reinforce  the  supports. 

The  support  also  stacks  arms ;  the  men  fall  out  of  ranks  and 
remove  their  equipments,  except  the  belts.  Sentinels  are  then 
posted  to  warn  the  supports  of  any  unusual  happenings  in  the 
direction  of  the  outguards.  Cooking  may  or  may  not  be  allowed 
at  the  supports.  This  is  determined  by  the  outpost  commander, 
not  by  the  support  commander. 

Outguard  duty  is  either  sentinel  duty  or  combat.  Until  the 
enemy  has  actually  attacked  them,  the  sentinels  remain  at  their 
posts,  alert,  keenly  observant  of  the  ground  assigned  them  to 
watch.  They,  and  the  outguards  that  sent  them  out,  remain  con- 
stantly on  the  alert,  fully  equipped  and  ready  for  instant  action. 

It  must  be  understood  that  mobility  counts  for  little  with  an 
outpost.  Observation  and  resistance  are  the  functions  of 
outposts.  The  greater  part  of  every  outpost  consists  of  in- 
fantry. Even  the  outposts  of  cavalry  commands  perform  most 
of  their  night  duties  dismounted.  (Paragraph  72,  Field  Service 


98  MILITARY  PRIMER 

Regulations. )  By  day  cavalry  patrols  can  go  to  prominent  points 
well  in  advance  of  the  line  of  infantry  outguards,  where  a  good 
view  may  be  had  of  the  surrounding  country,  and  so  can  be  of 
great  assistance  to  the  infantry.  The  Field  Service  Regulations 
say  (Paragraph  72)  :  "With  efficient  cavalry  in  front,  the  work 
of  the  infantry  on  the  line  of  observation  is  reduced  to  a  min- 
imum." But  the  cavalry  must  be  efficient  here  as  elsewhere  to 
be  of  value. 

At  night  mounted  men  are  of  very  little  value  to  an  outpost. 
It  is  impossible  for  them  to  move  without  making  noise.  Their 
bulk  makes  them  easily  seen,  and  it  is  comparatively  easy  to  way- 
lay them  and  destroy  them.  More  than  that,  cavalry  that  is  prop- 
erly used  is  of  great  value.  Horses  are  creatures  of  habit,  and 
are  without  that  patriotic  sentiment  that  keeps  men  going,  in 
spite  of  weariness  and  lack  of  food.  Horses  rest  best  between 
midnight  and  morning,  and  nothing  but  the  gravest  emergency 
should  deprive  them  of  their  rest.  So,  at  dark,  the  cavalry  of 
the  outpost  should  come  in.  It  is  quite  proper  to  use  the  men, 
dismounted,  on  night  outpost  duty  when  the  occasion  demands 
it,  but  the  horses  should  not  be  so  used. 

The  orders  for  outpost  sentinels  discussed  below  have  re- 
ceived the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  Every  military 
person  who  is  liable  to  be  called  on  to  act  either  as  a  sentinel 
of  the  outpost,  or  in  any  capacity  to  instruct  or  inspect  such 
sentinels,  should  learn  them  verbatim,  and  know  how  to  apply 
them. 

FIRST:     ABOUT   MYSELF   AND   FRIENDLY   NEIGH- 
BORS. 

My  post  is  number ,  outguard  number The 

outguard  is  There.     The  post  on  my  right  is  number  , 

outguard  number ,  and  is  There.     The  post  on  my  left 

is  number  ,  outguard  number  ,   and  is  There. 

The  support  is  There.  Other  detachments  are  There  and 
There.  Such  and  Such  patrols  are  operating  in  my  front. 
This  road  leads  to 

No  outguard  sentinel  should  permit  himself  to  be  posted 


OUTPOSTS  99 

without  receiving  the  necessary  information  to  enable  him  to 
fill  the  gaps  in  this  paragraph  of  his  orders. 

He  cannot  be  expected,  in  these  days  of  neutral-colored, 
non-distinctive  uniforms,  to  be  able  to  tell  friend  from  foe 
unless  he  knows  exactly  where  every  friendly  group  is  posted, 
where  every  friendly  patrol  may  be  looked  for  in  his  sector. 

SECOND :  ABOUT  THE  ENEMY. 

The  enemy  is  reported  to  be  There.  I  have  seen  Him, 
(describing  exactly  what  hostile  bodies  I  have  seen)  There; 
or,  I  have  not  seen  him.  I  am  to  watch  for  him  between 
There  and  There.  If  I  see  any  unusual  movement  I  am  to 
report  it  at  once  to  my  outguard  commander,  who  is  There. 
If  suddenly  attacked  and  forced  to  retire  or  threatened  with 
capture,  I  shall  rejoin  my  outguard  by  going  around  That 
Way  so  as  not  to  disclose  the  position  of  my  outguard  to  the 
enemy,  or  to  mask  its  fire. 

The  first  paragraph  shows  that  the  sentinel  knows  where 
his  friends  are;  the  second  shows  that  he  knows  everything 
he  should  know  about  the  enemy,  and  what  to  do  if  he  observes 
new  conditions  in  his  front,  or  is  suddenly  attacked. 

THIRD :     HOW  TO  CONDUCT  MYSELF  ON  MY  POST. 

By  day  I  shall  make  the  best  use  possible  of  such  cover  as 
is  available,  standing,  crouching  or  lying  down,  and  remaining 
stationary  or  moving  about  as  will  enable  me  to  observe  the 
sector  assigned  me  to  watch  in  the  most  efficient  manner. 

I  shall  carry  my  piece  at  will,  loaded  and  locked. 

I  shall  inform  friendly  patrols  of  what  I  have  seen. 

At  night  I  shall  remain  standing,  habitually  stationary, 
moving  about  only  for  the  purposes  of  observation.  I  will  not 
sit  or  lie  down  unless  authorized  to  do  so. 

This  paragraph,  properly  recited,  proves  to  the  inspector 
that  the  sentinel  knows  how  to  conduct  himself  while  on  post. 
He  should  be  required  to  explain  how  he  applies  the  first  par- 
agraph to  his  particular  problem.  He  is  required  to  remain 
standing  at  night  because  he  will  keep  awake  if  he  stands  up. 


100  MILITARY  PRIMER 

He  should  not  be  authorized  to  sit,  or  lie  down,  unless  it  be 
necessary  to  do  so  in  order  to  remain  concealed. 

FOURTH :     WHEN  TO  FIRE  ON  THE  ENEMY. 

Unless  specially  ordered  to  fire  on  the  enemy  whenever 
seen  I  shall  fire  only  under  the  following  circumstances:  (a) 
when  suddenly  attacked  and  there  is  no  time  to  call  the  out- 
guard  commander,  I  shall  fire  rapidly,  but  with  careful  aim. 
(b)  When  a  person  approaching  my  post  is  ordered  to  halt 
and  fails  to  do  so,  or  otherwise  disobeys  me,  I  shall  fire  delib- 
erately, taking  careful  aim,  so  as  to  be  sure  and  stop  him. 

Training  in  the  matter  of  when  to  fire  on  the  enemy  is  espe- 
cially important.  It  is  always  noticed  that  green  troops  are 
unnecessarily  alarmed  by  their  outposts.  Sentinels  are  per- 
mitted, or  ordered,  to  fire  at  every  moving  thing  in  their  front. 
Innumerable  instances  occur  where  the  supports,  or  reserves, 
or  even  the  main  body  itself,  are  rushed  to  the  line  of  resist- 
ance by  the  nervousness  or  apprehension  of  the  outguard 
sentinels,  when  there  was  no  occasion  for  alarm.  The  provi- 
sions of  the  above  paragraph  should  be  rigidly  enforced. 

FIFTH:        TREATMENT      OF      INDIVIDUALS      AP- 
PROACHING MY  POST. 

By  day  I  shall  allow  only  officers,  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers, and  detachments  recognized  as  part  of  the  outpost  and 
officers  known  to  have  authority  to  do  so,  to  pass  my  post 
either  in  or  out.  I  shall  detain  all  others  and  notify  my  out- 
guard  commander. 

At  night,  when  any  persons  approach  my  post,  I  shall  come 
to  a  ready,  halt  them,  and  notify  the  outguard  commander. 

Persons  claiming  to  be  deserters  from  the  enemy  are  re- 
quired to  lay  down  their  arms.  If  they  are  pursued  by  the 
enemy  I  shall  order  them  to  drop  their  arms,  and  I  shall  give 
the  alarm.  If  they  fail  to  obey  me  at  once  I  shall  fire  on  them. 

I  shall  halt  bearers  of  flags  of  truce  and  their  escorts,  re- 
quire them  to  face  outwards,  and  at  once  notify  the  commander 
of  the  outguard. 


OUTPOSTS  101 

This  paragraph,  if  properly  put  in  execution,  will  prevent 
unnecessary  firing  by  sentinels.  It  tells  who  are  permitted  to 
pass  the  sentinels,  in  or  out.  It  should  be  rigidly  followed. 
The  sentinel  must  be  sure  that  he  recognizes  every  person  or 
group  that  approaches  his  post  before  he  allows  them  to  pro- 
ced,  even  in  the  day  time.  If  he  has  the  least  doubt  as  to 
their  identity,  he  must  call  his  outguard  commander,  keeping 
the  suspected  person  or  group  at  a  safe  distance  from  him  until 
the  outguard  commander  comes  up  and  relieves  him  of  his  re- 
sponsibility. 

In  the  ordinary  case  there  is  only  one  group  on  the  outpost 
line  that  is  authorized  to  pass  strangers.  This  group  is  called 
an  examining  post.  Its  commander  is  usually  an  officer. 
Strangers  positively  identified  as  not  part  of  the  outpost, 
should  be  passed  along  the  front  of  the  line  of  observation  to 
the  examining  post,  and  never  allowed  to  go  in  rear  of  it.  It 
is  no  part  of  the  duty  of  outguard  commanders  to  permit 
strangers  to  visit  the  support,  unless  the  support  commander 
should  authorize  it  in  person. 

At  night  the  sentinel  must  pass  no  one,  except  his  own  out- 
guard commander.  The  latter  is  called  in  every  case,  and  on 
him  rests  the  responsibility  of  identification. 

Sentinels,  when  possible,  are  posted  (a)  so  as  to  have  a 
good,  clear  view  to  the  front ;  (b)  so  as  to  be  able  to  communi- 
cate easily  with  the  group  that  sent  them  out ;  (c)  so  as  to  be 
concealed  from  observation  to  the  front;  (d)  so  as  to  see  the 
sentinels  of  adjoining  outguards.  If  any  of  these  conditions 
are  impossible  to  realize,  they  should  be  sacrified  in  inverse 
order,  the  last  first. 

It  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  sentinel  should  have  a 
good  clear  view  to  the  front,  because  otherwise  the  enemy 
would  be  able  to  move  about  in  his  sector  without  his  seeing 
him.  He  must  be  able  to  communicate  easily  and  at  all  times 
with  the  group  that  sent  him  out.  This  communication  must 
never  be  broken.  It  is  imperative  that  every  signal  of  the 
sentinel  be  instantly  observed  and  repeated  to  the  outguard 
commander. 


102  MILITARY  PRIMER 

If  the  sentinel,  in  order  to  see  unobstructedly  to  the  front 
of  his  post,  has  to  show  himself,  he  must  do  so.  It  is  his  para- 
mount duty  to  observe.  He  should  use  his  ingenuity  to  screen 
himself  as  much  as  possible  from  hostile  observation,  but  he 
must  not  abandon  or  neglect  his  mission  as  an  observer  to  do 
this. 

When  it  is  possible,  with  the  men  available,  to  post  the 
sentinels  so  that  each  one  can  see  those  to  the  right  and  left 
of  his  post,  it  should  be  done.  It  is  often  not  possible.  In 
such  cases  connection  is  kept  up  by  means  of  visiting  patrols. 
In  every  case,  whether  or  not  the  sentinel  can  see  his  imme- 
diate neighbors  on  the  line  of  observation,  he  must  know  where 
they  are. 

Whether  a  cossack  post,  a  sentry  squad,  or  a  picket  is  to 
be  used  at  any  particular  spot  will  depend  on  its  importance 
in  the  scheme  of  security.  A  prominent  spot — the  top  of  a 
bald  hill  or  the  crest  of  an  open  ridge — that  is  off  a  road  and 
not  likely  to  be  used  as  an  avenue  of  hostile  approach,  could, 
perhaps,  be  effectully  covered  by  a  cossack  post,  while  an  im- 
portant road,  a  road  fork  or  crossroad,  a  bridge,  a  ford — any 
place  where  the  enemy  is  liable  to  come  in  force — would  be  an 
appropriate  place  for  a  picket. 

The  decision  as  to  the  strength,  composition  and  location 
of  the  outpost  rests  with  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  forces, 
no  matter  the  size  of  the  command,  up  to  and  including  the 
division. 

NOTE.— The  Field  Service  Regulations,  Paragraphs  60  to  83,  and 
the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  Paragraph  678  to  707,  prescribe  the 
general  rules  for  the  formation  and  duties  of  outposts.  The  student 
is  advised  to  study  these  paragraphs  closely.  Instructors  should 
include  them  in  assigning  lessons  to  students. 

The  duties  of  the  outguards  can  scarcely  be  taught  from  maps  of 
as  small  scale  as  those  accompanying  this  txet.  They  should  be 
taught  from  the  War  Game  Map,  or,  far  better  and  easier,  on  the 
ground. 

The  problem  below  is  to  show  the  relation  of  an  outpost  to 
its  main  body,  in  the  case  of  a  small  isolated  command,  in  un- 
friendly country: 


OUTPOSTS  103 

GENERAL  SITUATION. 
Guide  Map. 

War  exists  between  two  States  separated  by  the  Susquehanna 
River.  Eastern,  Blue,  forces  have  crossed  the  frontier,  and,  on 
July  20th,  were  massed  at  Gettysburg,  using  the  Western  Mary- 
land Railway  as  a  line  of  communication  and  supply. 

Western,  Red,  forces  are  concentrating  to  the  west  of 
Gettysburg. 

The  Blue  cavalry  is  to  the  south,  towards  Libertytown.  The 
people  are  hostile  to  the  Blues. 

SPECIAL  SITUATION  BLUE. 
Topographical  Map. 

The  1st  Battalion,  1st  Blue  Infantry,  to  which  14  mounted 
scouts  and  a  machine  gun  are  attached,  is  posted  at  New  Oxford, 
guarding  the  railroad  from  the  bridge  at  Brush  Run  to  Berlin 
Junction,  both  inclusive,  and  a  lot  of  supplies  that  have  been  col- 
lected at  New  Oxford,  which  will  be  forwarded  to  Gettysburg  as 
opportunity  offers. 

The  2nd  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  is  at  Guldens,  and  the  Head- 
quarters and  3d  Battalion  are  at  Hanover  (Guide  Map). 

Early  on  the  morning  of  July  20th  spies  report  that  a  regiment 
of  Red  cavalry  camped  at  York  Springs  the  night  before. 

Major  A ,  commanding  the  battalion  at  New  Oxford, 

estimates  the  situation  as  follows : 

MISSION  :  To  guard  the  railroad,  the  stores  at  New  Oxford, 
and  to  prevent  the  surprise  of  his  command  by  any  Red  force. 

FORCE:  Blue.  A  large  force  is  at  Gettysburg,  10  miles  to 
the  west;  one  battalion  of  his  regiment  is  at  Guldens,  4^  miles 
to  the  west ;  the  rest  of  the  regiment  is  at  Hanover,  6  miles  to  the 
southeast. 

Red.  The  only  Red  force  known  to  be  in  the  vicinity  is  at 
York  Springs,  10  miles  to  the  north. 

CONDITIONS:  The  weather  is  fine,  and  the  country  open. 
The  only  obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  troops  in  the  vi- 


104  MILITARY  PRIMER 

cinity  are  the  Conewago  and  Little  Conewago  Creeks,  small 
streams  that  are  crossed  by  numerous  bridges  and  fords.  The 
railway  to  be  defended  is  vulnerable  only  at  the  bridges  at 
Brush  Run,  and  across  the  Little  Conewago  below  Diehl's 
Mill.  A  train  of  flat  cars,  the  engine  with  steam  kept  up,  is  on 
the  siding  at  New  Oxford,  available  for  instant  use-  The  bat- 
talion is  camped  in  the  pasture  in  the  northwest  quarter  of  the 
village. 

WHAT  WILL  THE  ENEMY  PROBABLY  DO?  If  he  attacks  the 
battalion  at  all  it  will  probably  be  merely  a  feint  to  divert  atten- 
tion from  the  bridges,  which  are  vital  to  the  continued  operation 
of  the  railroad.  He  may  attempt  to  draw  the  garrison  at  New 
Oxford  away  from  there  by  an  attack  with  part  of  his  force  on 
the  bridge  at  Brush  Run,  while  the  rest  makes  an  attempt  to  de- 
stroy the  stores  there.  This  contingency  must  be  met  by  ample 
information  concerning  his  movements. 

TERRAIN  :  New  Oxford  is  on  the  western  crest  of  a  ridge 
sloping  from  Berlin  Junction  towards  the  northwest.  Another 
ridge  to  the  west  separates  the  valley  of  the  Little  Conewago  from 
those  of  Brush  Run  and  Swift  Run.  To  the  northeast  is  a  little 
valley,  and  beyond  it  the  ground  rises  gradually,  with  two  par- 
tially wooded  little  knolls  crowning  the  horizon  in  that  direction. 
The  Conewago  flows  through  a  narrow,  irregular  valley.  To  the 
north  of  this  valley  is  fairly  undulating  country,  with  a  few 
broken  patches  of  woods.* 

The  railway  bridge  across  the  Little  Conewago  is  fifteen  hun- 
dred yards  from  the  camp.  The  military  crest  hides  the  bridge 
itself  from  the  camp,  but  the  approaches  to  it  from  the  north 
and  west  are  in  plain  view.  The  bridge  at  Brush  Run,  and  its 
approaches,  are  completely  hidden  from  view  from  the  camp. 

COURSES  OPEN  :  Major  A has  but  fourteen  men  avail- 
able for  mounted  reconnoissance.  The  cavalry  reported  at  York 
Springs  is  the  only  Red  force  known  to  be  in  the  vicinity. 

The  roads  by  which  this  enemy  might  advance  are:  (1)  the 


*  All  consideration  of  the  phases  of  the  problem  concerning  the 
country  to  the  east  and  south  is  omitted  on  account  of  the  limita- 
tions of  the  map. 


OUTPOSTS  105 

Carlisle  and  Baltimore  Turnpike;  (2)  from  the  north,  passing 
through  Oakwood  School  House  and  Waldheim;  (3)  through 
Newchester;  (4)  from  the  northwest  through  594,  and  passing 
Swift  Run  School  House. 

The  mounted  scouts  may  be  used  either  as  moving  or  as  sta- 
tionary patrols.  In  the  former  case  they  would  cover  a  greater 
extent  of  country,  but  would  necessarily,  at  times,  leave  portions 
of  the  front  unobserved.  In  the  latter  case  the  whole  front  could 
be  kept  under  constant  observation. 

From  the  camp  itself  a  sentinel  could,  with  a  good  pair  of 
glasses,  keep  under  his  own  observation  the  roads  at  568,  two 
miles  west-northwest;  520,  nearly  as  far  north-northwest,  and 
502,  on  the  hill  in  the  bend  of  the  Conewago,  opposite  the  mouth 
of  the  Little  Conewago. 

There  is  a  farm  house  about  800  yards  west  of  548  (on  the 
Baltimore  Pike,  south  of  Greenridge  School  House)  that  com- 
mands a  view  of  the  roads  leading  south  towards  the  Conewago 
at  423,  and  at  Waldheim. 

568,  near  Swift  Run  School  House,  commands  a  good  view 
to  the  west  and  north,  but  is  cut  off  from  a  view  to  the  north- 
east by  the  woods  600  yards  away  in  that  direction.  The  nose 
northwest  of  520  affords  a  limited  view,  not  quite  a  mile,  towards 
Newchester,  while  from  the  ridge  just  east  of  594  (1^2  miles 
southwest  of  Newchester)  an  extended  view  is  had  of  the  roads 
leading  into  Newchester  from  the  north. 

It  would  hardly  be  prudent  for  a  small  patrol  to  enter  New- 
chester, considering  the  temper  of  the  inhabitants,  unless  it  were 
absolutely  necessary. 

During  the  daytime  it  would  scarcely  be  necessary  to  have 
any  infantry  outposts  around  the  main  camp,  in  consideration 
of  the  excellent  view  to  be  had  from  the  camp  itself,  and  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  all  available  approaches  from  the  north  can  be 
watched  so  easily  and  so  completely  from  two  or  three  observa- 
tion points  within  four  miles  of  the  camp. 

The  western  edge  of  the  orchard  600  yards  east  of  Brush  Run 
affords  an  excellent  place  to  watch  the  railway  bridge  there,  and, 
at  the  same  time  an  excellent  field  of  fire  on  the  approach  to  the 


106  MILITARY  PRIMER 

bridge.  A  few  men  posted  near  there  would  make  any  attempt 
on  that  bridge  futile  until  they  had  been  driven  away. 

DECISION  :  Major  A decides  to  send  a  platoon  of  in- 
fantry— 32  men,  commanded  by  a  lieutenant — with  a  machine 
gun,  to  the  vicinity  of  Brush  Run,  and  three  mounted  patrols  to 
station  themselves,  one  near  548,  to  observe  the  Baltimore  Pike 
and  the  road  leading  to  Waldheim  from  the  north ;  a  second  near 
520,  to  watch  the  road  from  Newchester,  and  the  third  to  594,  to 
observe  the  roads  leading  to  the  Conewago  from  the  north.  Sen- 
tinels at  the  camp,  or  on  the  roofs  of  the  higher  buildings  in  New 
Oxford  could  supplement  these  patrols. 

ORDERS:  Major  A sends  for  the  officer  commanding 

the  mounted  scouts,  and  the  captain  and  first  lieutenant  of  Com- 
pany B,  and  says: 

1.  "As  you  know,  the  2d  battalion  of  our  regiment  is  at 
Guldens;  the  headquarters  and  the  3d  battalion  are  at  Hanover. 
I  have  just  received  information  that  a  regiment  of  Red  cavalry 
was  at  York  Springs  last  night. 

2.  "To  anticipate  any  possible  attack  on  our  position,  I  shall 
have  the  country  to  the  north  kept  under  constant  observation, 
and  shall  send  a  detached  post  to  Brush  Run. 

3.  "Captain  B ,  send  a  platoon  of  your  company,  with 

one  machine  gun,  under  Lieutenant  C ,  to  take  a  position 

east  of  the  station"  (pointing  to  it  on  the  map)  "to  hold  the  rail- 
way bridge  at  Brush  Run.    Lieut.  N ,  send  three  patrols  of 

four  mounted  scouts  each,  one  to  the  vicinity  of  548,  one  to  the 
vicinity  of  520  and  one  to  the  vicinity  of  594,  instructing  their 
leaders  to  station  them  where  they  can  best  observe  the  roads 
leading  south  across  the  Conewago. 

5.     "Send  all  reports  to  me  here  in  New  Oxford." 

During  the  day  these  precautions  were  all  that  were  neces- 
sary, under  the  conditions  imposed.  The  arrangements  for  the 
night  would  depend  entirely  on  the  information  received  by  the 
Commanding  Officer  during  the  day.  Towards  evening  he  again 
estimates  the  situation,  and  issues  his  outpost  order  for  the  night 
so  that  it  will  fully  protect  his  camp,  and  with  a  minimum  of 
men. 


OUTPOSTS  107 

The  above  illustration  is  given  to  show  that  the  real  problem 
for  the  outpost,  its  strength,  composition,  and  the  positions  to  be 
occupied,  is  for  the  commander  himself  to  solve.  After  he 
assigns  the  troops,  and  directs  them  to  their  stations,  their  work 
is  determined  by  the  local  commanders,  within  the  scope  of  the 
limits  prescribed  for  them. 

For  instance :  Lieut.  C was  directed  to  hold  the  railway 

bridge  at  Brush  Run  with  his  platoon,  assisted  by  a  machine  gun. 
His  only  limitation  was  that  his  position  was  to  be  selected  east 
of  Brush  Run  Station.  Major  A ,  in  estimating  the  situa- 
tion from  the  map  concluded  that  the  best  position  to  defend  the 
bridge  from  would  be  found  at  the  western  edge  of  the  orchard, 
six  hundred  yards  east  of  it,  but  he  wisely  refrained  from  direct- 
ing Lieutenant  C to  take  that  exact  position,  because,  when 

the  latter  got  there,  he  might  find  that  it  was  not  so  well  suited 
to  his  mission  as  some  other  position  might  be.  In  doing  this 

Major  A followed  the  rule  laid  down  in  Paragraph  89  of 

the  Field  Service  Regulations :  "An  order  should  not  trespass 
upon  the  province  of  a  subordinate.  It  should  contain  every- 
thing beyond  the  independent  authority  of  the  subordinate,  but 
nothing  more." 

So  in  his  orders  to  the  mounted  scouts,  Major  A laid 

down  the  approximate  posts  he  wished  them  to  occupy — but  their 
mission  was  to  observe  the  roads  to  the  front,  and  he  did  not  and 
should  not  restrict  them  by  prescribing  the  exact  spots  where  they 
were  to  post  themselves. 

Later  on  Major  A should  go  to  Brush  Run  and  inspect 

Lieutenant  C 's  position.  Then,  and  not  until  then,  if  he 

found  it  not  well  selected,  he  would  be  justified  in  changing  it. 

So,  too,  Lieutenant  N should  visit  the  posts  of  his  patrols, 

and  personally  verify  that  they  had  selected  the  best  points  to 
observe  the  roads  to  the  front  that  could  be  found  in  the  places 
they  were  directed  to  go. 

When  an  enemy  approaches  a  defensive  position,  with  the 
intention  of  attacking  it,  the  advance  cavalry  of  the  outpost  meets 
the  first  attack.  Its  delaying  strength  is  small,  and  it  retires 
slowly,  gradually  withdrawing  to  a  flank  as  it  gets  nearer  to  the 
outguards.  These,  deploying,  delay  the  hostile  advance  as  long 
as  they  can,  when  they  retire  on  the  supports.  Their  withdrawal 


108  MILITARY  PRIMER 

should  be  deliberate,  and  never  directly  on  the  supports,  but  in 
such  a  direction  as  not  to  disclose  the  position  of  the  supports, 
nor  to  mask  their  fire. 

The  outguards  should  not  retire  until  it  is  absolutely  certain 
that  they  can  delay  the  hostile  advance  no  longer. 

The  supports,  in  the  event  that  a  stubborn  defense  is  planned, 
should  occupy  an  intrenched  position,  and  the  reserve,  when 
needed,  is  moved  up  to  that  line.  If  the  supports  are  expected 
merely  to  delay  the  enemy,  while  the  main  body  withdraws,  they 
fight  a  delaying  action,  compelling  the  enemy  to  deploy  and  attack 
deliberately,  then,  while  it  is  still  possible,  they  retire  on  the 
reserve,  and  a  rear  guard  action  commences.  The  outposts,  be- 
come now  a  rear  guard,  strengthened  if  necessary,  continues  its 
series  of  delaying  actions,  retiring  from  position  to  position  as  it 
is  driven  back. 

In  any  case,  the  advance  cavalry  and  the  outguards  on  the 
flanks  of  the  line  of  observation,  do  not  join  the  line  of  resistance 
at  all,  but  remain  on  the  flanks,  as  far  advanced  as  possible,  and 
act  as  combat  patrols. 

It  is  a  psychological  fact  that  troops  once  engaged  can  see 
only  the  hostile  forces  they  are  firing  at.  These  individuals 
absorb  their  entire  attention.  Their  nerves  are  tense,  strained 
to  the  utmost  with  the  excitement  of  the  moment.  The  sud- 
den appearance  of  an  enemy  on  their  flank  or  rear  will  throw 
the  best  seasoned  troops  into  a  momentary  panic,  and  it  is  the 
duty  of  combat  patrols  to  prevent  this.  A  panic  once  started  is 
desperately  hard  to  control. 

A  combat  patrol  is  an  outpost  to  a  line  of  battle.  In  modern 
warfare — other  than  trench  warfare — when  hostile  forces  meet 
one  another  they  at  once  deploy  into  line  of  battle.  Each  com- 
mander seeks  to  discover  the  weak  spot  in  the  other's  line,  and, 
massing  his  troops  there,  attacks  in  the  hope  that  he  may  pierce 
the  line.  A  skillful  commander  will  post  his  supports  and  re- 
serves so  as  to  quickly  reinforce  any  part  of  his  line.  He  leaves 
no  weak  spots.  However,  there  are  always  flanks  to  every  line, 
and  it  is  the  flank  that  the  skillful  general  seeks  to  attack. 

If  he  is  successful  in  this,  and  can  reach  his  enemy's  flank  with 
a  powerful  attack,  the  enemy  must  retire,  or  be  overwhelmed, 


OUTPOSTS  109 

unless  he  has  been  warned  of  the  impending  attack  and  is  pre- 
pared to  meet  it  with  sufficient  troops  to  beat  it  off. 

Combat  patrols  are  groups  of  men,  mounted  whenever  pos- 
sible, stationed  on  the  flanks  of  a  battle  line  to  give  warning  of 
the  approach  of  hostile  forces  that  threaten  the  flank  or  rear. 
They  should  be  posted  so  as  to  have  an  extended  view  to  the 
front  and  flanks,  and  to  be  in  quick  communication  with  the 
commander  of  the  forces.  They  should  not  allow  themselves  to 
be  drawn  into  the  action,  nor  away  from  their  post  by  small  hos- 
tile groups.  They  should  be  constantly  observed  by  men  detailed 
for  this  purpose  from  the  flank  units,  so  that  in  the  event  of 
disaster  to  the  patrol  it  may  be  quickly  replaced,  and  so  that  their 
signals  may  be  seen  at  once  and  quickly  transmitted  to  the 
commander. 

"When  cavalry  attacks  infantry,  material  effect  is  nothing — 
moral  effect  everything.  In  the  case  of  infantry  directly  engaged 
with  infantry  of  the  other  side,  this  moral  effect  may  be  produced 
by  the  smallest  units,  especially  if  they  attack  it,  with  surprise, 
in  the  flank  or  rear." 

Combat  patrols  are  posted  to  prevent  these  surprise  attacks 
by  cavalry  as  well  as  the  more  deliberate  turning  movements 
made  by  infantry.  Every  commander  must,  without  fail,  remem- 
ber to  post  his  combat  patrols  in  every  action,  whether  he  is  acting 
offensively  or  defensively.  The  annals  of  warfare  are  full  of  the 
records  of  disasters  that  small  combat  patrols,  intelligently  con- 
ducted, might  have  averted. 

See  OUTPOSTS,  page  200,  Appendix,  for  a  continuation  of 
this  subject. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
ADVANCE  GUARDS. 

"The  primary  duty  of  an  advance  guard  is  to  insure  the  safe  and 
uninterrupted  advance  of  the  main  body." — Paragraph  97,  Field  Ser. 
vice  Regulations,  1913. 

Modern  field  artillery,  using  shrapnel,  is  effective  up  to  ranges 
of  about  2J^  miles.  Colonel  Balck  (German  Army).,  in  his  recent 
book  on  Tactics,  says :  "Field  guns  may  be  effectively  employed 
up  to  a  range  of  4,000  metres ;  under  3,000  metres  their  fire  is 
so  annihilating  that  decisive  results  are  produced  in  a  short 
time."* 

The  modern  infantry  rifle  is  effective,  if  the  range  is  accu- 
rately known,  up  to  2,000  yards ;  if  the  range  is  estimated,  its  fire 
is  of  comparatively  little  effect  beyond  1500  yards.  At  1200 
yards  its  bullet  will  penetrate  two  men,  one  behind  the  other. 

For  effective  work  with  field  artillery  it  is  necessary  for  only 
one  man  to  see  the  target.  He  can  supply  the  data  needed  for 
the  men  working  the  pieces  so  that  they  need  not  see  the  target 
at  all.  Each  individual  using  the  infantry  rifle  must  see  his 
target. 

The  shrapnel  used  in  the  modern  field  gun,  having  a  calibre 
ranging  from  3"  to  3.4"  and  containing  upwards  of  250  round 
bullets,  bursts  over  a  beaten  zone  25  yards  in  width,  and  from 
200  to  300  yards  in  depth. 

The  shrapnel  bullet  has  a  much  less  penetrating  effect  than 
the  rifle  bullet,  within  their  effective  ranges,  but  "in  comparison, 
artillery  projectiles  produce  a  greater  number  of  fatal  wounds 
than  infantry  projectiles." — (Balck.) 


*  This  sentence,  written  only  a  few  years  ago,  is  still  true  for  the 
smaller  field  guns.  Field  ordnance  has  increased  enormously  in 
calibre  and  range  during  the  short  time  that  has  elapsed  since  it  was 
written,  but  the  general  principles  involved  are  still  true.  For  ranges 
beyond  4000  metres  the  target  must  be  accurately  located,  and  im- 
mobile, for  artillery  to  be  effectively  used  against  it,  no  matter  what 
the  calibre  or  range  of  the  gun  may  be. 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  111 

In  order  to  advance  under  artillery  fire,  infantry  must  be 
deployed  as  skirmishers,  advancing  with  thin  lines;  succeeding 
lines  following  each  other  at  distances  of  at  least  300  yards.  If 
the  distances  are  less  than  that,  two  lines  may  come  under  the 
"burst"  of  a  single  shrapnel,  thus  doubling  its  effectiveness. 

Large  bodies  of  infantry  march  best  on  the  roads,  in  column 
of  squads.  To  expose  such  a  column  to  the  sudden  fire  of  either 
infantry  or  artillery,  within  their  effective  ranges,  would  result 
in  an  enormous  number  of  casualties,  and  it  would  require  the 
sternest  discipline  to  prevent  a  panic. 

"Under  modern  conditions  the  haphazard  throwing  of  troops 
into  action  has  every  chance  of  resulting  in  a  disaster.  If  you 
expect  to  win  in  a  battle  you  must  have  an  understanding  of  the 
situation  and  must  so  put  in  your  troops  as  to  best  meet  condi- 
tions; remembering  that  troops  once  engaged  can  only  go  for- 
ward, stay  where  they  are,  or  retreat.  This  requires  that  enough 
troops  be  told  off  for  the  advance  guard  to  enable  it  to  be  the 
first  to  strike  the  enemy  and  then  be  strong  enough  to  hold  him 
until  the  commander  can  size  up  the  situation,  form  his  plan,  and 
properly  deploy  his  main  body  to  best  meet  the  situation.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  should  be  no  larger  than  necessary,  following  the 
rule  that  all  detachments  from  the  main  body  should  be  as  small 
as  practicable. 

"The  march  of  the  main  body  must  not  be  delayed  by  small 
bodies  of  the  enemy;  these  must  be  brushed  aside." — (Morrison.) 

For  these  reasons,  columns  of  troops  are  protected,  when  on 
the  march,  by  advance,  rear,  and  flank  guards,  who  precede  or 
follow  the  main  body,  to  give  warning  of  the  nearness  of  the 
enemy,  to  prevent  him  from  firing  on  the  main  body,  to  allow  the 
commander  time  to  mature  his  plans,  and  to  prevent  the  delay 
of  the  march  of  the  main  body  by  skilfully  handled  hostile 
patrols. 

"The  formation  of  the  advance  guard  must  be  such  that  the 
enemy  will  be  met  first  by  a  patrol,  then  in  turn  by  one  or  more 
larger  detachments,  each  capable  of  holding  the  enemy  until  the 
next  in  rear  has  time  to  deploy  before  coming  under  effective 
fire." — (Paragraph  642,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations.) 


112  MILITARY  PRIMER 

The  complete  advance  guard  consists  of  a  reserve  and  a 
support.  The  reserve  is  nearer  the  main  body.  The  support 
sends  forward  an  advance  party  that,  in  turn,  sends  forward  a 
small  patrol,  called  the  point,  still  farther  to  the  front. 

These  bodies  arrange  their  march  so  that  they  shall  protect 
the  main  column  from  attack  by  infantry  fire  before  it  shall  have 
deployed  to  meet  it. 

In  advance  of  the  infantry  point  is  the  advance  cavalry, 
also  preceded  by  a  point,  and,  if  necessary,  by  an  advance  party. 
It  reconnoiters  far  enough  to  the  front  and  flanks  to  protect  the 
main  body,  before  it  is  deployed,  from  artillery  fire. 

As  can  be  seen  by  the  study  of  the  Field  Service  Regulations, 
the  matter  of  the  composition  and  size  of  the  advance  guards  of 
large  columns  are  matters  to  be  determined  by  the  supreme  com- 
mander. He  studies  the  situation  with  care,  and  determines  on 
the  size  and  composition  of  the  advance  guard,  selects  its  com- 
mander, and  then  issues  his  orders  for  the  march.  This  order, 
either  written  or  dictated,  is  usually  issued  the  night  before  the 
contemplated  movement  takes  place.  Copies  of  this  order  (in  the 
case  of  dictated  orders,  officers  are  sent  to  headquarters  from  each 
of  the  larger  units  to  write  the  order  from  dictation)  reach  the 
subordinate  commanding  officers.  They  then  issue  orders  to 
their  subordinate  commanders  concerning  their  share  in  the 
movement,  and  so  on  down,  each  commander  receiving  general 
instructions  from  above,  and  issuing  more  and  more  closely  de- 
fined orders  as  the  commands  affected  become  smaller  and 
smaller,  but,  if  properly  worded,  never  trespassing  upon  the 
province  of  a  subordinate. 

GENERAL  SITUATION. 

Pennsylvania,  Red,  and  Maryland  and  the  Virginias,  Blue, 
are  at  war.  A  Blue  field  army  has  crossed  the  frontier;  one 
division  is  encamped  at  Barlow  (Strategic  Map),  five  miles  south 
of  Gettysburg.  Red  forces  are  advancing  on  Gettysburg. 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  113 

SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 

At  9:00  P.  M.,  Sept.  10,  1913,  General  F ,  command- 
ing the  1st  Blue  Division,  receives  this  letter  from  his  commander, 
Lieut.  General  H ,  at  Taneytown : 

Headquarters  1st  Field  Army. 
Taneytown,  Md.,  Sept.  10,  1913.     8:00  P.  M. 

Prom:     Lt.  Gen.  H ,  Taneytown,  Md. 

To:     Maj.  Gen.  F ,  Barlow,  Pa. 

Subject:     Orders  for  tomorrow. 

1.  The  Red  situation  remains  unchanged. 

2.  Move    your    division   by    GETTYSBURG    on    PLAINVIEW    to- 
morrow. 

3.  The  Second  Division  will  march  from  LITTLESTOWN  on  NEW- 
CHESTER  and  the  Third  Division  will  march  on  GETTYSBURG  to- 
morrow. 

4.  I  will  be  with  the  Third  Division. 

H 

The  first  Division  consists  of  the  1st,  2d,  and  3d  Brigades 
of  Infantry,  the  4th  Cavalry,  the  5th  Brigade  of  Field  Artil- 
lery, the  1st  Battalion  of  Engineers,  the  1st  Battalion  Signal 
Corps,  Sanitary  troops,  and  trains. 

General  F estimates  the  situation,  comes  to  a  deci- 
sion, and  issues  the  following  order : 

Field  Orders,  1st  Blue  Division, 

No Barlow,  Pa.,  10  Sept.,  '13.     10:00  P.  M. 

(a)  Ind.     Cav.,          1.     Red     cavalry     detachments     are     observing 

Col.  H.  the    advance    of    the    Blue    divisions.      The    Red 

4th  Cav.   (less  main  body  is  reported  on  the  line  DILLSBURG 

Troop  M).  — Mt.  HOLLY   (Guide  Map,)   an  advance  detach- 

1  Sec.  Sig.  Corps,  ment,  about  a  brigade,  is  at  YORK  SPRINGS. 

Our  Second  Division  is  at  LITTLESTOWN,  and 

(b)  Adv.    Guard.'  will   march   tomorrow   on   NEWCHESTER.     Our 
Brig.  Gen.  I Third  Division  is  at  TANEYTOWN,  and  will  ad- 
Troop    M,   4th  vance  on  GETTYSBURG  tomorrow. 

Cav.   (less  1 

plat.)  2.     This  division  is  ordered  to  advance  on  the 

1st  Brigade.  CONEWAGO,    at    PLAINVIEW,    and    will    begin 

1st  Bn.  3rd  F.  A.    "  the  march  tomorrow,  July  11. 

Co.    A,    Engn'rs. 


114 


MILITARY  PRIMER 


1st  Amb.  Co. 

1  Sec.  Sig.  Corps. 


(c)  Main  Body 
1  plat.  Tp.  M., 
4th  Cav. 

1  Sec.  Sig.  Corps. 
1st    Bn.    4th    Inf. 
Field.    Art.    Bgd. 
(less    1    Bn.    and 
combat  train.) 
2nd   Brigade, 
(less  1  Bn.) 
3d   Brigade. 
1st    Bn.    Bngn'rs. 
(less  1  Co.) 
1st   Bn.    Sig. 
Corps,    (less    de- 
tachments.) 
Artillery   combat 
trains. 
3  Amb.  Cos. 


3.  (a)     The    independent    cavalry    will    start 
at  5:30  A.  M.,  and  cover  the  movement,  towards 
CENTER  MILLS,   HEIDLERSBURG,  and  BOWL- 
DER. 

(b)  The    advance    guard    will    march    on    the 
TANEYTOWN    ROAD,    clearing    450    (1%    miles 
north  of  BARLOW)  at  7:00  A.  M. 

(c)  The    head    of    the    main    body    will    start 
from  WILLOW  GROVE  SCHOOL  at  6:45  A.  M., 
and  will  follow  the  advance  guard  at  about  1^ 
miles. 

Each  brigade  will  protect  its  own  left  flank. 

4.  The  field  trains  will  assemble  at  the  north 
end  of  the  present  camp  of  the   1st  Brigade  as 
soon  as  all  the  troops  have  left  camp. 


5.     The    division    commander 
head  of  the  main  body. 


will    be    at    the 


(Signed)  P , 

Major  General. 


Copies  to  brigade  and  independent  commanders  (cavalry, 
field  artillery,  engineers,  signal  corps,  etc.) 

This  order  is  delivered  to  General  I ,  commanding 

the  advance  guard,  by  the  staff  officer  he  sent  to  receive  it,  at, 
say,  10 :20  P.  M.  He  at  once  began  his  estimate  of  the  situa- 
tion, came  to  his  decision,  and  issued  this  order : 


Field  Orders,  Advance  Guard,   1st  Blue  Division. 

No.  1.  Near  Barlow,  Pa. 

10  Sept.,  '13.     11:00  P.  M. 

(a)  Adv.  Cav.  1.     The    main    Red    forces    are    reported,    etc. 
Capt.   M (Copying  Par.  1  of  the  above  order.) 

Tp.    M,4th  Cav.  2.     This  advance  guard  will  march  on  PLAIN- 

(less  1  plat.)  VIEW  via  the  TANEYTOWN  ROAD  and  GETTYS- 

BURG. 

(b)  Support.  3.      (a)     The    advance    cavalry    will    start    at 
Col.  N....                      6:40  A.   M. 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  115 

1st  Bn.,  1st  Inf.  (b)     The  point  of  the  support  will  march  on 

Co.  A,  Eng.  the     TANEYTOWN     ROAD,     leaving     WILLOW 

1st   Inf.    (less   1        GROVE  SCHOOL  at  5:50  A.  M. 
Bn.)  (c)      The   reserve   will   follow   the   support   at 

800  yards. 

(c)  Reserve.  4.     The  combat  trains   will  march  in   rear  of 

1st   Bn.   2   Inf.  the  reserve. 

1st  Bn.   3d  F.  A. 

2nd  Inf.  (less  1  5.    I  shall  be  at  the  head  of  the  reserve. 

Bn.)  I , 

3d  Inf.  Brigadier  General. 

This  order  was  issued  verbally  to  the  assembled  officers 
who  had  been  designated  to  receive  orders  by  their  respective 
commanders,  and  was  written  down  by  them. 

It  is  now  with  the  cavalry  commander,  Captain  M , 

that  we  are  especially  interested.  He  gets  this  order  at,  say, 
11 :20  P.  M.,  and  at  once  gets  his  map  and  goes  over  the  situa- 
tion, making  his  plans  for  the  next  day.  Hs  is  to  march  at 
5  :40,  ten  minutes  after  the  rest  of  his  regiment  leaves  on  its 
independent  mission.  The  cavalry  and  field  artillery  will  be 
camped  below  the  infantry,  along  the  stream,  perhaps  near  the 
crossroad  386. 

He  can  have  his  men  aroused  at  the  same  time  the  rest  of 
the  regiment  is  aroused,  so  the  orders  already  given  for  getting 
breakfast,  watering,  feeding,  and  saddling  need  not  be  changed. 
There  is  no  necessity  for  further  preparation  until  the  morn- 
ing. 

In  the  morning  Captain  M directed  his  1st  Sergeant : 

"The  troop  will  march  at  5  :40.  Have  it  formed  at  5  :35."  At 
breakfast,  with  his  lieutenants,  he  went  over  the  situation 
carefully.  The  troop  broke  camp,  assembled  as  ordered,  and 
started  on  its  day's  march.  Going  by  the  road,  walking  and 
trotting  so  as  to  reach  450  a  little  before  six  o'clock,  Captain 
M estimates  the  situation  as  follows  : 

His  MISSION  is  "to  reconnoiter  far  enough  to  the  front  and 
flanks  to  guard  the  column  against  surprise  by  artillery  fire, 
and  to  enable  timely  information  to  be  sent  to  the  advance 
guard  commander."  (Par.  45,  F.  S.  R.)  His  troop  is  pre- 


116  MILITARY  PRIMER 

ceded  by  independent  cavalry — the  rest  of  his  regiment — and 
therefore  he  must  "maintain  connection  therewith."  (Ibid.) 

FORCES.  To  accomplish  this  mission,  Captain  M has 

three  platoons  of  his  own  troop — say  60  men.  He  is  followed 
by  a  very  strong  support.  He  is  preceded  by  the  independent 
cavalry,  that  must  cover  a  wide  sector — six  miles  of  front  at 
its  outer  limit — and  to  the  right  should  be  the  advance  guafH 
groups  of  the  2d  Division.  He  must  look  out  for  his  own  left 
flank,  which  is  unprotected  by  other  troops. 

The  Red  forces  are  reported  to  be  25  miles  to  the  north, 
but  Red  cavalry  detachments  of  unknown  strength  are  said  to 
be  in  observation  of  the  Blue  forces. 

CONDITIONS.  It  is  the  fall  of  the  year,  and  roads  are 
usually  dusty  at  this  season.  The  trees  are  in  full  leaf.  The 
crops,  except  corn,  are  all  gathered.  Streams  are  rarely  in 
flood  at  this  season.  The  enemy  is  on  the  defensive.  His 
cavalry  should  be  aggressive,  and  resort  to  obstructive  tactics. 

WHAT  WILL  THE  ENEMY  DO?  It  would  seem  most  natural 
that  the  Red  forces  would  contest  the  line  of  Conewago  Creek, 
which  offers  good  defensive  positions  on  the  north  side,  with 
still  better  ones  in  the  rear,  at  the  passes  in  the  hills.  The 
Blue  independent  cavalry  should  not  be  allowed  by  them  to 
cross  the  creek  without  a  fight. 

THE  TERRAIN.  With  the  advantages  of  proximity  in  the 
Blue  favor,  there  should  be  no  difficulty  in  passing  the  hills  to 
the  east  and  south  of  Gettysburg,  but  the  ridges  to  the  north 
of  that  town,  slanting  across  the  front  of  the  line  of  march, 
offer  a  series  of  excellent  defensive  positions  for  delaying 
actions 

COURSES  OPEN.  There  is  really  no  course  open  but  to 
actively  patrol  the  front  of  the  division,  two  or  three  miles 
to  its  front,  and  for  two  or  three  miles  to  the  right  and  left 
of  the  Taneytown  and  Harrisburg  Roads.  This  can  be  done 
better  by  sending  out  large,  independent  patrols  to  right  and 
left,  than  by  small  patrols  that,  fanning  out  from  the  main 
body  of  the  troop,  attempt  to  keep  in  constant  connection  with 
it.  These  must  cover  parallel  roads,  advance  rapidly  over 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  117 

valleys,  and,  stationing  themselves  at  good  observation  points, 
remain  there  until  the  infantry  patrols  come  up  to  relieve  them. 

How  is  connection  to  be  maintained  with  the  independent 
cavalry?  By  a  series  of  connecting  files?  Not  at  all.  It  is 
not  meant  that  constant,  uninterrupted  communication  be 
maintained,  but  that,  at  reasonable  intervals,  connecting 
patrols  be  sent  for  enough  to  the  front  to  observe  the  march 
of  the  main  body  of  the  independent  cavalry.  If  it  is  march- 
ing along  without  interference  it  is  not  necessary  to  get  any 
other  evidence  that  all  is  well  in  front.  These  patrols  need 
only  to  observe  the  cavalry  from  a  distance,  watching  its  dust 
cloud,  listening  for  sounds  of  firing.  The  flank  patrols,  too, 
should  not  be  constantly  sending  in  reports  to  the  effect  that 
they  see  nothing.  It  is  enough  for  them  to  watch,  now  and 
then  for  indications  that  the  march  of  the  advance  guard  is 
progressing  normally,  reserving  their  messengers  for  use  when 
there  is  something  to  report,  remembering  always  to  so  con- 
duct their  march  that,  in  case  of  surprise,  at  least  one  man  can 
escape  to  bear  news  of  it  to  the  rest  of  the  advance  guard. 

So  Captain  M ,  on  reaching  450,  calls  his  lieutenants 

and  one  sergeant  to  him,  and  orders,  verbally : 

"Red  cavalry  detachments  are  reported  in  the  vicinity,  in 
observation  of  our  movements.  The  main  Red  forces  are  25 
miles  to  the  north. 

"The  division  will  march  on  Plainview  today,  via  the 
Taneytown  Road  and  Gettysburg.  The  regiment,  less  my 
troop,  will  act  as  independent  cavalry  for  the  division  in  its 
advance.  Troop  M  is  to  act  as  advance  cavalry  to  the  advance 
guard. 

"Lieut.  R ,  take  the  3d  platoon  by  the  road  west  of 

the  Round  Tops,  and  along  these  ridges"  (indicating,  on  the 
map,  McPherson  Ridge,  Oak  Ridge,  and  the  ridges  east  of 
Goldenville  and  Table  Rock)  "towards  Bridge  School.  I  shall 
march  on  the  Taneytown-Harrisburg  Roads  on  Plainview, 
averaging  2^2  miles  per  hour.  Send  messages  to  me,  or  in 
emergencies,  to  the  support  commander." 


118  MILITARY  PRIMER 

To  Sergeant  S ,  who  heard  the  orders  just  given: 

"Take  the  1st  squad  of  the  1st  platoon,  and  go  by  Wolf  Hill, 
Granite  Hill  and  Hunterstown,  on  Belmont  School.  Reports 
will  be  sent  to  me,  or  in  emergencies,  to  the  support  com- 
mander." 

To  Lieut.  T ,  who  heard  the  previous  instructions,  he 

said :  "Take  command  of  the  point — the  leading  eight  troopers 
and  the  right  principle  guide.  I  will  follow  with  the  re- 
mainder of  the  troop  at  about  200  yards." 

Consider  next  the  duties  of  the  support  commander. 

Colonel  N has  his  own  regiment,  and  one  company  of 

engineer  troops.  The  duties  of  the  advance  guard  are  (Para- 
graph 40,  Field  Service  Regulations)  : 

"An  advance  guard  is  a  detachment  of  the  main  body  which 
precedes  and  covers  it  on  the  march. 

"Its  duties  are : 

"1.  To  guard  against  surprise  and  furnish  information  by 
reconnoitering  to  the  front  and  flanks. 

"2.  To  push  back  small  parties  of  the  enemy  and  prevent 
their  observing,  firing  upon,  or  delaying  the  main  body. 

"3.  To  check  the  enemy's  advance  in  force  long  enough  to 
permit  the  main  body  to  prepare  for  action. 

"4.  When  the  enemy  is  encountered  on  the  defensive,  to 
seize  a  good  position  and  locate  his  lines,  care  being  taken  not 
to  bring  on  a  general  engagement  unless  the  advance  guard 
commander  is  empowered  to  do  so. 

"5.  To  remove  obstacles,  repair  the  road,  and  favor  in 
every  way  possible  the  steady  march  of  the  column." 

Colonel  N got  his  order  about  11 :20  P.  M.  He  esti- 
mated the  situation  as  follows : 

MISSION.  To  insure  the  safe  and  uninterrupted  march  of 
the  division  in  its  march  from  its  present  camp  towards  Plain- 
view. 

FORCES.     Colonel  N has  his  own  regiment,  to  which 

a  company  of  engineers  is  attached,  to  make  such  repairs  in 
the  road  as  are  found  to  be  necessary.  He  is  preceded,  (1) 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  119 

by  the  independent  cavalry — a  regiment,  less  one  troop — and 
(2)  by  the  advance  cavalry — one  troop. 

The  support  is  followed  by  the  rest  of  the  1st  Brigade  as 
a  reserve,  at  800  yards,  and  it,  in  turn,  by  the  main  body  of 
the  1st  Division. 

There  are  no  Red  forces,  except  cavalry  detachments, 
within  25  miles. 

CONDITIONS.     Colonel   N estimated  the  conditions  as 

Captain  M has  done  above. 

WHAT  WILL  THE  ENEMY  PROBABLY  DO?  Cavalry  detach- 
ments will  hardly  seriously  attack  an  infantry  division  on  the 
march.  They  will  undoubtedly  make  every  effort  to  observe 
its  march.  If  they  are  allowed  to  come  within  rifle  range  with- 
out discovery,  they  could  delay  the  march  considerably. 
These  possibilities  must  be  prevented.  A  stubborn  effort 
should  be  made  by  the  Reds  to  prevent  us  from  crossing  the 
Conewago.  No  serious  attack  should  be  expected  south  of 
Gettysburg. 

TERRAIN.    As  estimated  by  Captain  M 

COURSES  OPEN.    The  first  problem  for  Colonel  N is 

the  size  of  his  advance  party.  Under  the  rule  already  laid 
down  it  must  be  strong  enough  to  hold  the  enemy  until  the 
next  body  in  rear — the  support  proper — can  deploy.  It  will 
take  the  support  about  ten  minutes  to  deploy.  A  company  of 
infantry  cannot  be  brushed  aside  in  that  time  by  any  force  that 
could  sift  through  the  independent  and  advance  cavalry  that 
precede  the  support.  In  fact,  a  platoon  could  probably  hold 
any  such  force  in  check  long  enough  for  the  support  to  form 
to  defeat  it,  but  it  is  always  best  not  to  break  tactical  units 
when  it  is  not  necessary. 

One  squad  is  sufifcient  as  a  point,  and  it  should  precede  the 
advance  party  by  200  or  300  yards.  The  advance  party,  if  600 
to  800  yards  in  advance  of  the  support,  should  be  far  enough 
ahead  of  it  to  insure  it  from  being  fired  into. 

Six  of  the  mounted  orderlies  of  the  regiment  might  be 
assigned  for  scout  duty  to  the  advance  party  for  flank  recon- 
noissance  within,  say,  a  radius  of  1200  yards  to  right  and  left 
of  the  column. 


120  MILITARY  PRIMER 

The  engineer  company  is  to  assist  in  the  duty  of  making 
repairs  to  the  bridges  and  generally  to  aid  in  any  material  way 
possible  to  expedite  the  march.  It  should  march  near  the 
head  of  the  support,  where,  indeed,  its  place  has  been  desig- 
nated by  the  advance  guard  order. 

The  rest  of  the  support  will  march  as  a  unit.  The  support 
sets  the  pace  for  the  column,  since  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander directs  the  reserve  to  follow  it  at  800  yards,  and  the 
division  commander  directs  the  main  body  to  follow  the  ad- 
vance guard  at  \l/2  miles.  The  rate  of  march  for  a  column  of 
this  size  is  2  to  2T/2  miles  per  hour  (paragraph  633,  Infantry 

Drill  Regulations).  Captain  M prescribed  %*/>  miles 

per  hour  as  the  rate  of  march  for  the  advance  cavalry.  That 
rate  could  be  easily  maintained  by  the  support,  and,  if  the  ad- 
vance guard  commander  found  it  too  fast  for  the  reserve,  he 
could  easily  send  forward  and  order  an  extra  halt  for  the  sup- 
port of  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  to  allow  the  reserve  to  close  up. 

Distances  in  a  column  of  this  sort  are  only  approximate. 
No  effort  should  be  made  to  make  them  exact. 

With  six  mounted  scouts  attached  to  his  company,  Captain 

G ,  commanding  the  advance  party,  could  spare  the 

members  of  his  company  all  concern  for  the  flank  reconnois- 
sance. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  independent  cavalry  and  the 

advance  cavalry  both  precede  his  support,  Colonel  N 

cannot  neglect  local  reconnoissance.  These  two  cavalry 
bodies  should  comb  the  country  to  the  right  and  left  so  effect- 
ively that  no  body  of  troops  of  threatening  size  could  sift 
through  unobserved,  and  so  practically  eliminate  all  danger  of 
surprise.  Still,  (Paragraph  649,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations) 
"this  does  not  relieve  the  advance  guard  commander  from  the 
duty  of  local  reconnoissance."  His  would  be  the  burden  of 
blame  if  a  hostile  body  should  get  within  rifle  shot  of  the  main 
body  undiscovered. 

This  local  reconnoissance  can  best  be  done  (Paragraph  48, 
Field  Service  Regulations)  by  sending  patrols  of  2  to  4  men 
"to  high  places  along  the  line  of  march  to  overlook  the  coun- 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  121 

try  and  examine  the  danger  points."  One  company  of  the 
support  might  well  be  assigned  this  duty  throughout  the  day. 
The  mounted  scouts  attached  to  the  advance  party  would  first 
occupy  these  high  spots.  As  the  support  comes  up,  a  patrol 
could  be  detached  from  the  designated  company  to  relieve  the 
mounted  scouts,  who  could  then  trot  forward  to  a  more  ad- 
vanced position.  The  infantry  patrol  that  relieved  them  might 
then  be  left  in  observation  during  the  entire  time  the  division 
is  marching  by,  when  it  could  join  the  rear  guard,  and,  at  the 
end  of  the  day's  march,  all  these  patrols  could  be  united  and 
marched  to  the  camp  of  the  regiment.  In  this  way  a  maxi- 
mum of  safety  would  be  secured  with  a  minimum  of  effort. 

It  is  often  possible  to  have  these  flanking  patrols  march 
parallel  to  the  column,  but  generally  such  marching  would  be 
off  the  roads  and  be  difficult  and  wearying.  Often  such 
marching  patrols  would  find  it  impossible  to  keep  up  abreast 
of  their  own  units.  Even  mounted  patrols  will  find  that  their 
work  is  easier  and  better  done  by  remaining  stationary  on 
good  observation  points,  than  by  attempting  to  perform  the 
duty  by  marching. 

DECISION.  Colonel  N decides  to  detach  one  company 

as  advance  party ;  to  attach  six  mounted  scouts  to  the  advance 
party ;  to  follow  the  advance  party  at  600  yards  with  the  support, 
and  to  designate  the  leading  company  of  the  support  as  the  one 
to  furnish  the  flanking  patrols. 

ORDERS.  Colonel  N assembles  his  field  and  staff 

officers  and  the  captains  when  he  reaches  Willow  Grove  School 
House  at  5  :40  A.  M.,  and,  after  repeating  the  information  con- 
cerning the  enemy  and  supporting  troops,  and  the  plans  of  the 
commander,  as  found  in  paragraphs  1  and  2  of  the  advance  guard 
order,  says:  "Company  A  is  assigned  as  advance  party.  Sergt. 

H ,"  (who  commands  the  mounted  scouts)  "take  five  men 

and  report  to  Captain  A I  will  follow  with  the  rest  of  the 

support,  600  yards  behind  the  advance  party.  Company  B  is  des- 
ignated to  furnish  flank  patrols  throughout  the  day." 

Captain  A at  once  rejoined  his  company,  sent  one 

squad,  under  his  1st  lieutenant,  as  point.  He  directed  the  rest  of 


122  MILITARY  PRIMER 

the  company  to  follow  at  200  yards'  distance,  and,  joining  the  1st 
lieutenant,  at  the  point,  gave  him  what  information  he  possessed, 
and  his  instructions,  as  the  point  marched  along  the  road. 

When  the  division  is  all  on  the  march  it  is  twenty  miles  from 
the  point  of  the  infantry  advance  guard  to  the  rear  of  the  main 
body,  assuming  that  the  field  trains  follow  closely  on  one  road 
in  rear  of  the  3  ambulance  companies.  This  road  space  is  occu- 
pied as  follows : 

Infantry  point  to  advance  party 300  yards 

Advance  party,  including  20%  for  elongation  48       " 


Total  for  advance  party 348 

Advance  party  to  support 800 

Support:  1  battal'n  infantry,  less  1  company 140 

Co.  A,  Engineers 100 

1st  Inf.,  less  1  battalion 600 

Elongation,   20% 328 


Total  for  support 1968 

Support  to  reserve 800 

Reserve:  1  battalion  infantry 180 

1  battalion  field  artillery 620 

2d  Inf.,  less  1  battalion 600 

3d  Infantry  780 

Combat  trains,  infantry  300  yards 

Engineers  100      "     

F.  A ...410      "     810 

Elongation,  20%  598 


Total  for  support ..3588 


Total  for  advance  guard 7504 


*The  figures  used  in  the  following  illustration  are  based  on  the 
Field  Service  Regulations  of  1914,  which  are  based  on  the  organization 
of  the  army  as  provided  in  law  existing  prior  to  the  army  bill  of 
1916.  The  new  law  increases  somewhat  the  number  of  men  in  the 
organization,  but  the  approximation  in  the  illustration  is  close  enough 
to  fulfill  its  object,  which  is  to  enable  the  student  to  get  a  mental 
picture  of  a  large  force  on  the  march. 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  123 

This  is  practically  4.3  miles.  Adding  1.5  miles  for  the  distance 
from  the  reserve  to  the  main  body,  laid  down  in  the  march 
order  of  the  division,  it  is,  from  the  infantry  point  to  the  head 
of  the  main  body  5.8  miles. 

The  road  space  of  a  division  is,  (page  172,  Field  Service 
Regulations,  1914),  10.3  miles.  1688  yards  of  this  distance, 
approximately  one  mile,  should  be  deducted  for  the  troops  in 
the  advance  guard,  leaving  9.3  miles  for  the  length  of  the  divi- 
sion ;  adding  20  per  cent  for  elongation — lengthening  of  the 
column  due  to  imperfect  marching — would  make  the  road 
space  for  the  main  body  11.2  miles. 

The  field  trains  for  combatant  troops  cover  2.5  miles,  and 
for  the  division  sanitary  troops,  ammunition,  supply  and  pack 
trains,  3.6  miles  more,  making  the  total  length  of  the  column : 

Point  of  advance  guard  to  main  body 5.8  miles 

Main  body  11.2  miles 

Trains  6.1  miles 

Total  23.1  miles 

It  is  13  miles  from  Barlow  to  Plainview.  This  is  a  good 
day's  march  for  a  body  of  this  size:  "In  extensive  opera 
tions,  involving  large  bodies  of  troops,  the  average  (march) 
is  about  12  miles  a  day."  (Paragraph  101,  Field  Service  Reg- 
ulations.) "For  a  complete  division  the  distance  (marched) 
can  seldom  exceed  12^  miles  per  day  *  *  *  ."  (Para- 
graph 634,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations.) 

Assuming  a  rate  of  march  at  2.5  miles  per  hour — which 
means  an  absolutely  uninterrupted  march  for  well-disciplined 
troops — it  will  be  nine  hours  after  the  advance  guard  started 
before  the  last  wagons  start  to  leave  the  camp  at  Barlow. 
That  will  be  4:00  P.  M.  The  trains  march  at  the  same  rate 
as  the  troops,  and  it  will  be  five  hours  and  twelve  minutes 
later,  or  9  :12  P.  M.,  before  the  last  wagons  reach  Plainview, 
assuming  still  that  nothing  prevents  them  from  marching 
steadily,  and  that  only  one  road  is  used.* 

*Of  course  if  all  was  found  to  be  safe,  one  or  more  of  the  parallel 
roads  to  the  east  of  that  used  by  the  troops  would  be  used  by  the 
trains,  so  that  they  would  actually  get  to  camp  soon  after  the  troops 
did.  For  the  purposes  of  illustration  it  is  supposed  that  all  use  the 
same  road. 


124  MILITARY  PRIMER 

All  this  time  this  slender  column  of  marching  troops  and 
wagons  must  be  protected  throughout  its  length,  from  the 
aggressiveness  of  the  enemy.  The  wagon  trains  are  especially 
vulnerable,  and  absolutely  vital  to  the  success  of  the  campaign. 
They  are  helpless.  An  attack  on  the  troops  can  be  met  by  a 
counter  attack,  but  the  wagons  must  be  defended.  They  can- 
not deploy,  nor,  on  the  roads,  can  they  close  up  much  to 
shorten  the  column. 

It  is  the  hostile  cavalry  that  is  especially  dreaded  along  the 
line  of  communications  of  an  army.  The  enemy's  cavalry 
must  be  located,  and  neutralized  or  destroyed,  before  the  line 
of  supply  can  be  made  secure. 

It  was  a  maxim  of  Napoleon's  that  "an  army  whose  com- 
munications are  threatened  will  almost  invariably  devote  its 
whole  attention  to  protecting  them." 

The  foregoing  illustration  is  given  to  enable  the  student 
to  get  a  mental  picture  of  a  large  army  on  the  march.  The 
1st  Field  Army,  above,  consisted  of  three  infantry  divisions. 
To  them,  in  the  armies  of  the  military  nations,  a  division  of 
cavalry  would  be  attached.  If  such  a  division  had  been 
attached  to  this  field  army,  it  would  have  been  operating  in 
search  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  on  one  flank  or  the  other  of  the 
infantry  divisions,  or  out  in  front.  Once  it  has  met  and  over- 
come the  hostile  cavalry,  it  is  free  to  operate  against  the  hostile 
communications,  or  against  his  weaker  flank. 

Without  such  a  cavalry  force,  and  assuming  that  the  Red 
army  had  a  considerable  force  of  cavalry,  much  greater  pre- 
cautions would  have  to  be  taken  to  protect  the  left  flank  of 
the  1st  Blue  Division  that  has  been  outlined. 

See  ADVANCE  REAR  AND  FLANK  GUARDS,  page  204,  Appen- 
dix. 


CHAPTER  X. 
THE  ADVANCE  GUARD   (CONTINUED) 

"The  rate  of  march  of  infantry  is  so  slow  that  in  reconnoissance 
it  can  only  by  great  exertions  attain  results  which  a  small  force  of 
cavalry  would  obtain  without  appreciable  effort.  Infantry  acting 
alone  therefore  unquestionably  requires  the  assignment  of  mounted 
men  for  reconnoissance  and  messenger  duty.  As  regards  reconnois- 
sance, infantry  is  like  a  man  walking  in  the  dark,  who  can  guard 
against  collisions  only  by  stretching  out  his  hand  and  feeling  his  way." 
— Balck,  Infantry  Tactics,  page  20. 

GENERAL  SITUATION. 
Guide  Map. 

The  boundary  between  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  may  be 
taken  as  the  frontier  between  two  nations  at  war.  Blue,  South- 
ern, forces  have  crossed  the  frontier  at  Littlestown.  Red,  North- 
ern, forces  are  advancing  to  meet  them  from  the  north. 

FIRST  SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 

Topographical  Map. 

A  regiment  of  infantry  and  a  detachment  of  21  mounted  men, 
without  trains,  has  reached  New  Oxford  at  10:00  A.  M.,  August 
26th.  Its  mission  is  to  secure  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago 
at  Newchester,  and  to  reconnoiter  to  the  north  of  that  stream. 
The  country  is  hostile.  No  information  of  the  enemy  can  be 
obtained  from  the  inhabitants.  Information  from  Blue  sources 
sources  indicates  the  probability  of  meeting  hostile  forces  at  any 
moment.  The  weather  is  warm  and  clear. 

The  formation  of  the  column,  as  the  main  body  leaves  New 
Oxford,  is :  The  head  of  the  main  body  is  leaving  the  last 
houses  in  the  village,  700  yards  north  of  the  town.  The  sup- 
port, two  companies,  is  at  494.  The  advance  party,  one  pla- 
toon, is  500  yards  ahead,  at  the  little  private  road  leading  to 
the  right  towards  hill  536.  The  point,  one  squad,  is  at  the 
bridge.  The  main  body  is  marching  at  3  miles  per  hour. 


126  MILITARY  PRIMER 

You  are  in  command  of  the  point.  Just  as  you  get  to  the 
farther  end  of  the  bridge  a  group  of  Red  soldiers  fire  at  you 
from  the  direction  of  the  church,  325  yards  ahead  to  the  right 
of  the  road.  You  cannot  see  how  many  there  are.  (1)  What 
do  you  do  (2)  What  would  you  do  if  you  were  in  command 
of  the  advance  party  ? 

Before  proceeding  intelligently  with  problems  of  this  sort, 
we  must  consider  the  sort  of  an  enemy  that  is  confronting  us. 
Are  the  men  good  shots?  Are  they  fearless,  resourceful?  Or 
are  they  poor  shots,  and  of  the  sort  that  fire  a  volley  or  two, 
and  then  retreat?  Are  they  liable  to  be  closely  supported,  or 
may  they  be  simply  the  members  of  a  reconnoitering  patrol 
seeking  only  to  cause  a  deployment,  and  so  to  discover  some- 
thing of  the  strength  and  morale  of  our  forces? 

The  first  three  questions  can  be  answered  only  after  war 
has  been  declared,  and  we  know  who  our  enemy  is.  Then  we 
shall  know  the  sort  of  fighters  we  have  to  deal  with.  Until 
that  time,  in  our  studies,  we  must  assume  an  ideal  enemy,  brave, 
well  instructed,  good  marksmen,  intelligent,  and  generally  for- 
midable. If  we  know  how  to  deal  with  such  an  enemy,  knowl- 
edge of  the  tactics  to  use  against  a  lesser  one  will  readily  follow. 
However,  the  mere  fact  that  our  enemy  is  not  disciplined  and 
instructed  in  the  art  of  war  according  to  the  standards  of  the 
armies  of  the  principal  nations  of  the  world,  or  that  he  will  not 
stand  before  well  disciplined  troops  and  a  well  directed  fire,  does 
not  necessarily  mean  that  he  is  not  a  resourceful  enemy.  He 
may,  in  spite  of  his  lack  of  tactical  training,  be  possessed  of 
natural  abilities  and  special  cunning  in  certain  kinds  of  minor 
warfare,  as  were  our  American  Indians,  and  as  are  some  of  the 
partly  civilized  and  barbarous  peoples  with  which  we  are  often 
thrown  in  contact.  And,  if  such  be  our  enemy,  we  must  con- 
sider those  conditions  and  learn  how  to  best  meet  them. 

The  last  question  deals  only  with  this  particular  problem. 
If  this  hostile  group  has  come  from  the  north  they  may  not 
have  seen  the  command  behind  our  point.  The  advance  party, 
at  the  moment  under  discussion,  has  not  come  in  sight  of  them, 
and  they  have,  perhaps,  seen  nothing  of  the  rest  of  the  column. 
Of  course  they  know  much  about  it,  from  the  fleeing  inhabi- 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  127 

tants.    But  reports  from  such  a  source  are  sure  to  be  misleading. 

The  head  of  the  main  body  is  1400  yards  from  the  place 
where,  if  the  Red  troops  remain  near  the  church,  it  will  be 
under  their  fire.  It  is  marching  at  such  a  rate  that  it  will  be 
about  sixteen  minutes,  roughly,  before  it  reaches  the  danger 
zone.  In  that  time  the  advance  guard,  to  properly  fulfill  its 
mission,  must  drive  them  away,  if  weak;  must  develop  their 
strength,  if  strong. 

It  is  800  yards  from  the  church  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge  north- 
west of  520.  From  the  church  to  this  ridge  the  road  will  be  in 
full  view  of  the  advance  party  when  it  reaches  the  next  rise  in 
the  road.  The  northwestern  horizon  for  the  advance  party  will 
then  be  at  this  ridge's  crest.  It  hides  everything  beyond. 

Nothing  is  known  of  the  strength  of  the  Red  force  at  the 
church.  The  point,  at  the  bridge,  although  much  nearer  than 
the  advance  party,  has  not  as  good  a  view.  There  is  no  cover, 
except  the  creek  bank,  to  protect  the  point  in  case  it  should  at- 
tempt to  advance.  The  range  is  very  close,  and  the  Red  soldiers, 
under  cover,  in  full  knowledge  of  the  Blue  point's  strength,  have 
every  advantage. 

Besides,  there  is  no  need  for  hurry.  The  advance  party  is 
there  to  support  the  point,  and  a  few  minutes'  delay,  more  or 
less,  will  not  work  any  harm.  Of  course,  the  point  should  fire 
on  the  group  at  the  church,  if  they  can  see  any  Red  soldiers  to 
aim  at.  The  point  should  not  advance  to  attack  yet.  Men  should 
not  be  sacrificed  uselessly  in  prematurely  attacking  a  force  whose 
strength  is  entirely  unknown. 

There  are  21  mounted  scouts  with  the  regiment.  15  of  these 
are  acting  as  a  flank  patrol  on  the  road  next  west,  running  past 
Swift  Run  School  House.  The  other  6  have  just  joined  the 
advance  party,  coming  in  from  Hill  587,  where  they  have  been 
stationed  in  observation  of  the  country  to  the  east  and  north. 
If  they  should  trot  down  the  hill  to  the  west,  cross  the  creek  at  the 
ford,  and  then,  under  cover  of  the  woods  to  the  north,  threaten 
the  Red  group  at  the  church,  they  will,  if  the  latter  is  weak,  cause 
it  to  retreat  while  it  can  get  away;  if  it  be  strong,  or  is  strongly 
supported,  that  fact  will  also  be  developed,  and  disclosed  to  the 
rest  6f  the  advance  party,  waiting  in  observation  where  we  first 


128  MILITARY  PRIMER 

placed  it.  In  the  meantime  the  point,  which  took  cover  at  once 
when  fired  on,  can  afford  to  await  developments. 

Why  did  the  Red  group  at  the  church  wait  so  long  before 
disclosing  its  presence  there  by  firing  on  the  point?  Because 
they  hoped  to  discover,  perhaps,  by  waiting,  whether  the  point 
was  really  the  point  of  an  advance  guard,  or  merely  a  patrol, 
but  they  could  not  afford  to  wait  any  longer;  325  yards  is  not 
far,  and  the  point  was  coming  right  along,  in  a  very  open  for- 
mation. The  Red  group  has  not  seen  any  other  Blue  groups. 
If  it  wishes  to  remain  there  any  longer  in  observation  it  must 
delay  the  point.  So  it  fires  on  it,  and  the  point,  very  properly, 
scuttles  to  cover. 

Very  soon  afterwards  the  advance  party  comes  in  sight. 
Six  mounted  men,  a  moment  later,  are  seen  by  the  Red  look- 
outs to  leave  the  advance  party.  They  trot  down  the  hill  towards 
the  ford.  The  rest  of  the  advance  party  halts  and  takes  cover. 
Now  is  the  moment  for  the  Red  group,  if  a  patrol,  as  is  the  case, 
to  escape.  This  they  do  by  galloping,  as  foragers  well  spread  out, 
towards  the  north,  across  the  fields.  They  disappear  in  the 
woods  north  of  the  church. 

Now,  you  ask,  why  did  they  go  to  the  church  at  all?  They 
could  get  a  better  view  of  the  country  towards  New  Oxford 
from  the  crest  northwest  of  520  than  from  the  church,  unless 
the  latter  is  more  than  60  feet  high — an  unlikely  assumption. 

Is  it  a  ruse,  to  lead  the  advance  guard  into  a  trap  on  top  of 
the  hill?  Or  had  the  Red  patrol  missed  the  Blue  groups  to  the 
south,  in  their  advance  from  520  to  the  church,  and  only  dis- 
covered their  presence  when  they  saw  the  Blue  point  coming 
down  the  hill  towards  the  bridge?  That  can  only  be  con- 
jectured. 

The  advance  party  commander,  when  he  saw  the  Red  patrol 
gallop  off  to  the  north,  went  down  the  hill  to  the  point,  and  ad- 
vanced with  it  to  the  church.  Here  he  signalled  to  the  mounted 
scouts  at  the  northern  edge  of  the  woods  to  the  left  to  advance. 

You  should  be  cautious  about  the  matter  of  signals  when  you 
are  where  you  suspect  the  enemy  may  be  watching  you.  If  you 
were  in  action  with  a  hostile  group,  and  saw  one  member  of  it 
moving  about,  swinging  his  arms  wildly,  you  would  at  once  mark 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  1M 

him  as  a  leader,  and  your  fire  would  concentrate  on  him.  No 
order  to  do  so  would  be  necessary.  Instinctively  your  men 
would  select  him  as  a  target.  It  is  a  psychological  fact  that  as 
long  as  a  group  of  men  is  under  fire,  and  no  one  of  them  makes 
himself  conspicuous  in  any  way,  men  will  fire  at  the  group,  and 
not  at  an  individual.  The  result  is  that  casualties  will  be  few. 
But  let  one  man  become  prominent  in  any  way,  and  he  attracts 
all  the  attention.  Not  only  is  the  one  making  signals  very  likely 
to  be  hit,  but  the  shooting  at  the  group  becomes  more  accurate, 
because  the  men  have  a  definite  target  to  fix  their  attention  on. 

The  British  learned  this  lesson  from  the  Boers :  "If  you  do 
not  wish  to  be  singled  out  as  the  patrol  commander,  refrain  from 
making  signals ;  you  can  shout  any  orders  you  like  as  loud  as  you 
like ;  but  as  soon  as  you  make  any  movement  with  your  arm  you 
are  pretty  sure  to  be  spotted.  The  casualities  among  officers, 
compared  with  those  among  the  men,  have  become  far  greater 
in  modern  warfare  than  formerly. 

"The  reason  for  this  appears  to  be  that  improvements  in 
modern  rifles  and  in  field  glasses  have  made  it  far  more  easy  to 
pick  out  individuals  at  distant  ranges;  and  with  the  present 
weapons  of  precision  it  has  become  a  far  easier  matter  to  hit  a 
solitary  individual,  even  when  he  is  a  long  way  off,  than  it  was 
formerly."  (Capt.  Vander  Byl,  Patrolling  in  South  Africa, 
1902.) 

So,  in  this  case,  do  not  give  conspicuous  signals.  Your  use- 
fulness will  be  greatly  prolonged  thereby. 

It  is  500  yards  from  the  church  to  the  northwest  corner  of 
the  woods  where  the  group  from  the  advance  party  should  now 
be.  How  would  you  signal  them  to  go  forward,  over  this  dis- 
tance, and  not  make  a  conspicuous  signal?  It  should  have  been 
prearranged.  The  advance  party  commander,  in  sending  out 
this  group  of  mounted  scouts,  should  have  called  the  leader  to 
him,  and  instructed  him  in  somewhat  this  way:  ''There  is  a 
Red  group  at  that  church.  Take  your  men,  by  this  road,  across 
the  ford,  and  then,  under  cover  of  those  woods  over  there,  make 
a  feint  on  the  church.  If  the  Reds  retire,  do  not  follow  them, 
but  as  I  advance  with  the  point,  from  the  church,  skirmish  up  to 
the  ridge,  through  that  cornfield." 


130  MILITARY  PRIMER 

Having  these  instructions  in  mind,  when  the  leader  of  the 
flanking  group,  from  the  cover  of  the  woods,  at  the  495  con- 
tour, saw  the  point  advance  from  the  church,  he  commanded: 
"As  foragers,  at  twenty  yards,  MARCH/'  (Paragraph  348,  Cav- 
alry Service  Regulations,  and  Paragraph  621,  Infantry  Drill 
Regulations.)  The  leader  of  the  patrol  trotted  up  towards  the 
cornfield. 

Now  let  us  consider  another  assumption :  The  leader  of  the 
advance  party,  on  first  seeing  the  group  at  the  church,  mused 
thus:  "What  are  those  Reds  doing  way  down  there?  They 
must  have  seen  us  as  we  came  down  the  hill  out  of  New  Oxford. 
Is  it  a  trick  to  coax  the  support  into  an  ambush  set  for  it  up 
there  in  that  cornfield?  I'll  investigate."  So  he  calls  a  sergeant 
to  him,  and  says:  "I  am  going  to  take  a  few  men  across  this 
ford  here,  and  go  up  behind  those  woods,  to  run  those  Reds  out 
of  there.  If  they  pull  out,  go  ahead  with  the  rest  of  the  advance 
party  and  the  point.  Halt  the  point  at  the  church.  I  shall  go  on 
and  investigate  that  ridge  over  there.  That  cornfield  looks  like 
a  pretty  good  place  for  a  Red  position." 

The  Red  group  at  the  church  retires  as  before  on  seeing  this 
group  detach  itself  from  the  advance  party.  The  mounted  scouts 
were  directed,  when  they  were  detached,  to  halt  at  the  north- 
west corner  of  the  woods  across  the  Conewago,  instead  of  skir- 
mishing up  to  the  cornfield,  as  in  the  other  case,  and  to  wait  there 
for  the  group  from  the  advance  party  to  come  up.  When  the 
leader  of  the  advance  party  reached  the  corner  of  the  woods, 
with  his  group,  he  found  the  mounted  scouts  there.  They  had 
seen  nothing.  The  officer  selects  three  mounted  scouts,  and  says 
to  them:  "There  may  be  Reds  hidden  in  that  cornfield,  and  I 
want  you  to  investigate  it.  It  is  dangerous  duty,  but  I  have  con- 
fidence in  you.  Keep  your  wits  about  you,  and  do  this:  Trot, 
in  open  order,  directly  towards  that  cornfield.  When  you  have 
nearly  reached  the  fence,  halt,  and  then  suddenly  turn  about  and 
gallop  back  .  If  there  are  Reds  there,  one  or  more  of  the  nervous 
ones  will  surely  fire  at  you.  Don't  gallop  straight  back — zigzag 
a  little." 

Such  tactics  sound  dangerous,  but  they  really  are  not.  The 
men  who  cannot  resist  the  impulse  to  shoot  without  orders  at 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  131 

a  retreating  enemy  will  invariably  be  the  younger,  less  steady 
soldiers ;  inexperienced  and  undisciplined,  their  aim  will  certainly 
be  bad.  It  is  notable  that  when  one  or  two  men  of  a  firing  line 
fire,  through  nervousness  and  without  command,  they  will  be 
followed  by  a  ragged  volley,  each  shot  pulled  off  without  aiming, 
often  without  the  rifle  at  the  shoulder,  and  in  the  resulting  con- 
fusion, a  very  fair  estimate  of  the  length  of  the  firing  line  can  be 
got.  Another  thing  that  will  add  to  the  chances  of  not  being 
hit  is  that  our  three  troopers  are  galloping  down  hill,  and  men 
firing  down  hill  almost  invariably  fire  high 

Suppose,  in  this  instance,  that  the  three  men  do  develop  the 
fact  that  there  is  a  Red  firing  line  in  the  edge  of  the  cornfield. 
What  should  the  commander  of  the  advance  party  do  ?  Should 
he  attack  ?  By  no  means.  It  is  not  the  function  of  the  advance 
party  commander  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement,  or  that  of  the 
support  commander,  nor  of  the  advance  guard  commander  even. 
It  is  the  commander  of  the  main  body  who  must  decide  whether 
or  not  he  wishes  to  give  battle.  The  advance  guard  commander 
who  commits  his  command  to  an  engagement,  unless  specifically 
ordered  "to  attack  the  enemy  wherever  found,"  or,  after  having 
reported  the  enemy  in  a  certain  place  in  force,  to  his  commander, 
is  ordered  to  engage  him,  is  an  unsafe  man  for  such  duty.  His 
duty  is  protective;  his  duty  is  to  ward  off  attacks  of  the  enemy, 
or  to  warn  his  commander  of  his  presence,  not  to  bring  on  a 
battle.  He  must  resist,  of  course,  if  attacked.  He  must  deter- 
mine the  strength  of  the  enemy,  when  he  is  discovered,  and  not 
allow  the  march  of  the  main  body  to  be  delayed  by  small  hostile 
bodies,  but  he  must  not  commit  his  superior  to  a  general  engage- 
ment without  specific  instructions  to  do  so. 

Should  the  commander  of  the  advance  party  then  simply 
wait  for  orders?  Again  by  no  means.  He  should  now  try 
to  determine  the  extent  of  the  hostile  line,  by  seeking  to  dis- 
cover its  flanks.  The  cornfield  is  a  small  one ;  to  the  west  is 
the  stubble  of  a  grain  field,  and  beyond  that  some  woods.  Be- 
yond these  woods  is  another  stubble  field.  It  is  beyond  the 
woods  that  the  mounted  patrol  southwest  of  the  church  should 
go,  after  locating  the  hostile  line  in  the  cornfield.  If  that 
stubble,  which  affords  no  cover  at  all,  is  clear,  it  should  next 


152  MILITARY  PRIMER 

examine  the  woods.  And,  in  doing  this  it  should  not  halt  two 
or  three  hundred  yards  from  the  woods.  Here  it  must  take 
a  chance:  trot  right  up  to  them  and  into  them,  in  open  order, 
over  a  wide  front.  It  should  go  to  the  eastern  edge  of  the 
woods,  if  they  are  clear,  leaving  a  man  or  two  at  the  western 
edge,  to  watch  in  that  direction.  In  this  position  it  can  afford 
to  await  developments.  It  is  beyond  the  right  flank  of  the 
Red  line.  Its  leader  can  quickly  give  warning  if  the  Red  line 
is  strengthened  on  that  flank,  or  of  any  movement  of  troops 
in  that  vicinity. 

SECOND  SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 

The  Red  group  at  the  church  has  disappeared.  The  sup- 
port is  at  the  bridge.  The  advance  party  is  at  520.  You  still 
command  the  point,  and  you  are  at  the  farm  house  at  the  right 
of  the  road  400  yards  ahead.  How  would  you  reconnoiter  the 
valley  of  Swift  Run? 

The  Red  group  at  the  church  disappeared  in  the  woods  to 
the  east  of  your  present  position.  It  has  not  been  seen  since. 
Where  did  it  go?  You  do  not  see  it  on  the  hill  to  the  north, 
across  the  Conewago.  The  valley  of  Swift  Run  is  hidden 
behind  the  military  crest;  the  trees  and  the  little  knoll  north 
of  the  bridge  448W  hide  the  road,  to  the  north  of  the  bend 
in  it,  across  the  Run.  You  can  see  but  little  of  the  country 
beyond,  where  you  must  go.  How  are  you  going  to  advance? 
There  is  nothing  to  do  but  to  advance.  You  must  either  take 
a  chance,  and  go  ahead  rapidly  to  the  crest  of  the  little  knoll 
across  the  Run,  or  you  may  send  two  or  three  mounted  scouts 
ahead,  at  the  trot,  while  you  watch  them  as  they  go.  If  they 
get  to  the  bend  a  hundred  yards  beyond  the  cut  in  the  road 
without  incident  they  should  halt,  signal  "all  clear,"  (and  the 
fact  that  they  do  halt,  and  remain  steadily  in  observation 
should  be  sufficient  signal  to  you  that  all  is  clear)  and  wait  for 
the  rest  of  the  point  to  come  up,  and  then  go  ahead  to  the 
crest  of  the  knoll.  Nothing  would  be  gained  by  their  going 
ahead  before  the  dismounted  point  reached  their  own  present 
position.  When  the  point  has  come  up,  and  is  in  a  position 
to  watch  them,  the  scouts  could  trot  to  the  top  of  the  little 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  158 

knoll  ahead,  wait  there  for  the  point  again,  and  then  trot  across 
the  little  valley  to  the  next  rise  in  the  road,  always  keeping 
on  the  horizon  ahead,  effectually  preventing  any  surprise  of  the 
point. 

This  is  nerve-racking  work.  You  know  that  the  enemy  is 
near;  you  have  seen  him  disappear,  and  in  the  direction  you 
must  go,  and  you  must  follow  him.  For  such  duties  it  takes 
men  of  steady  nerve,  full  of  courage,  resourceful.  Men  who 
are  sent  on  it  should  be  warned  of  its  danger,  and  assured  of 
its  necessity. 

THIRD  SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 

You  are  now  in  command  of  the  fifteen  mounted  scouts 
that  are  acting  as  a  left  flanking  patrol  on  the  road  paralleling 
the  one  the  main  body  is  on,  1%  miles  to  the  west.  As  the 
head  of  the  main  body  leaves  New  Oxford  you  have  nearly 
reached  the  crossroad  557,  1%  miles  west  of  New  Oxford. 

How  do  you  conduct  the  march  of  your  patrol?  What 
advance  guard  do  you  have  out?  Where  do  you  make  your 
halts  between  557  and  the  Conewago  crossing  four  miles  to 
the  northwest. 

From  the  head  of  the  support  to  the  rear  of  the  main  body 
the  column  whose  left  flank  you  are  protecting  from  surprise  is 
about  a  mile  long.  In  view  of  its  mission  and  the  length  of 
the  column,  it  should  march  at  the  rate  of  three  miles  per  hour ; 
it  should  pass  a  given  point  in  about  twenty  minutes.  You 
must  dispose  your  fifteen  men  so  that  they  will  cover  this 
length  of  column  from  an  unexpected  attack.  The  colonel,  you 
are  told,  is  to  march  through  New  Oxford  on  Newchester  and 
across  the  Conewago,  to  secure  the  crossings  of  that  stream. 
You  are  to  protect  the  regiment  from  surprise  from  the  west. 
Whence  might  come  that  surprise?  Manifestly  it  must  come 
from  the  direction  of  the  roads,  unless  an  ambush  has  been  laid, 
in  anticipation  that  the  regiment  would  march  by  that  special 
road. 

You  crossed  the  York  Turnpike  without  seeing  the  trail  of 
a  hostile  body,  or  any  indications  of  his  presence.  The  roads 
by  which  an  enemy  might  reach  the  regiment  run  northeast  from 


134  MILITARY  PRIMER 

557,  568,  530,  and  594.  These  are  the  roads  you  must  watch. 
If  you  send  a  patrol  to  568,  and  remain,  yourself,  at  557,  with 
a  couple  of  men  watching  from  the  nose  200  yards  to  the  south- 
east, through  the  gap  in  the  trees  to  the  east,  until  the  head 
of  the  column  leaves  New  Oxford,  you  will  know  that  it  is 
safe  from  an  attack  coming  east  from  557.  You  may  then  ride 
forward  to  568,  where  you  wait  for  the  head  of  the  main  body 
to  reach  the  ridge  400  yards  northwest  of  520,  when  you  trot, 
with  your  patrol,  less  the  group  ahead,  towards  594. 

You  do  not  leave  anyone  at  530.  This  crossroad  can  be 
as  well  watched  from  the  crest  300  yards  to  the  northwest,  so 
you  leave  two  men  there  and  two  at  Snyder's,  while  you  go  on 
with  the  rest  to  594. 

Let  us  now  go  back  to  the  patrol  that  went  ahead  from  557. 
It  was  composed  of  a  sergeant  and  six  men.  It  went  forward 
as  described  on  page  83.  The  same  precautions  taken  by  the 
point  of  the  advance  guard,  described  above,  must  be  taken 
by  this  patrol,  which  will  act  as  advance  guard  for  the  partol 
in  rear.  The  sergeant,  riding  in  advance  with  one  of  the  troop- 
ers, has  the  other  five  men  follow  at  200  yards.  When  he 
reaches  Swift  Run  School  House,  he  and  the  man  with  him 
separate.  He  rides  forward  to  the  edge  of  the  woods  ahead, 
keeping  on  the  right  side  of  the  road.  As  he  reaches  it  he 
halts,  looks  north  along  the  road  northeast  from  568.  finds  all 
clear,  and  then,  keeping  on  the  left  side  of  the  road,  rides  up 
to  the  farm  house  just  beyond.  From  the  shelter  of  the  trees 
and  shrubbery  at  the  northern  edge  of  the  farmyard  he  sees 
that  the  horizon  is  just  beyond  568,  in  that  direction. 

His  view  is  the  same  to  the  northeast  it  was  from  the  corner 
of  the  woods,  but  to  the  northwest  he  can  now  see  the  hills  across 
Swift  Run  valley,  and  here  and  there  to  the  west  he  gets  glimpses 
of  the  road  506 — 606  up  to  632,  where  it  drops  over  the  ridge 
and  out  of  sight.  There  is  no  sign  of  movement  anywhere.  He 
signals,  with  his  hand  low  down,  to  the  trooper  to  join  him. 
As  he  does  so  they  ride,  boot  to  boot,  straight  up  the  road  to 
the  farm  house  at  568.  The  rest  of  the  patrol  follows,  and 
closes  up  at  the  farm  buildings.  A  man  dismounts  and  walks 
forward,  keeping  close  to  the  fence,  to  the  crest  a  hundred  yards 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  135 

beyond,  where  the  best  view  in  this  part  of  the  terrain  can  be 
had.  He  signals  "all  clear"  by  leaning  against  a  fence  post,  or 
by  using  any  other  prearranged  and  inconspicuous  signal.  The 
men  all  dismount,  drop  out  their  horses'  bits,  water  them  at  the 
trough,  and  then  let  them  graze. 

As  the  rest  of  the  patrol  comes  up,  a  little  later,  bridles  are 
adjusted,  the  men  mount  and  await  instructions.  The  ser- 
geant's patrol  is  ordered  to  go  ahead  to  530,  and  the  ridge  at 
Snyder's,  while  the  patrol  will  wait  here  for  the  main  body  to 
pass  the  ridge  just  beyond  520,  to  the  northeast.  The  advance 
patrol  goes  ahead,  using  the  same  formation  as  before;  one, 
man  is  dropped  off  at  530,  one  more  at  the  private  road  leading 
to  the  farmhouse  to  the  left,  350  yards  beyond;  the  rest  ride* 
on  and  halt,  one  at  Snyder's,  the  others  at  the  edge  of  the  woods 
beyond. 

This  disperses  the  patrol  over  nearly  a  half  mile  of  road, 
but  it  is  necessary.  Here  is  a  broad  ridge,  with  roads  on  both 
sides  of  it,  leading  across  the  one  the  main  body  must  take. 
Both  these  roads  must  be  watched,  and  the  patrol  must  not 
be  broken — i.  e.,  each  group  of  it  must  be  able  to  see  at  least 
one  group  towards  the  leader.  When  the  rest  of  the  flank 
patrol  comes  up,  the  group  near  530  trots  up  and  is  joined  by 
the  next  group ;  together  they  pick  up  the  man  at  Snyder's,  and 
advance.  Then  the  sergeant,  at  the  northern  edge  of  the  woods, 
knows  it  is  time  to  go  on,  and  he  rides  up  to  594,  where  he  halts, 
sending  one  man  west  of  the  orchard  to  watch  the  road  towards 
Rupp's  and  beyond,  leaves  one  man  on  the  ridge  100  yards  south- 
east of  the  crossroad,  and  halts  with  the  rest  of  the  patrol,  at 
the  crossroad.  The  commander  of  the  flank  patrol  now  rides 
up  and  joins  him. 

Until  the  main  body  reaches  Newchester  the  roads  at  530 
and  594  must  both  be  watched.  The  patrol  is  not  strong  enough 
to  keep  in  touch  with  the  main  body,  using  connecting  files, 
in  this  rough  country.  How,  then,  is  the  patrol  commander 
to  know  when  to  move  ahead?  There  is  a  stretch  of  road  about 
700  yards  long,  leading  southeast  from  Oak  Grove  School  House, 
that  is  visible  from  the  top  of  the  ridge  near  594.  If  this  road 


136  MILITARY  PRIMER 

is  watched,  the  advance  guard,  after  crossing  the  Conewago, 
will  be  seen  moving  on  it,  and  until  the  advance  guard  does 
appear  there,  the  flank  patrol  should  remain  where  it  is,  unless 
something  should  occur  to  give  it  duties  elsewhere. 

FOURTH  SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 

Soon  after  you  reach  594  you  hear  heavy  firing  to  the  east 
(you  are  still  commanding  the  left  flank  patrol)  ;  the  woods 
hide  everything  in  that  direction.  What  do  you  do  now,  and 
why? 

Let  us  look  at  the  terrain  for  a  moment.  At  Newchester 
the  Conewago  makes  an  abrupt  bend,  and  is  crossed  by  two 
bridges,  one  to  the  north,  one  to  the  east.  To  the  south  of  the 
village  is  a  semi-circular  ridge  that  commands  all  the  roads 
leading  to  the  village  from  the  south.  This  ridge  begins  at  the 
nose  east  of  the  cut  in  the  road  leading  to  New  Oxford,  runs 
across  that  cut,  and  bending  at  hill  572,  ends  at  hill  573.  The 
ridge  is  about  a  mile  long,  and  is  so  placed  that  reserves  sent 
from  behind  its  center  could  quickly  reinforce  any  part  of  a 
line  occupying  it. 

The  left  flank  patrol  has  seen  no  indications  of  the  passage 
of  hostile  troops  from  the  west  or  southwest  into  Newchester, 
so  they  might  have  come  from  the  north.  You  have  sent  no 
messages  to  the  advance  guard  commander.  The  latter,  and 
the  colonel  of  the  regiment,  must  now  be  most  anxious  to  know 
the  strength  of  the  Red  force  occupying  Newchester.  The 
need  of  watching  crossroad  530  has  now  disappeared,  but  594 
must  still  be  watched.  You  are  there  now.  You  say  to  the 
sergeant:  "Hear  that  firing!  Remain  here,  with  your  patrol, 
for  the  present  in  observation.  I  will  take  the  rest  of  the  patrol 
and  try  and  locate  the  right  of  the  Red  line  that  must  be  in 
front  of  Newchester,  and  get  in  touch  with  the  left  of  our  line. 
I  will  leave  a  small  patrol  on  the  road  here"  (pointing,  on  the 
map,  to  the  Y  in  the  road  650  yards  east  of  Snyder's,  where  a 
private  road  leads  from  the  main  road  to  a  farm  house)  ''and 
will  instruct  the  leader  of  that  patrol  as  to  my  farther  move- 
ments. Send  messages  through  that  patrol." 


ADVANCE  GUARDS  137 

You  then  return  to  530  at  the  gallop,  picking  up  the  mem- 
bers of  your  patrol  as  you  go ;  you  reach  530,  turn  there  to  the 
north,  and  halt  at  the  farm  road,  where  you  leave  three  men. 
This  leaves  you  five  men;  seven  are  at  594,  three  are  here.  To 
the  leader  of  this  group  you  say:  "Stay  here  for  the  present. 
Watch  well  in  all  directions.  I  am  going  to  reconnoiter  from 
the  farther  edge  of  those  woods,  towards  Newchester.  Send 
messages  to  our  main  body,  which  must  be  to  the  east." 

So  far  you  have  seen  no  Red  troops.  You  lead  your  patrol 
into  the  woods,  bend  northeast  through  them,  and  the  woods 
to  the  northeast  of  them,  to  the  edge  of  the  pasture  on  the 
southern  edge  of  hill  573.  Here  you  halt.  You  see  a  few  Red 
mounted  men  on  the  road  at  the  northeast  corner  of  the  pasture. 
Looking  through  the  trees  to  the  east  you  see  a  column  of 
infantry  filling  the  road  leading  south  from  the  school  house. 
They  are  halted.  The  firing  is  heavy  to  the  east.  You  cannot 
see  your  own  troops.  You  divide  your  patrol  quickly,  leaving 
three  men  and  a  corporal  here  in  the  edge  of  the  woods,  with 
these  instructions:  "Watch  that  infantry.  If  they  advance 
to  the  south,  follow  them.  Keep  on  their  flank,  and  warn 
the  regiment  if  they  attempt  to  flank  it  by  slipping  down  any 
of  these  ravines  to  the  south.  You  are  now  on  your  own  re- 
sources. I  shall  join  the  regiment  and  report  what  I  have  seen." 

Taking  the  remaining  men  you  ride  through  the  woods  as 
rapidly  as  you  can  to  the  valley  of  the  little  stream  to  the  south- 
west, then  down  that  stream,  and  up  its  eastern  branch  to  the 
private  road  leading  to  480.  Here  you  find  the  colonel,  and 
you  report  what  you  have  seen  to  him. 


CHAPTER  XL 
FLANK  GUARDS. 

"The  flanks  of  a  column  are  protected  in  part  by  the  advance 
guard,  which  carefully  examines  the  ground  on  both  sides  of  the 
line  of  march.  It  may  be  necessary,  however,  to  provide  additional 
security  for  flank  threatened  by  an  enemy.  This  is  done  by  sending 
a  detachment,  called  a  FLANK  GUARD,  to  cover  the  exposed  flank." — 
Paragraph  53,  Field  Service  Regulations. 

GENERAL  SITUATION. 
Guide  Map. 

The  boundary  between  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland  sepa- 
rates two  States  that  are  at  war.  Blue,  Southern,  forces  have 
crossed  the  frontier,  and  are  in  the  vicinity  of  Littlestown.  Red, 
Northern,  forces  are  advancing  from  the  North.  Gettysburg 
is  fortified,  and  held  by  a  small  garrison. 

SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 
Topographical  Map. 

A  reinforced  brigade  (a  brigade  of  infantry  to  which  de- 
tachments of  cavalry  and  field  artillery  are  attached)  is  sent 
from  Littlestown  to  the  north,  through  New  Oxford  and  New- 
chester,  on  a  special  mission. 

At  noon,  July  26th,  the  formation  of  the  column  is  as  fol- 
lows: The  advance  cavalry,  one  troop,  has  crossed  the  South 
Conewago;  the  infantry  point,  one  squad,  is  at  the  center  of 
New  Oxford;  the  advance  party,  one  company,  less  one  squad, 
is  at  the  railroad  crossing,  near  the  southern  edge  of  the  town  ; 
the  support,  one  battalion,  less  one  company,  marches  800  yards 
in  rear  of  the  advance  party;  the  reserve,  one  regiment,  less 
two  battalions  *,  800  yards  in  rear  of  the  support.  The  main 


*  This  expression,  one  regiment,  less  two  battalions,  indicates  that 
the  headquarters  of  the  regiment  is  here;  only  one  battalion  is  with 
the  headquarters. 


FLANK  GUARDS  139 

body,  800  yards  in  rear  of  the  reserve,  is  5,740  yards  long,  com- 
posed as  follows:  Each  regiment  of  infantry,  with  its  combat 
trains,  covers  1500  yards  of  road  space;  the  field  artillery  bat- 
talion covers  1030  yards;  the  field  trains,  1710  yards.  The  com- 
bat train  of  the  regiment  in  advance  marches  in  rear  of  the 
reserve  of  the  advance  guard.  The  field  and  combat  train  of 
the  cavalry  squadron  are  with  the  field  train  of  the  brigade. 

The  squadron,  less  one  troop,  is  acting  as  a  flank  guard  on 
the  right  flank,  and  the  3d  battalion  of  the  advance  guard 
regiment  is  acting  as  left  flank  guard. 

The  main  body  that  is  covered  by  these  two  flank  guards  is 
5740  yards  long — 3*/2  miles.  It  takes  it,  marching  at  2^  miles 
per  hour,  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes  to  pass  a  given  point. 

The  latest  information  that  the  Blue  commanding  officer 
has,  concerning  the  Red  forces,  is  to  the  effect  that  heavy  in- 
fantry reinforcements  are  being  rushed,  by  train,  into  Gettys- 
burg, and  that  a  brigade  of  Red  cavalry  was  at  York,  16  miles 
east  of  New  Oxford,  last  night. 

Major  B ,  commanding  the  left  flank  guard,  had  brought 

his  battalion  by  the  roads  on  the  ridge  west  of  Brush  Run  from 
Bonneauville  as  far  as  Cedar  Ridge  (Strategic  Map),  where 
he  crossed  to  the  east  side,  and,  at  noon,  his  most  advanced 
group  was  at  584,  ^  mile  east  of  Brush  Run  Station,  on  the 
York  Turnpike. 

He  estimates  the  situation  as  follows: 

MISSION  :  To  protect  the  brigade  he  is  covering  from  sur- 
prise from  the  west. 

FORCES:  The  brigade  he  is  covering  is  the  most  advanced 
Blue  force  in  the  vicinity.  The  rest  of  its  division  is  at  Littles- 
town,  9  miles  to  the  south.  A  strong  Red  infantry  force  is 
intrenched  at  Gettysburg.  Other  Red  forces  are  advancing 
from  the  north,  but  none  of  them  are  reported  as  being  within 
striking  distance  from  this  side.  A  Red  cavalry  brigade  was 
reported  to  be  at  York,  16  miles  to  the  east,  last  night. 

CONDITIONS:  The  country  is  hostile.  The  Blue  brigade  is 
wedging  itself  between  two  hostile  forces,  which,  combined,  are 


140  MILITARY  PRIMER 

stronger  than  the  Blue  brigade.  Its  mission  is  independent,  and 
it  can  hope  for  no  assistance  from  Littlestown  before  tomorrow. 

WHAT  WILL  THE  ENEMY  PROBABLY  DO?  From  the  Stra- 
tegic Map  it  is  evident  that  if  a  force  comes  from  Gettysburg 
to  intercept  the  Blue  brigade  it  will  probably  use  the  York 
Turnpike,  the  road  through  Hunterstown,  or  the  Harrisburg 
Road.  It  is  with  the  two  former  roads  that  his  problem  now 
concerns.  The  Red  cavalry  may  ride  around  the  head  of  the 
Blue  column,  and  attack  from  the  left  flank.  If  the  attack  comes 
by  way  of  the  York  Turnpike  it  will  probably  be  delivered  at 
the  crossing  of  the  Little  Conewago  or  at  Brush  Run.  It  may 
be  delivered  in  the  direction  of  Irishtown,  (Strategic  Map) 
as  the  main  body  is  now  marching  northeast  from  Square  Corner 
by  551,  489,  and  521  towards  New  Oxford. 

If  the  road  towards  Irishtown,  from  584,  York  Turnpike, 
where  the  leading  group  of  the  flank  guard  now  is,  is  not  used, 
the  Reds  may  advance  northeast  from  584,  or,  turning  north- 
east from  552,  a  little  more  than  a  mile  west  of  Brush  Run 
Station,  marching  on  Newchester.  They  may  advance  on  the 
York  Turnpike  to  the  shelter  of  the  ridge  between  Brush  Run 
and  Swift  Run,  thence  across  the  fields,  sheltered  from  view 
by  that  ridge,  and  the  ridge  next  east,  to  a  position  across  the 
New  Oxford-Newchester  road,  south  of  Swift  Run. 

If  they  use  the  road  through  Hunterstown,  they  may  seek 
a  position  across  the  Blue  line  of  advance  at  Newchester. 

THE  TERRAIN:  The  general  trend  of  the  ridges,  south  of 
the  Conewago,  is  north  and  south.  The  stream  valleys  are 
from  100  to  200  feet  below  the  ridge  levels,  and  good  defen- 
sive positions,  with  easy  lines  of  retreat,  can  be  found  on  the 
crests  of  the  ridges  on  both  sides  of  each  little  valley. 

COURSES  OPEN  :  The  battalion  has  a  column  3%  miles  long 
to  protect  from  surprise.  It  must  be  strong  enough  at  any 
point  of  that  long  line  to  delay  the  advance  groups  of  a  Red 
attacking  force  to  enable  the  Blue  main  body  to  select  a  de- 
fensive position,  and  to  deploy  on  that  position.  If  the  threaten- 
ing body  is  not  too  strong,  it  must  hold  it  in  check  while  the 
Blue  main  body  passes,  and  not  allow  the  latter's  march  to  be 


FLANK  GUARDS  141 

delayed  by  it.  It  cannot  hope  to  stop  small  hostile  reconnoitering 
patrols  from  sifting  through  here  and  there  to  observe  the  main 
body,  nor,  indeed,  should  that  be  attempted.  The  Red  military 
authorities  should  know,  from  the  friendly  inhabitants  of  the 
country,  all  about  the  Blue  strength  and  direction  of  march. 

The  flank  guard's  field  of  action  is  limited  to  a  lateral  dis- 
tance of  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  main  body.  (Paragraph 
658,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations.)  Patrols  of  the  advance  cav- 
alry should  cover  the  front  of  the  line  of  march  over  a  front 
of  about  three  miles.  There  should  be  such  a  patrol  now  at  668, 
just  beyond  Swift  Run  School  House. 

(a)     Major  B may  secure  his  flank  of  the  main  body 

by  marching  his  battalion  as  an  attenuated  column  of  small 
groups,  marching  on  the  road,  paralleling  the  whole  length  of 
the  main  body.  This  arrangement  could  effectively  warn  the 
main  body  of  a  hostile  approach,  but  would  entirely  destroy 
the  offensive  value  of  the  flank  guard. 

(b)  He  might  divide  his  battalion  into  two  groups  of  two 
companies  each.  One  of  these  groups  might  start  at  the  same 
time  as  the  advance  guard  of  the  main  body,  and  keep  abreast 
of  the  support,  preceded  by  an  advance  party  and  point.  The 
other  group,  starting  at  the  same  time  the  main  body  starts, 
might  keep  abreast  of  its  head  during  the  march. 

Applying  the  principles  of  Paragraph  48,  Field  Service  Regu- 
lations, patrols  could  be  detached  from  the  leading  group,  to 
station  themselves  on  points  having  a  commanding  view  to  the 
west.  There  they  could  remain  until  the  rear  of  the  wagon 
train  had  passed,  when  they  could  resume  the  march,  picking 
up  succeeding  patrols  as  they  advance,  and  joining  their  proper 
command  at  the  end  of  the  day's  march.  This  method  pre- 
serves the  offensive  strength  of  the  flank  guard  where  it  is  most 
needed,  maintains  a  constant  watch  over  the  country  to  the  west, 
and  all  with  a  minimum  of  marching  on  the  part  of  the  men 
employed. 

DECISION  :     Major  B decides  to  use  the  latter  method, 

and  issues  instructions  accordingly. 


142  MILITARY  PRIMER 

The  plan  works  out  as  follows :  The  patrol  of  the  advance 
cavalry  reported  above  as  at  568,  remains  there  until  relieved 
by  the  flank  guard.  At  the  moment  the  problem  opens,  the 
point  of  the  advance  party  of  the  leading  group  has  reached 
584,  and  marches  on  toward  557;  the  advance  party,  150  yards 
in  rear,  reaches  584  about  two  minutes  later,  and  stations  two 
men  at  this  crossroad  to  wait  for  its  main  body  that  is  600 
yards  in  its  rear.  When  this  group  comes  up,  it  detaches  a 
patrol  of  a  corporal  and  four  men,  who  go  to  the  western  edge 
of  the  orchard,  450  yards  to  the  west.  Two  men  are  left  at  584. 
There  they  are  instructed  to  wait  until  the  rear  of  the  wagon 
train  enters  New  Oxford,  when  they  are  to  join  the  rearmost 
group  of  the  flank  guard. 

The  next  important  observation  point  is  568.  The  point  of 
the  flank  guard  reaches  there,  and  finds  there  the  patrol  of  the 
advance  cavalry  referred  to  above.  This  patrol  gives  them  all 
the  information  it  has  concerning  the  enemy,  and  it  then  trots 
ahead,  observing  the  usual  precautions,  to  Hill  571,  just  across 
Swift  Run,  where  it  resumes  its  observation  duties. 

A  second  stationary  patrol  is  posted  at  568,  where  it  waits 
until  the  rearmost  group  of  the  flank  guard  comes  up,  which 
it  joins. 

Succeeding  stationary  patrols  are  left  on  Hill  571;  on  the 
nose  300  yards  northwest  of  530;  at  the  edge  of  the  woods 
beyond  Snyder's;  and  at  594,  at  each  of  which  places  the  point 
of  the  advance  guard  relieves  the  patrol  of  the  advance  cavalry, 
which,  in  turn,  trots  forward  to  the  next  place,  where  it  again 
waits  in  observation  until  relieved. 

Paragraph  568,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations,  provides  that 
"practicable  communication  must  exist  between  it  (the  flank 
guard)  and  the  main  body."  This  does  not  mean  that  constant 
visual  communication  must  be  kept  up.  That  would  be  often 
impossible,  without  a  great  expenditure  of  men,  and  it  is  not 
necessary.  What  is  necessary  is  that  each  patrol  should  be  so 
posted  that  it  can  see  at  least  one  other  patrol  towards  the 
nucleus,  whatever  that  nucleus  may  be.  The  paragraph  quoted 
also  insists  that  physical  communication  between  the  two  bodies 


FLANK  GUARDS  143 

must  be  always  possible ;  that  is,  the  flank  guard  must  not  allow 
any  obstacle  between  it  and  the  main  body  that  could  make  it 
impossible  for  the  flank  guard  to  join  the  main  body,  if  it  be- 
came necessary. 

In  this  case  the  patrol  west  of  the  orchard  can  see  the  two 
men  at  584,  who  can  see  the  main  body  across  the  Little  Cone- 
wago.  The  patrol  at  568  can  see  the  one  west  of  the  orchard; 
that  at  571,  the  one  at  568;  that  northwest  of  530,  the  one  on 
571 ;  the  one  beyond  Snyder's  should,  by  connecting  files,  or 
otherwise,  as  the  terrain  permits,  see  the  one  south  of  Sny- 
der's, and  the  one  at  594,  the  one  northwest  of  Snyder's. 

The  right  flank  guard,  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  less  the  troop 
in  the  advance  guards,  has  marched,  (Strategic  Map)  through 
Germantown,  Whitehall,  Mount  Rock  School,  Irishtown,  to  the 
Baltimore  Pike. 

A  series  of  patrols  strung  along  the  line  of  march,  as  de- 
scribed in  the  case  of  the  infantry  flank  guard  above,  would 
give  the  same  measure  of  protection  against  surprise,  but  it 
would  be  impossible  to  give  the  same  amount  of  physical  pro- 
tection, because  of  the  inferior  strength  of  the  cavalry — 258 
sabres  to  432  rifles.  The  cavalry  is  farther  weakened  by  the 
necessity  of  subtracting  one-fourth  of  its  number  to  hold  the 
horses  of  the  others  when  they  dismount  to  take  the  defensive. 
That  reduces  the  effective  dismounted  strength  of  this  flank 
guard  to  192  rifles.  To  make  up  for  this  weakness  in  numbers, 
the  cavalry  reconnoissance  must  be  over  a  wider  area. 

Due  to  the  limitations  of  the  map,  we  can  only  conjecture 
what  the  terrain  to  the  east  is  like.  It  is  safe  to  assume  that 
Pigeon  Hills  gave  a  very  extensive  view  to  the  east.  The  Red 
cavalry  at  York  was  almost  as  near  to  Pigeon  Hills,  when  at 
its  camp  there,  as  the  Blue  cavalry  was  in  its  camp  at  Littles- 
town.  So,  if  Major  C expects  to  occupy  those  heights 

in  advance  of  the  Red  cavalry,  he  must  send  a  detachment  there 
early,  and  at  a  rapid  gait.  It  is  nine  miles  from  the  cavalry 
camp  at  Littlestown  to  Pigeon  Hills,  and  Major  C de- 
tached one  of  his  troops  early  in  the  morning,  directing  its 
commander  to  go  rapidly  there.  A  smaller  force  might  be  sent, 


144  MILITARY  PRIMER 

but  it  might  not  be  able  to  hold  the  position  there.    That  reduces 

Major  C 's  flank  guard  proper  to  two  troops. 

When  he  arrived,  at  noon,  at  581,  1J4  miles  east  of  New 
Oxford  on  the  York  Turnpike  (Strategic  Map)  he  learned  from 
a  messenger  from  the  troop  on  Pigeon  Hills  that  atmospheric 
conditions  were  such  that  the  view  from  the  hill  was  limited 
to  about  three  miles,  and  that  there  were  no  signs  of  hostile 
troops  within  that  radius. 

Major  C then  estimated  the  situation  as  follows: 

MISSION  :  To  protect  the  right  flank  of  the  brigade  from 
surprise. 

FORCES:  The  Red  cavalry  brigade,  and  the  Blue  brigade 
he  is  screening,  are  the  only  known  forces  to  be  considered. 
However,  the  information  received  may  be  deceptive,  and  he 
must  take  no  chances. 

CONDITIONS:  He  is  so  weak  that  the  most  he  can  hope  to 
be  able  to  do  is  to  warn  the  main  body  of  the  approach  of  the 
hostile  cavalry,  and,  having  discovered  it,  to  keep  in  contact 
with  it,  holding  his  small  force  between  it  and  the  main  body, 
during  the  latter's  deployment.  The  thick  atmosphere  limits  him 
in  his  work  in  a  measure. 

WHAT  WILL  THE  ENEMY  PROBABLY  DO?  The  enemy  will 
undoubtedly  advance  until  near  New  Oxford  by  the  York  Turn- 
pike. He  may  turn  off  to  the  northwest,  when  within  a  few 
miles  of  that  village,  and  seek  to  ride  around  the  head  of  the 
Blue  column,  attacking  it  in  front  or  near  its  head,  while  the 
troops  from  Gettysburg  attack  it  in  flank.  He  may  turn  south- 
west, east  of  Pigeon  Hills,  and  seek  to  attack  the  trains,  while 
the  troops  from  Gettysburg  attack  in  flank. 

TERRAIN  :  The  terrain  may  be  assumed  to  be  similar,  east 
of  the  map  we  have,  to  that  the  Blue  troops  are  working  on. 
It  is  favorable  for  rapid  marching,  and  the  number  of  parallel 
roads  available  will  permit  the  Red  brigade  to  advance  with  a 
number  of  short  columns,  thus  increasing  considerably  the  rate 
of  march.  He  is  probably  unhampered  by  his  trains. 

COURSES  OPEN:  Major  C must  give  the  brigade  com- 
mander ample  time  to  prepare  for  a  cavalry  attack,  since  he  is 


PLANK  GUARDS  14i 

not  strong  enough  to  delay  the  hostile  command  materially.   His 
plan  is  stated  above. 

At  noon  the  right  flank  guard  was  in  this  position:  One 
troop  in  observation  on  Pigeon  Hills;  two  troops  at  the  inter- 
section of  the  York  and  Baltimore  Turnpike,  1^  miles  east  of 
New  Oxford.  Patrols  are  scattered  along  parallel  to  the  Blue 
line  of  march,  and  two  to  three  miles  distant  from  it.  A  patrol 
is  on  Hill  586  (Topographical  Map),  two  miles  northeast  of 
New  Oxford;  and  a  patrol  is  on  the  ridge  crossed  by  the  Balti- 
more Pike,  two-thirds  of  a  mile  south  of  the  bridge  where  the 
Baltimore  Pike  crosses  the  Conewago.  This  patrol  could  see 
the  patrol  of  the  advance  cavalry  that  was  stationed  near  the 
cut,  400  yards  northeast  of  Oakwood  School  House. 

Instead  of  having  his  patrols  remain  in  position  until  the 

rear  of  the  wagon  train  had  passed,  Major  C has  them 

move  up  progressively.  Thus:  when  the  rearmost  patrol  saw 
the  rear  of  the  wagon  train  had  come  opposite  his  position,  it 
walked  and  trotted  leisurely  up  to  the  next  patrol  ahead,  which 
it  relieved.  The  patrol  so  relieved,  relieved  the  one  ahead,  and 
so  on  throughout  the  column.  In  this  way  each  patrol  marched 
the  same  distance  that  every  other  one  did,  and  every  patrol 
was  constantly  in  observation,  except  one.  This  one  was  al- 
ways the  one  that  was  not  at  the  moment  needed. 

The  patrols  could  relieve  each  other  at  very  moderate  gaits 
indeed,  since  the  main  column  was  marching  at  only  2%  miles 
per  hour. 

The  patrol  of  the  advance  cavalry  was  the  only  one  whose 
duty  was  particularly  hazardous. 

Flank  protection  for  this  column  might  have  been  secured 
by  requiring  each  regiment  to  provide  its  own  flank  guards. 
In  that  case  each  flank  guard  would  march  with  flanking  groups 
thrown  out  to  the  side  away  from  the  column,  at  the  same  rate 
as  the  column  itself  did. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

REAR  GUARDS. 

"The  rear  guard  is  charged  with  the  important  duty  of  covering 
the  retreat." — Paragraph  55,  Field  Service  Regulations. 

Students  are  advised  to  study  Paragraphs  55  to  58,  Field 
Service  Regulations,  which  describe  the  duties  of  the  rear 
guard,  and  need  but  little  comment  in  explanation. 

The  formation  and  nomenclature  of  the  rear  guard  is  very 
similar  to  that  of  the  advance  guard,  but  its  mission  is  very 
different-  The  advance  guard  is  seeking  the  enemy,  so  that 
the  main  body  may  attack  him  to  advantage;  the  rear  guard  is 
delaying  the  enemy  so  that  he  may  not  attack  the  main  body. 

It  often  happens  that  a  detachment  of  troops  finds  itself 
in  a  situation  where  it  would  be  folly  to  give  battle.  The 
enemy,  superior  in  numbers,  or  in  the  advantage  of  position, 
should  not  be  met.  The  detachment  must  retreat  until  it  is 
reinforced,  or  until  it  reaches  a  position  where  the  advantage 
would  be  on  its  side.  In  such  cases  the  work  of  the  rear  guard 
is  very  important.  The  force  it  protects  must  not  be  hurried, 
or  it  may,  instead  of  retiring  in  good  order,  under  the  control 
of  its  officers,  suddenly  be  stampeded. 

The  patrols  from  the  rear  guard  cavalry  cover  the  country 
over  a  broad  sector  in  rear  of  the  column  they  are  protecting. 
They  must  be  vigilant  and  tenacious,  hanging  on  to  good  points 
of  observation  to  the  last  moment,  always  with  a  good  line  of 
retreat  selected,  and  with  a  clear  idea  of  where  their  next  halt 
is  to  be  made.  They  send  their  information  in  to  the  rear 
guard  by  visual  signals,  with  flags,  or  by  verbal  messages.  As 
the  enemy  presses  the  rear  guard  closer,  these  patrols  become 
combat  patrols,  hanging  on  to  the  hostile  flanks  and  watching 
and  promptly  reporting  every  hostile  move. 

Defeated  troops  may  easily  become  demoralized,  and  their 
orderly  retreat  easily  turned  into  a  rout.  It  is  this  calamity 
that  the  rear  guard  seeks  to  prevent.  The  march  of  the  main 


REAR  GUARD  147 

body  must  not  be  hurried.  The  victor  should  do  all  in  his 
power  to  gather  the  full  fruits  of  his  victory  by  destroying 
his  defeated  enemy  utterly,  by  spreading  panic  among  his 
troops,  by  creating  in  their  minds  the  idea  that  he  cannot  be 
stopped.  This  effect  can  be  easiest  produced  at  the  beginning 
of  the  retreat.  When  an  army  has  been  driven  out  of  its 
position  by  a  superior  enemy  its  morale  is  very  low,  and  the 
troops  that  have  suffered  most  in  the  battle  need  the  longer 
time  to  recover  their  confidence,  to  have  their  tactical  units 
reorganized.  Confusion  reigns  at  first,  but,  after  a  time,  this 
condition  is  improved,  and  the  army  may  again  become  a  for- 
midable body- 
When  a  large  army  has  been  driven  from  a  position  that 
it  has  stubbornly  defended  up  to  the  point  where  it  has  been 
overwhelmed  by  the  enemy,  the  resulting  confusion  in  the 
defeated  troops  is  usually  complete.  The  wise  general  has 
saved  strong  reserves  that  are  placed  in  commanding  positions 
to  check  the  enemy  while  this  confusion  is  reduced  to  order. 

These  reserves,  to  which  are  added  the  least  demoralized 
of  the  defeated  troops,  fight  delaying  actions,  retreating  from 
one  defensive  position  to  another,  holding  east  just  long 
enough  to  force  the  enemy  to  a  wide  deployment,  but  not  long 
enough  to  become  so  involved  as  not  to  be  able  to  retreat  to 
the  next  selected  position. 

The  enemy  will  attempt  to  hold  the"  rear  guard  in  its  posi- 
tion as  long  as  possible,  in  order  to  make  a  detour  with  his 
cavalry  and  horse  artillery,  clear  around  the  flank  of  the  rear 
guard,  to  reach  and  strike  the  confused  mass  of  fugitives  it  is 
protecting,  and  whose  officers  are  straining  every  nerve,  to 
reorganize  into  efficient  fighting  units. 

For  instance,  suppose  a  Blue  army  has  been  defeated  at 
Gettysburg,  (Strategic  Map)  and  the  disorganized  units  that 
bore  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  are  retreating  towards  the  pass 
in  South  Mountain  west  of  Cashtown.  A  rear  guard  has  been 
organized,  that  successfully  holds  the  Red  pursuing  force  in 
check  along  the  Chambersburg  Pike.  A  force  of  Red  cav- 
alry and  horse  artillery  makes  a  detour  by  Arendtsville  and 


148  MILITARY  PRIMER 

the  roads  running  south  and  southwest  from  there.  A  por- 
tion, dismounted,  supporting  the  guns,  suddenly  appears  on 
Rock  Top  just  as  the  roads  in  the  pass  are  choked  with 
wagons,  ambulances,  troops  without  officers  or  organization, 
discouraged,  disheartened.  The  panic  heightens  and  spreads. 

Other  portions  of  the  Red  cavalry  attack  the  column, 
reaching  it  by  the  roads  from  the  north,  and,  striking  the  dis- 
organized column  in  flank  in  several  places,  complete  the  de- 
moralization. It  is  not  difficult  to  predict  what  might  happen 
to  the  Blue  command  under  such  a  condition  of  affairs. 
Already  beaten,  threatened  in  front  and  flank  and  rear  by 
superior  troops,  already  flushed  by  victory,  it  would  require  a 
strong  hand  indeed  to  save  anything  from  the  wreck. 

Such  a  catastrophe  must  be  prevented  by  covering  the 
country  that  could  possibly  be  used  by  the  enemy,  with  a  mass 
of  patrols  so  that  such  an  unexpected  attack  as  that  described 
could  not  be  given.  It  is  the  suddenness  of  the  attack,  its 
entirely  unexpected  quality,  that  makes  such  an  attack  success- 
ful. If  the  fugitive  troops  had  an  hour's  warning  even,  that 
a  cavalry  attack  from  the  north  was  impending,  they  could 
have  partially  organized,  at  .least,  to  meet  it;  the  element  of 
surprise  would  be  wanting.  It  is  the  moral,  and  not  the 
physical  effect  of  cavalry  attacking  infantry  that  is  to  be 
feared- 

"The  individual  infantryman  whose  rifle  is  loaded  and  who 
knows  how  to  use  his  bayonet  is  more  than  a  match  for  the 
individual  mounted  man  even  on  open  ground;  and,  if  he 
remains  cool,  retains  his  presence  of  mind,  and  uses  his  rifle 
properly  while  keeping  the  opponent  constantly  in  view,  he  is 
even  superior  to  several  mounted  men.  Infantry  which  re- 
tains its  steadiness  has  nothing  to  fear,  ever  when  outnum- 
bered by  cavalry.  Its  main  strength  lies  in  steadily  delivered 
fire,  while  cavalry  relies  on  the  possibility  of  making  an  un- 
expected rapid  charge,  on  quickly  covering  great  distances,  and 
on  the  moral  effect  which  its  irresistible  onslaught  undoutedly 
produces  upon  infantry.  So  long  as  there  is  a  possibility  of 
surprise  and  misunderstanding,  of  infantry  allowing  itself  to 


REAR  GUARD  149 

become  discouraged,  and  of  the  individual  soldier  becoming 
exposed  to  hunger  and  hardships,  so  long  will  cavalry  that  is 
energetically  led  be  able  to  gain  brilliant  victories."  (Page 
301,  Infantry  Tactics,  Balck.) 

Rear  guard  problems  are  essentially  combat  problems,  and 
are  studies  for  officers  of  higher  training  than  it  is  expected 
will  use  this  book,  but  the  duties  of  the  patrols  of  the  rear 
guard  are  most  important.  It  is  necessary  for  young  students 
in  the  Art  of  War  to  know  their  importance. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

PATROLING,  REVIEWED. 

"From  the  standpoint  of  training,  scouting  detachments  give 
young  infantry  officers,  who  are  tied  to  a  command,  an  opportunity 
to  develop  self -confidence,  decision  and  tactical  judgment;  to  cope 
with  hardships  and  difficulties  on  their  own  responsibility.  In  this 
manner  characteristics  may  be  developed  in  the  young  officers  which 
will  be  of  benefit  to  them  in  a  large  battle." — Balck,  Infantry  Tac- 
tics, page  28. 

GENERAL  SITUATION. 
Guide  Map. 

The  Susquehanna  River  separates  two  States  that  are  at 
war.  Blue,  Western,  forces  are  defending  Gettysburg.  Red, 
Eastern,  forces  have  crossed  the  frontier,  and  are  advancing 
on  Gettysburg. 

SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 
Strategic  and  Topographical  Maps. 

You  are  the  leader  of  a  Blue  officer's  strategic  patrol, 
mounted,  that  has  come  this  morning  from  Gettysburg  by  way 
of  Hunterstown,  whose  mission  is  to  search  the  country  from 
Round  Hill  to  New  Oxford  for  hostile  troops.  The  people 
of  the  country  are  in  rebellion  against  their  own  government, 
and  are  friendly  to  the  Reds. 

Your  patrol  has  reached  crossroad  594,  about  \y2  miles 
southwest  of  Newchester.  You  halt  it  there,  and  send  one 
man  to  the  top  of  the  ridge  on  the  road  a  hundred  yards  to  the 
southeast,  to  see  what  may  be  on  the  southern  slope  of  the 
ridge,  and  in  the  valley  beyond- 

While  waiting  for  a  report  from  this  man  a  Red  cavalry 
patrol  comes  suddenly  out  from  the  shelter  of  the  farm  build- 
ings northeast  of  the  crossroad,  charges  your  patrol  and  cap- 
tures it. 


PATROLLING  REVIEWED  151 

What  was  defective  in  the  way  you  handled  your  patrol? 
How  could  it  have  escaped  the  disaster  that  overtook  it? 

The  patrol  had  come  from  the  southwest,  along  the 
northern  slope  of  a  long  ridge.  Your  southern  and  eastern 
horizon,  up  to  the  moment  you  were  jumped,  had  been  along 
the  crest  of  that  ridge,  except  for  the  moment  you  were  pass- 
ing the  high  spot  in  the  road  to  the  west  of  the  orchard. 
When  the  patrol  reached  Rupp's  house,  the  road  could  be  seen 
(by  observation,  and  with  the  help  of  the  map)  to  cross  the 
northern  end  of  that  ridge,  and  to  drop  down  a  long,  gentle 
slope  towards  the  east.  594  is  at  the  crossing  of  two  quite 
important  roads,  and  a  patch  of  timber,  with  underbrush,  is 
in  the  northern  angle  of  the  crossroad.  Just  west  of  the 
crossroad,  as  just  mentioned,  near  594,  the  road  reaches  the 
top  of  the  ridge,  where  the  view  to  the  south  suddenly  becomes 
more  extended.  Here  is  where  the  patrol  should  have  halted, 
while  two  men  went  forward  to  the  bend  in  the  road,  100 
yards  east  of  594. 

Now  let  us  consider  the  different  ways  the  patrol  should 
have  been  handled,  depending  on  whether  it  was  a  strategic 
patrol,  the  point  of  an  advance  guard,  the  point  of  a  flank 
guard,  or  the  rear  point  of  a  rear  guard. 

Of  all  these  patrols,  the  strategic  patrol  needs  to  act  with 
greatest  caution.  It  is  alone,  far  from  support,  on  a  most 
important  mission.  The  country  is  hostile,  and  the  people 
will  use  every  means  at  their  disposal  to  warn  your  enemy  of 
your  approach.  If  the  Red  forces  are  near,  you  may  be  sure 
that  they  will  know  you  are  in  the  neighborhood,  and  they  will 
certainly  seek  to  destroy  or  capture  you. 

You  must  constantly  bear  this  in  mind,  and  must  make 
your  halts  only  in  places  where  you  cannot  be  surprised.  You 
must,  too,  have  you  lines  of  retreat  constantly  worked  out. 
Move  rapidly  over  suspicious  places,  never  giving  a  possible 
enemy  time  to  plan  your  capture. 

With  this  idea  in  mind,  should  you  have  taken  your  patrol 
to  594  at  all?  Hardly.  The  woods  west  of  Rupp's  would 
be  an  unlikely  place  for  an  ambush.  You  might  stumble  on 


152  MILITARY  PRIMER 

a  Red  group  marching  on  the  road  there,  but  594  would  be  a 
much  more  likely  place  for  a  Red  group  to  wait  for  you- 

A  strategic  patrol  should  avoid  important  crossroads, 
unless  the  country  is  very  open  around  them  in  all  directions, 
and  the  view  better  there  than  can  be  obtained  elsewhere. 

This  patrol  might  have  trotted  up  to  Rupp's  —  his  house 
is  in  the  open  and  is  a  most  unlikely  place  for  an  ambush. 
A  pair  of  men  then  would  probably  have  ridden  up  to  the 
crest  of  the  ridge,  in  the  cornfield,  for  a  look  around  to  the 
south ;  if  that  is  clear,  the  whole  patrol  might  take  the  private 
road  to  the  north,  thence  across  the  fields  to  the  northeast, 
where  you  have  an  excellent  view  in  the  direction  you  are  to 
go,  then  by  Cashman's  to  513,  thence  by  the  little  used  road 
across  the  ford  to  the  northeast  to  527  and  the  open  country 
beyond. 

Suppose  you  were  the  point  of  an  advance  guard.  The 
body  you  are  protecting  is  marching  from  Hunterstown  on 
Newchester  and  Hampton.  You  are  followed  at  200  yards 
by  an  advance  party,  and,  it  at  700  yards,  by  a  support.  In 
such  a  case,  do  you  imagine  the  Reds  would  lay  an  ambush 
at  594  to  pick  you  off?  By  no  means.  That  would  be  a  bad 
place  for  a  large  force  to  put  up  a  fight,  and  a  small  one  would 
stand  a  small  chance  of  getting  away  from  the  rest  of  the 
advance  guard.  Besides,  nothing  is  gained  by  picking  off  the 
point  of  an  advance  guard.  It  is  quite  the  reverse  with  a 
strategic  patrol.  In  the  former  case,  the  point  would  simply 
be  replaced  by  another  one.  In  the  latter,  the  entire  purpose 
of  the  patrol  would  be  defeated.  The  commander  who  sent  it 
out  would  get  no  benefit  from  it  at  all. 

The  point  of  an  advance  guard  would  have  no  reason  to 
look  for  trouble  at  594.  Where,  then,  would  he  look  for 
trouble?  At  573,  a  little  farther  on,  if  anywhere  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Conewago.  Here  is  a  commanding  position ;  good 
cover  and  good  lines  of  retreat  are  also  here,  protected  by 
excellent  covering  positions  in  rear.  So  the  point  of  an  ad- 
vance guard  could  go  right  on  through  594,  without  any 
hesitation- 


PATROLLING  REVIEWED  153 

Suppose  the  Blue  force  marching  from  Hunterstown  on 
Newchester  were  a  flank  guard  for  a  larger  force  marching 
on  the  York  Turnpike.  How  would  its  march  be  conducted? 
What  would  it  look  for?  In  many  respects  its  methods  of 
advancing  would  be  the  same  as  those  of  the  advance  guard 
just  considered.  It  must  protect  itself  from  surprise.  But 
its  mission,  in  addition  to  the  ever-present  one  of  self-protec- 
tion, is  now  to  protect  another  body,  marching  on  a  parallel 
road.  How  might  that  body  be  reached  from  the  north? 
Only  by  the  roads.  Small  groups,  easily  brushed  aside,  if 
seen,  might  break  through  the  flank  guard  to  observe  the  main 
body.  The  flank  guard  can  hardly  hope  to  prevent  that  alto- 
gether. Such  Red  groups  would  never  waylay  the  point  of 
the  flank  guard.  Their  only  salvation  is  secrecy.  Their  re- 
connoissance  must  be  a  stealthy  one.  So  594  in  this  case,  as 
well  as  in  that  of  the  advance  guard,  could  hardly  conceal  an 
ambush. 

The  patrol  we  are  considering,  after  a  glance  up  the  road 
594 — 613 — 529,  to  see  that  it  was  clear,  after  a  glance  at  the 
dust  in  the  road  at  594,  to  see  if  any  tracks  indicated  the 
recent  passage  of  troops  on  the  roads  meeting  there,  would 
go  on  through  594,  pausing  at  the  cemetery  500  yards 
farther  on  to  look  towards  Oak  Grove  School  House  to  see  if 
that  road,  too,  were  clear,  and  then  on  to  the  hill  573. 

Suppose  our  patrol  were  the  rear  point  of  a  rear  guard. 
How  would  its  problem  differ  from  the  ones  we  have  been 
considering?  As  the  main  body,  in  its  retreat,  passed  along 
over  the  road,  the  rear  guard  halted,  from  time  to  time,  wher- 
ever it  found  a  good  position  to  put  up  a  delaying  action. 
The  last  such  position  was  at  575,  2,000  yards  southwest  of 
594,  and  here  and  at  632,  to  the  south,  the  rear  party  and  its 
rear  points  would  remain  in  observation,  watching  the  roads 
to  the  west  and  the  country  to  the  north  and  south,  until  the 
larger  units  of  the  rear  guard  had  reached  the  fine  covering 
position  at  the  hills  573  and  572,  on  the  edge  of  Newchester. 
This  they  would  seek  to  hold  until  the  retreating  forces  had 
all  crossed  the  Conewago  safely.  As  soon  as  the  rear  party 


154  MILITARY  PRIMER 

was  convinced  that  the  rear  guard  had  reached  this  position, 
they  would  follow  to  594  and  the  hill  near  Snyder's,  to  the 
southeast,  taking  no  precautions  whatever  in  regard  to  594, 
but  watching  keenly  to  the  rear  and  to  the  flanks  for  indica- 
tions of  the  enemy 

So,  it  is  seen,  in  the  methods  used  in  the  reconnoissance  of  a 
crossroad  depend  entirely  on  the  mission  of  the  patrol  making 
it.  The  same  is  true  of  all  other  forms  of  tactical  duties. 
When  the  time  comes  to  apply  the  tactical  principles  learned 
from  theoretical  studies,  to  maneuvers,  or,  in  that  unhappy 
event,  to  war,  this  thought  should  be  kept  foremost  in  mind : 
"Nothing  that  I  have  studied  hitherto  will  apply  exactly  to 
the  situation  that  I  may  meet  over  the  next  hill,  but  if  I  keep 
my  mission  clearly  in  mind,  and  keep  my  head,  I  ought  to  be 
able  to  apply  the  correct  principle  to 'the  changed  conditions." 

Above  all,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  function  of 
mounted  patrols,  whether  of  cavalry  or  mounted  scouts,  is  to 
help  its  infantry;  that  it  is  the  infantry  that  must  bear  the 
brunt  of  the  battle,  and  that  the  success  of  the  infantry,  in 
great  measure,  will  depend  on  the  constant  stream  of  infor- 
mation that  it  should  get  from  its  mounted  auxiliaries. 

To  go  back  to  the  situation  on  page  145:  Consider,  now, 
that  you  are  the  one  man  sent  southeast  to  observe  the  valley 
to  the  south.  When  you  saw  your  patrol  had  been  surprised 
and  captured,  you  galloped  towards  Snyder's  across  the  pas- 
ture to  the  east  of  his  house  and  into  the  woods  beyond.  Two 
men  pursue  you ;  you  shoot  one  of  them  and  the  other  turns 
back,  evidently  to  join  his  patrol.  What  is  your  mission  now  ? 
How  do  you  go  about  it  ? 

Should  you  obey  the  impulse  to  go  back  to  Gettysburg,  and 
report  that  your  patrol  had  been  overwhelmed.  The  manu- 
als say:  "When  it  is  certain  that  the  enemy  has  been  discov- 
ered, that  fact  is  promptly  reported." — Paragraph  28,  Field 
Service  Regulations.  "Whether  the  information  gained  is  of 
sufficient  importance  to  be  reported  at  once  *  *  *  is  a 
question  which  must  be  decided  in  each  case." — Paragraph 
619,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations. 


PATROLLING  REVIEWED  155 

Is  the  information  now  possessed  by  you  —  that  a  Red 
patrol  had  captured  all  of  your  patrol  except  yourself,  at  the 
crossroad  l*/2  miles  southwest  of  Newchester  —  important 
enough  to  be  reported  at  once?  It  is  of  tremendous  impor- 
tance to  you,  and  still  more  to  your  recent  companions,  but 
does  it  possess  more  than  human  interest  to  your  commander? 
Decidedly  not.  He  wants  to  know  more  about  the  situation. 
Was  that  patrol  you  saw  a  strategic  patrol,  a  reconnoitering 
patrol,  the  point  of  an  advance  guard,  an  outpost  patrol? 
Was  it  followed  by  other  troops,  or  was  it  alone?  You  are 
under  cover;  you  can  go,  still  under  cover,  to  where  you  can 
observe  the  road  leading  eastward  from  where  the  Red  patrol 
was  seen,  and  it  is  your  duty  to  try  and  get  some  information 
that  will  be  of  real  value  to  your  commander.  If  you  were 
to  go  back  now  he  would  learn  nothing  of  real  value  to  him. 
He  already  knows  that  the  Reds  are  advancing  from  the  east ; 
the  fact  that  a  Red  cavalry  patrol  was  at  the  crossroad  594 
at  the  hour  that  disaster  overtook  your  leader,  of  itself  means 
nothing  to  him,  but  if  you  can  discover  what  larger  bodies 
this  patrol  is  screening,  and  you  can  give  him  definite  infor- 
mation as  to  where  they  are,  the  risk  you  run  will  be  well 
compensated  for. 

So  you  ride  through  the  open  woods,  west  of  the  brook, 
and  into  the  thicker,  brushy  woods  beyond-  From  its  south- 
ern edge  you  see  a  column  of  Red  infantry  march  down  the 
road  leading  southwest  from  the  Newchester  School  House. 
It  takes  them  three  minutes  to  pass.  They  are  preceded  by 
about  half  a  company,  and  it  by  a  patrol.  You  watch  this 
road  for  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  and  no  more  troops  pass.  You 
work  your  way  cautiously  to  the  southern  angle  of  the  thick 
woods  you  are  in,  and  you  see  that  the  infantry  has  halted  near 
the  farmhouse  in  the  little  valley  beyond,  directly  in  your  front. 
They  have  stacked  arms,  taken  off  their  equipments,  and  are 
cooking  food  at  many  little  fires.  Men  are  lounging  about; 
evidently  they  are  not  intending  to  move  on.  You  slip  back 
into  the  woods,  work  through  them  to  the  northern  edge  of 
them,  and  along  the  western  edge  of  the  pasture  to  the  north, 


15«  MILITARY  PRIMER 

screened  from  view  by  a  little  ridge  to  the  cast,  and  by  a  fringe 
of  trees  to  the  west.  You  reach  the  northwest  corner  of  the 
pasture,  where  there  is  a  gate.  You  pass  through  this  gate, 
and,  from  the  road,  you  see  a  group  of  fifteen  or  twenty  infan- 
try at  the  farmhouse  about  400  yards  to  the  west.  They  sec 
you,  but  you  gallop  down  the  little  private  road  to  the  north, 
and  through  the  fields  to  Cashman's.  You  have  escaped.  Is 
it  now  appropriate  for  you  to  start  for  Gettysburg?  By  all 
means.  You  have  located  a  battalion  of  infantry  that  is 
probably  a  support  of  an  outpost  line  supplying  a  line  of  out- 
guards  to  the  south  and  southwest.  A  second,  smaller  group 
has  also  been  seen,  probably  a  picket  of  the  same  outpost. 
This  is  information  of  value,  and  it  would  be  decidedly  wrong 
for  you  to  jeopardize  your  own  safety  by  trying  to  get  more 
definite  information,  alone  and  unsupported,  especially  as  you 
seem  to  be  clear  of  the  Reds,  and  escape  seems  possible. 

When  you  get  back  would  you  tell  your  commander  that 
you  had  seen  a  support  and  a  picket  of  an  outpost  line?  No. 
Show  him,  on  the  map,  where  you  have  been  and  what  you 
have  seen.  Let  him  draw  his  own  inferences.  Perhaps  other 
Blue  patrols  have  also  secured  information  of  this  same  Red 
command,  and  what  you  tell  him,  added  to  what  he  learns 
from  them,  may  be  just  the  bit  of  information  he  needs  to 
complete  his  knowledge  of  the  situation  in  that  quarter. 

The  above  discussion  should  prove  the  correctness  of 
General  von  Bernhardi's  assertion :  "The  first  contact  witk 
the  hostile  infantry  should  always  be  reported."  Aggressive 
and  well  led  cavalry  will  send  patrols  all  over  the  country  in 
the  neighborhood  of  its  own  army  and  that  of  its  enemy.  In- 
fantry patrols,  however,  are  seldom  sent  far  from  their  own 
command,  (paragraph  620,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations)  and 
the  fact  that  even  a  patrol  of  infantry  is  seen,  if  it  is  the  first 
infantry  group  to  be  seen,  is  usually  important  enough  to  be 
reported. 

Strategic  patrols  should  not  attempt  too  close  reconnois- 
sance  of  a  hostile  force.  Distant  reconnoissance  made  through 
glasses,  when  possible,  is  best.  A  nearer  view  will  undoubt- 


PATROLLING  REVIEWED  ISf 

edly  give  the  patrol  leader  more  accurate  information,  but 
the  chance  of  getting  messages  through  to  supporting  bodies 
is  greatly  lessened  when  the  reconnoissance  is  made  by  break- 
ing through  the  hostile  protective  groups.  Especially  is  it 
mandatory  that  a  patrol  "back  out"  when  the  leader  discovers 
that  he  is  between  hostile  columns.  Reconnoissance  is  usually 
best  made  from  a  flank,  and  the  surest  results  are  apt  to  fol- 
low if  the  reconnoissance  is  made  from  the  flank  that  is  near- 
est the  supporting  group. 

Von  Bernhardi  says :  (pp.  52  and  53,  Cavalry  in  War  and 
Peace)  "We  must  lay  down  here,  once  and  for  all,  that  the 
distant  observation  with  the  glass  is  by  far  the  most  important ; 
it  affords  the  best  survey  over  the  general  conditions,  and  a 
better  possibility  of  sending  back  a  report  safely  and  quickly. 
It  is  just  in  this  method  of  observation  that,  in  consequence 
of  our  peace  conditions,  patrols  are  generally  so  badly  trained. 
Again  and  again  they  fall  into  the  error  of  approaching  too 
close  to  the  enemy,  and,  in  order  to  see  as  much  of  him  as 
possible,  let  him  march  past  them.  They  are  then  compelled 
to  send  in  their  reports  from  places  which  lie  behind  the  belt 
of  the  hostile  service  of  security.  The  despatch  riders  have 
then  to  ride  from  the  rear  through  the  hostile  advance  guard, 
outposts,  and  patrol  system. 

"In  peace,  where  there  are  no  bullets,  and  prisoners  may 
not  be  made,  these  methods  lead  to  the  best  results,  and  to 
their  being  employed  agai^  and  again,  particularly  if  the 
superior  commanders  are  in  ^ined  to  praise  such  too  complete 
information  instead  of  condemning  it.  In  truth,  it  is  the 
worst  system  that  could  be  conceived." 

The  leaders  of  patrols  must  be  familiar  with  the  tactics  of 
all  the  arms.  Not  only  should  they  report  on  the  presence  of 
the  enemy,  his  position,  strength,  the  direction  of  his  march 
and  his  tactical  dispositions,  but  they  should  also  be  able  to 
report  on  the  character  of  the  country  they  explore,  artillery 
positions  found  there,  important  localities  or  points  to  be  held 
or  avoided.  This  latter  information  is  especially  valuable  as 
the  forces  approach  nearer  to  each  other,  and  battle  seems 
near. 


158  MILITARY  PRIMER 

The  local  reconnoissance  of  the  infantry  during  or  preced- 
ing an  engagement  is  described  by  Balck  (Infantry  Tactics, 
pp.  248  et  seq.)  as  follows: 

"It  is  a  strange  fact  that,  while  splendid  work  was  done 
in  strategic  reconnoissance  in  the  large  maneuvers  of  recent 
years,  not  only  in  Germany  but  also  in  France,  the  local,  tac- 
tical reconnoissance  was  less  good  and  often  deficient,  so  that 
in  consequence  thereof  surprises  were  not  rare.  Frequently  a 
gap  occurred  in  the  reconnoitering  line  when  the  cavalry  in 
front  of  the  various  parts  of  the  army  was  brushed  aside  and 
the  stronger  cavalry  force  deprived  the  weaker  of  the  freedom 
of  choosing  its  line  of  retreat.  Occasionally,  when  this  hap- 
pened, cavalry  patrols  were  sent  out  with  orders  to  report 
directly  to  the  infantry,  or,  at  any  rate,  to  find  the  hostile 
route  column,  but  this  expedient  was  only  partially  successful. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  troopers  cannot  ride  close  enough 
to  the  enemy  to  see  anything  of  importance,  and  that  they 
frequently  are  in  ignorance  of  the  very  things  that  are  of  value 
to  the  infantry.  In  addition,  the  divisional  cavalry  is  entirely 
too  weak  to  perform  all  the  tasks  assigned  to  it.  Therefore 
infantry  and  artillery  should  not  rely  on  cavalry  reconnois- 
sanct.  The  mere  fact  that  infantry  has  sent  out  cavalry 
patrols  in  a  certain  direction  does  not  relieve  it  from  the  duty 
of  providing  for  its  own  reconnoissance. 

"The  greatest  obstacle  to  infantry  reconnoissance  lies  in 
the  fact  that  its  cyclists"  (cyclists  are  attached  to  infantry 
regiments  in  the  German  army,  for  messenger  duties)  "are 
confined  to  good  roads ;  that  its  mounted  officers  cannot  be 
withdrawn  from  their  appropriate  duties  except  for  short 
periods ;  that,  as  a  rule,  orderlies  are  not  available  for  carrying 
messages ;  and  that,  if  officers  cafry  messages  in  person,  the 
reconnoissance  is  interrupted.  Infantry  patrols,  on  account 
of  the  slowness  of  their  movements,  cannot  transmit  messages 
quickly,  and,  as  a  result,  such  messages  frequently  arrive  too 
late  to  be  of  value-  On  the  other  hand,  infantry  patrols  pos- 
sess an  advantage  in  that,  by  utilizing  cover,  they  can  get  close 
to  the  enemy  without  being  observed.  The  need  of  local 


PATROLLING  REVIEWED  159 

reconnoissance  is  greater  now  than  it  was  in  the  past,  because 
troops  can  no  longer  change  front  when  deployed  and  because 
those  which  come  under  hostile  fire  while  in  close  order  forma- 
tions may,  in  a  short  time,  suffer  well-nigh  annihilating  losses. 

"The  Japanese  attached  much  importance  to  local  recon- 
noissance, whereas  the  Russian  leaders  considered  it  as  some- 
thing unusual,  so  that  Kuropatkin  was  finally  obliged  to  pre- 
scribe it  in  orders.  'Local  reconnoissance  was  performed  by 
20  to  30  infantrymen.  These  carefully  approached  our  posi- 
tions in  small  groups.  One  man  of  each  group  laid  his  rifle 
aside  and  crawled  close  up  to  our  trenches,  raised  his  head 
and  observed,  while  three  or  four  of  his  companions,  whom 
he  had  left  farther  in  rear,  opened  fire  on  the  trenches. 
Occasionally  all  of  these  men  threw  themselves  flat  on  the 
ground  for  protection.  This  method  of  procedure  continued 
for  seven  hours.' ' 

"The  thoroughness  of  the  reconnoissance  generally  made 
a  timely  deployment  possible,  even  when  the  enemy  was  well 
concealed,  but  that  neglects  occurred  nevertheless  is  borne  out 
by  the  advance  of  the  Japanese  2d  Division  at  Fuchau  and 
Kapukai  on  March  10th,  1905.  The  division  advanced  with- 
out reconnoitering,  struck  the  fortified  Russian  position,  was 
unable  to  move  forward  or  to  the  rear,  and  had  to  fight  under 
unfavorable  conditions,  and  while  suffering  heavy  losses,  from 
early  morning  until  4  P.  M.,  when  the  general  situation  com- 
pelled the  enemy  to  evacuate  the  position.  The  advance  of 
the  Russian  54th  Division  during  the  battle  of  Liao  Yang  (2d 
Sept.)  is  a  similar  example  of  disproportionately  greater  im- 
portance, and  with  a  tragic  ending.  The  noise  of  the  battle 
at  Sykwantun  caused  the  commander  of  the  54th  Division  to 
leave  the  position  assigned  to  him  and  to  march  towards  the 
sound  of  the  cannonading.  The  division,  advancing  over  cov- 
ered terrain  without  adequate  reconnoissance,  was  taken  in 
flank  and  rear  by  the  Japanese  12th  Brigade  and  thrown  back 
in  utter  rout  on  its  former  position,  carrying  with  it  the  troops 
which  had  been  left  there.  Thus  the  Yentai  heights  fell  into 
the  possession  of  the  Japanese. 


160  MILITARY  PRIMER 

"The  primary  object  of  local  reconnoissance  is  to  protect 
a  force  from  surprise.  This  may  be  accomplished  by  sending 
out  combat  patrols,  and  by  company  commanders"  (mounted 
in  the  German  army)  "riding  ahead  in  time.  The  latter  are 
likewise  charged  with  picking  out  avenues  of  approach  to 
selected  fire  positions,  and  the  sooner  they  begin  the  recon- 
noissance the  better,  for  the  accidents  of  the  ground  can  then 
be  utilized  to  the  best  advantage. 

"The  difficulties  of  the  reconnoissance  are  increased  when 
we  have  to  reckon  with  the  measures  taken  by  the  enemy  to 
screen  his  force. 

"Weak  infantry  patrols  can  neither  break  down  this  re- 
sistance nor  create  the  necessary  openings  through  which  the 
leaders  can  reconnoiter  in  person.  *  *  * 

"If  the  cavalry  reconnoissance  has  determined  that  the 
enemy  intends  to  accept  battle  within  a  particular  area,  the 
details  of  his  intentions  must  be  obtained  by  local  reconnois- 
sance. Then  the  commander  will  wish  to  know  whether  or 
not  an  immediate  attack  is  feasible,  or  whether  it  is  advisable 
to  wait  until  nightfall  for  bringing  up  his  infantry.  The  local 
reconnoissance  determines  where  the  flanks  of  the  enemy  are 
located ;  whether  the  position  in  front  is  the  hostile  main  posi- 
tion or  only  an  advanced  post;  whether  the  enemy  has  made 
preparations  for  defense;  and  where  the  hostile  artillery  is 
posted.  As  a  rule  it  will  be  impossible,  until  after  the  engage- 
ment has  begun,  to  recognize  a  skillfully  located  fortified 
position,  to  distinguish  between  the  real  and  the  dummy 
trenches,  determine  the  position  of  obstacles  and  estimate 
whether  they  can  be  surmounted  with  or  without  adequate 
apparatus.  Then  it  likewise  becomes  necessary  to  find  and 
mark  covered  avenues  of  approach.  In  moving  to  new  firing 
positions  it  is  important  that  advanced  positions,  masks,  and 
dummy  trenches  be  recognized  in  time.  The  commander  of 
a  unit  on  the  flank  should  make  dispositions  for  observation 
on  his  flank,  and  for  permanent  communication  with  neighbor- 
ing units,  even  though  no  specific  orders  have  been  received 
by  him  to  that  effect.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  troops 


PATROLLING  REVIEWED  161 

deployed  on  the  road  Gorze-Rezonville  (battle  of  Vionville), 
by  their  failure  to  get  into  early  communication  with  the 
troops  which  had  been  on  the  ground  for  some  time,  neglected 
to  take  advantage  of  the  information  gained  by  those  troops. 
"The  enumeration  of  these  tasks  shows  that  local  recon- 
noissance  should  not  be  restricted  to  the  preparatory  stage  of 
the  combat  alone,  but  that  it  must  be  kept  up  during  the  whole 
course  of  the  action.  To  the  duties  enumerated,  we  may  add 
occasional  tasks,  such  as  picking  off  staffs  and  signal  men ; 
sneaking  up  on  artillery  that  has  been  incautiously  pushed  for- 
ward ;  and  annoying  the  enemy  by  flanking  fire.  For  such 
tasks  so-called  'scouting  detachments/  after  the  Russian  pat- 
tern, have  frequently  been  recommended.  Their  usefulness 
in  difficult  country  and  in  operations  against  the  enemy's  flank 
and  rear  cannot  be  denied-  In  minor  operations,  if  provided 
with  ample  ammunition  and  advancing  on  side  roads,  they  can 
hamper  the  reconnoissance  of  the  enemy,  secure  the  flanks  of 
their  own  force,  ascertain  the  probable  extent  of  the  prospec- 
tive battlefield,  and,  finally,  having  made  a  skillful  lodgement, 
they  can  become  very  annoying  to  the  hostile  artillery.  In  a 
large  battle  the  necessary  elbow  room  for  such  employment  is 
lacking." 


CHAPTER  XIV. 
MEASURES  OF  SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS 

GENERAL  SITUATION. 
Guide  Map. 

The  Susquehanna  River  separates  two  States  that  are  at 
war.  Blue,  Eastern,  forces  have  invaded  Red,  Western,  terri- 
tory. Blue  main  forces  are  in  the  vicinity  of  Carlisle.  The 
main  Red  forces  are  advancing  on  Carlisle  from  the  direction 
of  Chambersburg.  The  country  is  bitterly  hostile  to .  the 
Blues. 

SPECIAL  SITUATION.     BLUE. 
Topographical  Map, 

A  squadron  of  Blue  cavalry  reached  New  Oxford  on  the 
afternoon  of  September  19th,  and  went  into  bivouac  near  the 
village.  Cattle  and  grain  are  being  collected  from  the  farmers 
in  the  vicinity.  The  grain  is  collected  in  wagons ;  the  cattle, 
as  they  are  brought  in,  are  assembled  in  the  pastures  1,200 
yards  northeast  of  New  Oxford. 

At  daylight,  September  20th,  Lieut.  N ,  who  has  been 

detailed  by  his  captain  to  report,  with  a  platoon  of  24  men,  to 

Major  B ,  commanding  the  squadron,  for  detached 

service,  so  reports,  and  received  this  order : 

"Our  regiment  is  expected  to  reach  York  Springs  today. 
A  battalion  of  infantry  will  be  here  during  the  day,  coming  by 
rail  from  the  east,  to  take  charge  of  the  supplies  we  are  col- 
lecting. Red  infantry  garrisons  are  known  to  be  at  Fairfield 
(8  miles  southwest  of  Gettysburg,  Strategic  Map)  and 
Arendtsville  (7  miles  northwest  of  Gettysburg).  Cavalry 
detachments  of  undetermined  strength  are  reported  in  the 
vicinity.  No  other  troops  of  either  side  are  near. 


SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS  163 

"I  shall  continue  to  use  the  squadron  today  collecting  sup- 
plies. You,  with  your  platoon,  are  assigned  to  watch  the 
sector  Hampton,  inclusive,  to  Plainview,  (Strategic  Map) 
inclusive.  Lieut.  A will  have  the  sector  Plainview,  ex- 
clusive, to  Gettysburg,  inclusive. 

"Report  all  movements  of  Red  troops  larger  than  patrols 
in  your  sector  to  me  at  the  earliest  moment. 

"I  shall  remain  at  the  post-office  in  Hampton  all  day." 

Lieut.  N estimates  the  situation,  and  acts  as  follows : 

MISSION  :  To  so  cover  the  approaches  to  New  Oxford 
within  my  sector  with  a  platoon  of  24  men  that  I  can  surely 
discover  the  approach  of  any  hostile  force  in  that  sector  in 
time  to  warn  my  commander  at  New  Oxford  before  he  can 
be  attacked. 

FORCES:  The  only  help  our  squadron  can  expect  is  the 
battalion  of  infantry  that  is  due  to  arrive  today,  by  rail  from 
the  east.  I  know  of  no  hostile  troops  near  except  the  Red 
infantry  garrisons  at  Fairfield  and  Arendtsville,  which  are 
evidently  kept  there  to  guard  the  eastern  approaches  to  the 
passes  leading  west  and  south,  respectively,  through  South 
Mountain,  and  cavalry  detachments  of  unknown  strength  and 
location  that  are  reported  to  be  near  here.  The  other  two 
squadrons  of  our  regiment  are  marching  on  York  Springs 
today.  (York  Springs  is  about  a  mile  north  of  the  north- 
west corner  of  the  Topographical  Map.) 

CONDITION  : :  The  Red  military  authorities  must  know  of 
our  presence  and  mission  at  New  Oxford.  It  is  a  mile,  by 
the  road,  from  where  messages  must  be  sent,  to  the  bivouac 
of  the  squadron  in  the  pasture,  one  mile  northeast  of  New 
Oxford.  The  squadron  outposts  are  as  follows :  In  the 
northeast  edge  of  the  woods  on  hill  587 ;  at  the  forks  490, 
near  Klinger's ;  at  the  northeast  exit  of  New  Oxford.  A  de- 
tached post  is  on  hill  536.  With  only  24  troopers  at  my 
disposal  I  cannot  send  more  than  three  patrols. 

WHAT  WILL  THE  ENEMY  PROBABLY  DO?  He  will,  if  he  attacks 
at  all,  use  cavalry,  or  cavalry  and  infantry  combined.  If  he 
attacks  over  my  sector,  coming  from  the  northwest,  where 
his  forces  would  naturally  be,  he  will  probably  advance  by 


164  MILITARY  PRIMER 

Waldheim,  since  in  that  way  he  would  have  but  one  stream  to 
cross,  and  he  will  be  between  our  squadron  and  its  supporting 
bodies  to  the  north.  A  very  small  force  could  delay  him 
seriously  if  he  attempted  to  use  the  Newchester-New  Oxford 
road,  at  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago,  Swift  Run,  and  the 
Little  Conewago-  The  road  next  west,  passing  Swift  Run 
School  House,  might  be  used,  but  he  can  get  nearer  to  our 
camp  by  the  Oakwood  School  House- Walheim  route,  under 
cover,  than  by  any  other  road.  He  might  use  the  Baltimore 
Turnpike.  The  least  likely  route  is  by  Newchester. 

TERRAIN  :  The  country  is  rolling,  lightly  forested.  The 
general  level  is  broken  by  Conewago  Creek  and  its  branches. 

COURSES  OPENS  (a)  The  terrain  may  be  covered  by  a 
system  of  marching  patrols.  These  may  cover  the  road  past 
Swift  Run  School  House,  the  one  through  Newchester,  and 
the  Baltimore  Pike.  Marching  patrols  can  cover  a  greater 
extent  of  country  than  stationary  patrols,  but  the  question  of 
how  much  time  will  be  needed  to  prepare  the  squadron  for 
action  will  determine  the  distance  the  patrols  should  go.  The 
action  should  be  fought  at  the  crossings  of  the  Conewago  or 
Little  Conewago.  Selection  of  positions  to  meet  hostile  forces 
coming  from  any  direction  should  already  have  been  made. 
The  troops  should  be  ready  for  instant  action.  If  the  patrols 
go  out  too  far,  the  spaces  between  them  will  be  increased  be- 
yond the  range  of  inter-communication,  and  a  hostile  body 
might  get  between  them  unobserved. 

(b)  Places  for  stationary  patrols  should  be  found  that 
will  cover  the  sector  completely,  that  are  visible  from  a  com- 
mon point  nearer  camp,  and  that  afford  lines  of  retreat 
towards  that  central  point. 

Such  places  are :  For  the  central  group,  the  roof  of  a  two- 
story  building  at  the  crossroad  at  Newchester.  The  ground 
elevation  there  is  530 ;  the  building  is  30  feet  high,  giving  the 
observer  an  altitude  of  560  —  sufficient  for  him  to  see  over 
the  tops  of  the  trees  to  the  north  of  the  village.  For  the 
patrols,  the  hill  602,  north  of  Hampton,  and  584,,  west  of 
Belmont  School,  are  well  located,  are  visible  from  the  roofs 
of  Newchester,  and,  indeed,  with  glasses,  from  each  other. 


SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS  166 

Both  have  good  fields  of  view  to  the  front,  and  lines  of  quick 
retreat  out  of  sight  from  the  front  can  be  easily  prepared  by 
making  gaps  in  the  fences- 

DECISION  :  Lieut.  N decides  to  take  his  platoon,  less 

two  patrols  of  six  men,  to  Newchester  at  the  trot.  To  send 
one  of  the  detached  patrols  by  the  mst  direct  road  to  the  hill 
602.  This  patrol  will  accompany  the  lieutenant  (the  squadron 
is  camped  in  the  pasture  along  the  stream  west  of  the  hill  587, 
northeast  of  New  Oxford)  as  far  as  the  northern  end  of  the 
private  road  leading  north  through  the  pasture.  He  will  also 
detach  a  second  patrol,  of  equal  size,  to  go  to  Belmont  School 
House. 

ORDERS:  "Sergeant  F ,  you  know  the  situation. 

Take  your  patrol  by  the  Baltimore  Pike  towards  Hampton  and 
the  hill  602.  If  not  prevented,  occupy  this  hill  and  keep  an 
active  lookout  for  troops  approaching  from  the  front.  I  shall 
be  at  the  crossroad  in  Newchester.  Send  messages  there  at 
top  speed.  Make  a  smoke  ball  *  if  the  enemy  is  advancing 
rapidly  in  force." 

To  the  other  patrol  leader,  Corporal  G ,  who  rode 

along  with  the  lieutenant,  he  said :  "You  know  the  situation. 
Go  rapidly,  with  your  patrol  of  six  men,  towards  the  hill  584, 
near  Belmont  School  House.  If  not  prevented,  occupy  this 
hill,  and  watch  for  hostile  movements  from  the  north  and 
west.  Send  messages  to  me  at  the  crossroad  in  Newchester." 

Sergeant  F ,  as  soon  as  he  left  Lieut.  N ,  trotted 

to  the  outpost  near  Klinger's,  who  reported  nothing  unusual. 
He  then  trotted  to  the  farmhouse  on  the  eastern  slope  of 
hill  586.  This  much  of  his  road  was  under  the  observation 
of  the  outguard  on  hill  587.  Here  he  turned  to  the  left  on  the 
private  road  leading  over  the  hill  to  the  north,  halting  a  mo- 


*To  make  a  smoke  ball,  have  a  small,  clear  fire  burning,  with  a 
pile  of  damp  grass,  weeds,  ferns,  or  the  like,  near  it.  When  the 
signal  is  to  be  made,  drive  a  green  stake  in  the  center  of  the  fire 
and  throw  a  dampened  blanket  over  it,  supported  by  the  stake. 
Throw  the  smoke-producing  material  on  the  fire  and  then  hold  the 
edges  of  the  blanket  low  down  until  the  smoke  begins  to  leak  out 
around  them;  then  jerk  the  blanket  off  quickly,  and  if  the  wind  is 
not  too  strong,  a  ball  of  smoke  will  rise  that  will  be  visible  for  miles 
on  a  clear  day.  The  fire  should  be  put  out  or  smothered  at  once. 


166  MILITARY  PRIMER 

ment  there,  when  he  got  to  where  he  could  see  over  the  crest 
towards  the  north.  Seeing  nothing  unusual,  he  led  his  patrol, 
riding  with  a  trooper  by  his  side,  the  rest  of  the  patrol  100 
yards  in  rear,  by  the  private  road  north  and  east  to  5481;  a 
little  to  the  north  of  here  is  another  crest,  near  the  farmhouses 
on  the  left.  Halting  here,  he  could  see  ahead  to  the  next 
crest  in  the  road,  (at  the  letter  T  in  BALTIMORE)  1200 
yards  ahead.  The  woods  crowning  this  ridge,  east  of  the 
Pike,  prevented  him  from  seeing  any  farther  on  the  road  he 
must  take,  and  the  ridge  paralleling  the  road,  to  the  west,  300 
yards  away,  cut  off  his  view  in  that  direction. 

He  trotted  to  the  next  horizon,  and  here  the  valley  of  the 
Conewago,  and  the  opposite  slopes,  spread  out  to  his  view. 
There  is  practically  no  cover  for  him  the  rest  of  the  way  to 
his  station  on  hill  602,  so  there  can  be  no  more  effort  at  con- 
cealment. 

He  assembles  his  patrol,  directs  two  of  the  five  men  who 
have  been  with  the  second  group,  to  follow  the  other  three  at 
200  yards,  and  directs  the  second  group  to  increase  the  dis- 
tance between  them  and  him,  when  they  advance  again,  to 
200  yards.  He  explains  his  mission  to  the  patrol,  and  tells 
them  that  the  thing  of  greatest  importance  to  them  on  this 
occasion  is  to  get  information  of  the  approach  of  any  large 
body  of  hostile  troops  to  the  commanding  officer  at  the  earliest 
moment.  He  then  proceeds,  at  the  trot  and  gallop,  to  his 
station  on  hill  602- 

He  left  Lieut.  N at  5:50  A.  M. ;  he  reached  hill  602 

at  6  :20.  He  went  at  once  to  the  crest  of  the  hill,  crawling  to 
the  top,  to  make  himself  as  little  conspicuous  as  possible-  He 
looked  through  his  glasses  in  all  directions,  saw  no  signs  of 
movements  of  troops,  and  then  stationed  two  men,  hiding  them 
as  best  he  could,  to  act  as  sentinels.  He  had  a  small  fire  built 
on  the  southern  slope  of  the  hill ;  he  sent  a  man  to  get  some 
green  grass  and  ferns  to  make  a  smudge  of;  he  sent  another 
to  cut  gaps  in  the  fences  to  the  south,  in  case  it  should  become 
necessary  to  retreat  suddenly  in  that  direction ;  he  had  the 
horses  put  out  of  sight  from  the  west  and  north,  on  the  south- 


SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS  167 

ern  slope  of  the  hill,  and  then  he  joined  the  sentinels,  where 
he  remained  in  observation. 

Corporal  G ,  adopting  much  the  same  tactics,  pro- 
ceeded more  slowly  until  he  neared  Newchester.     He  could 

get  no  such  view  of  this  village  as  Sergeant  F could  of 

Hampton,  because  of  the  woods  and  hills  that  screen  it  from 
the  south.  But  he  had  to  get  through  it,  so,  assembling  his 
patrol  at  the  bend  in  the  road  on  the  southern  outskirts  of  the 
village,  and  after  he  had  looked  up  the  main  street  and  seen 
that  it  was  practically  deserted,  he  took  the  gallop,  and,  with 
pistols  raised,  he  and  his  men  dashed  in  one  group  through 
the  village,  looking  to  right  and  left  for  signs  of  hostile  occu- 
pation as  they  passed.  At  the  northern  exit  of  the  town  he 
got  a  momentary  glimpse  of  the  road  across  the  creek,  near 
Oak  Grove  School  House,  but  here  his  view  stopped,  on  ac- 
count of  the  woods  and  orchards  there.  He  slackened  his  pace 
going  down  the  hill,  had  five  members  of  the  patrol  drop  back 
to  100  yards'  distance,  and  continued  to  his  post,  observing 
the  usual  precautions. 

Arriving  there  he  found  that  at  hill  584  his  view  to  the 
northeast  was  cut  off  by  the  woods  a  half  mile  away  in  that 
direction,  so  he  was  forced  to  send  two  men  to  the  farmhouse 
east  of  Belmont  School  House,  directing  them  to  find  a  place 
where  they  could  observe  the  roads  to  the  east,  particularly 
the  one  leading  southeast  from  Bowlder. 

He  made  similar  preparations  on  hill  584  to  those  described 

as  made  by  Sergeant  F He  was  in  position  on  the  hill 

at  6:35  A.  M. 

Lieut.  N used  Corporal  G 's  patrol  as  an  ad- 
vance guard  for  his  own  party,  now  reduced  to  ten  troopers. 
On  reaching  Newchester  he  sent  two  troopers  at  once,  at  a  trot, 
to  station  themselves  on  Hill  573,  to  observe  the  country  to 
the  west;  had  the  horses  of  the  rest  held,  kept  saddled  and 
bridled,  in  the  center  of  the  town,  and,  with  two  men,  went  to 
the  top  of  the  building  referred  to 'above.  Here  he  had  one 
man  watch  the  country  to  the  north  and  east,  the  other  to  the 
north  and  west,  while  he,  from  time  to  time  swept  with  his 
glasses  the  whole  terrain  in  his  sector. 


168  MILITARY  PRIMER 

RED.  Meanwhile  a  squadron  of  Red  cavalry  had  camped 
the  night  of  September  19th  and  20th  at  Bendersville  (Strate- 
gic Map),  13  miles  northwest  of  New  Oxford.  Its  comman- 
der learned  of  the  Blue  cavalry  at  the  latter  place,  and  its  mis- 
sion there.  He  determined  to  attack  this  Blue  squadron,  hoping 
to  find  it  so  dispersed  in  its  search  for  military  supplies  that 
he  might  destroy  it.  From  his  knowledge  of  the  terrain,  and 
from  the  map,  he  estimated  that  he  should  be  able  to  reach 
Oakwood  School  House,  one  mile  northwest  of  Waldheim, 
marching  by  way  of  Center  Mills,  Heidlersburg,  and  Bowlder, 
without  being  discovered  by  the  Blue  outposts,  and  that  he 
could  then  make  a  dash  across  the  Conewago  before  the  Blue 
cavalry  could  be  informed  of  his  approach. 

After  reaching  Waldheim  he  would  be  guided  by  circum- 
stances. He  determined  to  march  with  only  a  point;  to  go  at 
a  walk  until  he  saw  he  was  discovered,  and  then  to  take  the  trot. 

He  reached  crossroad  601,  in  the  woods  lj^  miles  north  of 
Belmont  School  House,  at  7 :00  A.  M.  Here  he  was  met  by 
a  farmer  boy  riding  a  barebacked  horse,  who  said  that  he  lived 
in  the  bend  of  the  road  a  mile  below,  and  that  "some  Blue 
soldiers,  on  horses,  were  on  the  hill  near  the  school  house." 
When  asked  what  they  were  doing  there,  he  said  he  didn't 
know ;  he  was  frightened  and  ran  away. 

The  Red  commander,  Major  R ,  then  led  his  squadron 

through  the  fields  north  of  the  ridge  the  road  to  Bowlder  is 
carried  on,  reaching  Bowlder  at  7  :20. 

There  is  a  store  at  Bowlder,  with  a  telephone.  Here  Major 

R got  into  communication  with  the  information  division 

(paragraph  9,  Field  Service  Regulations)  of  the  Red  army,  at 
Chambersburg,  and  learned  of  the  advance  of  the  rest  of  the 
Blue  cavalry  regiment  towards  York  Springs,  and  also  that 
several  car  loads — probably  a  battalion — of  Blue  infantry  had 
left  York  that  morning,  by  train,  for  the  west.  He  telephoned 
the  commanding  officer  at  Arendtsville,  asking  that  some  in- 
fantry be  started  at  once  for  Hampton,  that  he  thought  with 
their  help  he  could  bag  the  Blue  command.  The  commanding 
officer  at  Arendtsville  could  spare  only  a  battalion,  but  he  would 


SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS  169 

send  it  at  once.  He  also  learned  that  the  Blue  cavalry  was  em- 
ployed to  the  west  and  south  of  New  Oxford,  and  that  no  part 
of  it  had  been  seen  to  cross  the  Conewago  that  morning. 

At  7:40,  Major  R started  again  with  his  command, 

preceded  by  only  a  point,  and,  marching  at  the  trot,  soon  came 
into  view  of  the  Blue  patrol  on  hill  602.  It  is  four  miles  from 
Bowlder  to  Waldheim,  and  the  point  of  Major  R 's  com- 
mand reached  the  latter  place  at  8:20  A.  M.  The  Major  sent 
his  leading  troop  across  the  ford  first,  directing  its  captain  to 
gallop  up  to  Seven-hundred  School  House,  and,  from  there  to 
throw  out  several  patrols  to  the  south  to  locate  the  Blue  out- 
posts. The  other  three  troops  were  to  follow  closely,  and  halt 
at  542,  600  yards  north  of  the  school  house. 

Major   R ,   accompanying   the   leading  troop,   went   to 

the  school  house,  climbed  to  its  belfry,  from  which  place  he 
could  see  over  the  tops  of  the  trees  to  the  south.  It  was  now 
8:40  A.  M.,  and  he  could  see,  coming  from  the  northern  edge 
of  the  village,  a  column  of  infantry  that  turned  and  marched 
northeast  toward  the  camp  of  the  Blue  cavalry. 

The  Red  position,  at  this  moment,  was  as  follows:  The 
head  of  the  main  body,  three  troops,  was  at  542;  the  support 
of  the  advance  guard,  one  troop,  less  detachments,  was  at  Seven- 
hundred  School  House;  one  platoon  was  600  yards  south  of 
the  school  house,  stopped  there  by  the  fire  from  a  Blue  outpost 
at  552 ;  a  patrol  of  eight  men  was  at  the  farmhouse  north  of 
Klinger's,  where  they  were  held  by  the  fire  of  the  Blue  outpost 
at  490;  one  patrol  of  eight  men  was  approaching  hill  586  from 
the  north. 

BLUE.     The  patrol  at  hill  584,  near  Belmont  School  House, 

missed   Major  R 's   squadron,  but  the  two  men  on  the 

ridge  to  the  east  of  the  school  house  saw  him  as  he  came  trot- 
ting out  of  the  woods  south  of  Bowlder.  One  of  the  two  men, 
waiting  only  long  enough  to  be  sure  that  the  command  was 
larger  than  one  troop,  galloped  down  the  farm  road  towards 

the  school  house.     Corporal  G ,  with  one  man,  galloped 

to  meet  him.  The  man  reported:  "The  head  of  a  Red  cavalry 
column  larger  than  one  troop  just  came  out  of  the  woods  south 


170  MILITARY  PRIMER 

of  Bowlder,  about  two  miles  from  here.  It  is  going  at  a  trot 
towards  New  Oxford." 

The  corporal  saw  a  smoke  ball  rising  from  hill  602,  and 

knew  from  that  that  Sergeant  F had  seen  the  Red  column 

too,  so  he  said  to  the  man  who  made  the  report :  "Go  rapidly 
to  Newchester  and  report  what  you  have  seen."  It  was  now 
7:52  A.  M.  It  is  three  miles  from  Belmont  School  House  to 
Newchester,  and  riding  at  the  trot  and  gallop,  it  took  the  mes- 
senger 15  minutes  to  reach  Newchester. 

Lieut.   N ordered  a   fresh  horse   for  the  messenger, 

and,  while  saddles  were  being  shifted,  he  got  the  report  of  the 
messenger.  It  was  8:10  when  he  started  again,  and  8:28  when 
he  reached  the  Y  in  the  road  just  north  of  New  Oxford.  A 
trooper  there  directed  him  to  go  to  camp  with  his  message;  he 
went  there,  reporting  to  the  Major  at  8  :35  A.  M. 

Corporal  G ,  after  dispatching  his  messenger,  went  at 

once  to  the  place  whence  the  Red  column  had  been  discovered. 
When  he  got  there  it  was  crossing  the  ridge  1,000  yards  north- 
west of  Chromis'  house.  Nothing  was  following  it.  The  cor- 
poral withdrew  his  sentinel  here,  went  rapidly  back  towards 
the  school  house,  signalling  to  his  patrol  on  the  hill  to  come  in; 
when  it  joined  him,  he  trotted  back  to  Newchester. 

He  found  that  Lieut.  N had  taken  his  patrol  to  the 

ridge  600  yards  southeast  of  Newchester,  and  learned  that  the 
dust  of  the  Red  squadron  had  just  been  seen  near  Oakwood 
School  House.  The  lieutenant,  estimating  the  situation,  decided 
that  he  could  now  be  of  more  service  closer  in,  so  he  withdrew 

to  the  nose  400  yards  northwest  of  520,  sending  Corporal  G , 

with  his  patrol,  to  568,  1%  miles  to  the  southwest. 

Sergeant  F also  saw  the  Red  cavalry  at  7:43  A.  M. 

He  waited  long  enough  to  see  the  rest  of  the  column.  At  7  :48 
he  sent  up  a  smoke  ball.  He  saw  he  could  accomplish  no  more 
by  staying  at  602  than  by  crossing  to  the  south  side  of  the  creek. 
Here  was  an  enemy  large  enough  to  be  formidable,  and  his 
place  was  on  its  flank.  So  he  assembled  his  patrol,  and  led  it, 
at  the  trot  and  gallop,  to  the  nose  on  the  Baltimore  Pike  1200 
yards  south  of  the  Conewago.  He  reached  there  at  8:10.  He 


SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS  171 

saw  the  Red  cavalry  just  coming  out  of  the  woods  southeast 
of  Oakwood  School  House,  and  sent  the  best  mounted  trooper 
of  his  patrol  in  to  camp  with  these  instructions :  "You  know  the 
situation.  Go  in  at  your  best  speed,  and  tell  the  senior  officer 
in  camp  about  it.  Tell  him  where  you  left  me,  and  that  I  will 
remain  on  this  flank  of  the  enemy." 

The  outpost  on  hill  536  also,  at  8:10  A.  M.,  saw  the  Red 
cavalry  as  it  came  out  of  the  woods  southeast  of  the  Oakwood 
School  House,  and  it  signalled  to  camp:  ''Enemy  in  sight," 
and,  as  soon  as  the  rear  of  the  squadron  came  in  sight,  sent 
a  messenger  at  the  gallop  to  camp,  to  give  them  the  direction 
of  the  enemy,  and  his  estimated  strength. 

The  smoke  ball  sent  up  from  hill  602  was  seen  at  camp  at 
7 :48.  Only  two  troops  were  in  camp.  They  assembled  as 
rapidly  as  they  could.  The  senior  officer  in  camp  called  Major 

B to  the  telephone  and  told  him  that  a  smoke  signal  had 

been  seen  from  hill  602,  and  that  he  was  assembling  the  troops 
in  camp. 

Major  B sent  out  messengers  to  call  in  the  foraging 

parties  and  left  a  small  patrol,  under  a  sergeant,  to  meet  the 
Blue  infantry  battalion  that  was  momentarily  expected,  and, 
then,  with  the  rest  of  the  troopers  in  New  Oxford,  he  galloped 
to  camp.  He  left  a  trooper  at  the  northern  exit  of  the  village 
to  direct  messengers  where  to  find  him. 

The  troops  at  camp  were  assembled  at  the  northern  edge 
of  the  pasture  where  they  had  been  camped,  in  readiness  for  a 
move.  At  8:10  the  signal  from  the  outpost  on  hill  536  was 
seen,  and,  about  the  same  time,  the  whistle  of  an  engine  was 
heard. 

Major  B ,  realizing  that  the  Red  squadron  would  be 

across  the  Conewago  before  he  could  oppose  it,  estimated  that 
it  would  be  better  tactics  for  him  to  allow  the  Red  squadron 
to  get  nearer  to  New  Oxford,  to  wait  for  the  Blue  infantry  to 
come  up,  then  to  attack  the  Red  squadron  on  its  left  flank  and 
rear,  holding  it  south  of  the  Conewago  while  the  Blue  infantry, 
attacking  it  in  front,  might  destroy  it.  So  he  moved  his  troops 
up  to  hill  586,  massed  them  on  the  south  side  of  that  hill,  left 


172  MILITARY  PRIMER 

his  outposts  as  they  were,  adding  one  group  of  ten  men  at  552, 
and  awaited  developments. 

The  Blue  infantry  reached  the  station  at  8:20,  and,  unload- 
ing rapidly,  was  soon  on  the  march.  The  head  of  the  column 
left  the  northern  exit  of  the  village  at  8:40  A.  M. 

RED.  The  patrol  of  eight  men  sent  to  occupy  hill  586  was 
fired  on  from  that  hill  and  forced  to  take  cover  in  the  woods 

to  the  northwest.  Major  R ,  realizing  that  his  chance 

to  attack  the  Blue  squadron  successfully  had  passed,  gave  orders 
to  retire  at  once.  He  directed  the  captain  of  the  leading  troop 
to  retire  slowly,  joined  his  squadron  at  542,  and  led  it,  at  the 
trot,  to  the  northwest,  across  the  bridge  at  434W,  and  then,  by 
hill  526,  he  retreated  to  Oakwood  School  House.  His  fourth 
troop  retired  a  few  minutes  later,  joined  him,  and  the  Red 
squadron  was  then  massed  behind  the  screen  of  woods  a  half 
mile  east  of  Oakwood  School  House. 

Major  R estimated  now  that  the  Blue  forces  would 

attempt  to  reach  York  Springs  with  their  convoy,  using  the 
Baltimore  Pike,  and  he  decided  to  dismount  his  squadron,  and 
move  the  dismounted  men  to  the  southern  margin  of  the  woods, 
to  contest  the  crossing  of  the  Conewago. 

BLUE.  The  Blue  infantry  commander,  who  was  the  senior 
officer  present,  decided  to  start  at  once,  with  the  supplies  already 
collected,  for  York  Springs.  Estimating  the  situation,  he  de- 
cided to  advance  immediately  with  three  companies,  directly 
towards  the  bridge  423,  on  the  Baltimore  Pike,  and  to  send  so 

much  of  Major  B 's  squadron  as  was  already  assembled, 

by  Greenridge  School  House,  thence  around  the  bend  in  the 
Conewago,  where  the  road  is  completely  screened,  by  the  fringe 
of  trees  along  the  river,  from  view  to  the  north,  thence  across 
the  ford  north  of  hill  466,  to  attack  the  Red  left  flank,  in  case 
he  contested  the  crossing  of  the  bridge. 

Major  B delayed  crossing  the  ford  until  he  heard  the 

firing  of  the  infantry,  when  he  led  his  squadron  across  the 
fields,  towards  the  little  patch  of  woods  east  of  Miller's.  While 

doing  so  he  was  discovered  by  Major  R 's  combat  patrol, 

posted  at  the  farmhouse  600  yards  southeast  of  Miller's,  who 


SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS  173 

at  once  gave  warning.  The  Red  line  withdrew,  mounted  up, 
and  retired  slowly  to  the  southern  edge  of  Round  Hill.  Major 

B followed,  and,  at  noon,  both  forces  were  posted  as 

follows :  The  Red  squadron  on  Round  Hill.  The  Blue  squadron, 
now  completely  assembled,  on  the  Baltimore  Pike,  with  march 
outposts  on  602,  at  the  orchard  on  the  Pike  1200  yards  north- 
west of  564,  and  at  548,  nearly  a  mile  to  the  east  of  564. 

Lieut.  N 's  patrol,  which  had  kept  on  the  Red  right 

flank  all  the  morning,  was  at  the  orchard  nearly  a  mile  north- 
west of  Chromis',  towards  Bowlder. 

The  Blue  infantry  had  three  companies  at  Miller's,  while 
the  other  one  was  in  rear  of  the  convoy,  which  stretched  along 
for  about  a  mile,  its  head  in  rear  of  the  leading  three  com- 
panies. 

At  about  noon  an  infantry  column  was  seen  by  the  outpost 
on  602,  coming  down  the  hill  east  of  Bowlder.  His  appearance 

was  signaled,  and  Major  B rode  up  to  the  hilltop.  He 

saw  what  appeared  to  be  a  battalion  of  Red  infantry,  marching 
east,  and  at  the  same  time,  the  Red  cavalry  squadron  marched 
down  the  slope  of  Round  Hill  to  meet  it. 

A  little  later  Lieut.  N 's  patrol  was  seen  to  leave  the 

orchard  where  it  had  been  stationed  to  take  a  position  in  the 
cut  800  yards  southeast  of  there,  and  open  fire,  its  target  evi- 
dently to  the  north. 

Major  B sent  his  adjutant  to  Major  I ,  com- 
manding the  Blue  infantry,  directing  him  to  point  out  to  the 
Major  the  advantages  of  the  ridge  that  hill  602  is  on  as  a  de- 
fensive position,  to  inform  him  that  he,  Major  B ,  would 

hold  the  ridge  with  a  dismounted  line  until  he  could  be  re- 
lieved, and  that  he  believed  that  the  Red  Cavalry  was  working 
around  on  his  left  flank. 

Major  B dismounted  Troop  A  at  once,  holding  the 

horses  in  the  little  ravine  just  east  of  602,  and  led  his  other 
three  troops,  with  no  other  advance  protection  than  ground 
scouts,  at  the  gallop  across  the  fields  to  the  orchards,  half  a 
mile  southwest  of  602,  keeping  out  of  sight  behind  the  ridge. 
There  they  dismounted,  and  deployed  on  the  crest.  Gaps  were 


174  MILITARY  PRIMER 

cut  in  the  fences.  The  outpost  at  the  orchard  was  brought  in 

a  little  nearer,  and  left  there  as  a  combat  patrol.  Lieut.  N 

took  his  patrol,  which  had  been  firing  on  the  advancing  Red 
squadron,  to  the  rectangle  of  woods  southeast  of  Chromis'  house, 
where  he  remained  as  a  combat  patrol.  The  march  outpost  at 
548  was  left  in  observation  there. 

The  Blue  infantry  came  up  and  deployed  in  about  twenty 
minutes.  Troop  A,  when  relieved,  mounted,  and  remained  in 
the  little  valley  where  the  horses  had  been  held.  The  other 
three  troops,  when  relieved,  mounted  and  went  to  the  eastern 

edge  of  the  woods  where  Lieut.  N !s  patrol  was,  to  await 

the  appearance  of  the  Red  squadron,  and  to  assist  in  the  de- 
fense of  the  convoy. 

The  convoy,  meanwhile,  has  been  brought!  up  to  Hampton, 
and  is  held  in  the  pasture  east  of  the  village.  The  Blue  com- 
pany guarding  it  is  held  in  the  center  of  the  village,  with  march 
outposts  at  the  northern  and  western  exits  of  the  town. 

With  the  positions  and  forces  as  indicated,  the  Red  chance 
of  success,  everything  else  being  equal,  in  attacking  the  Blues, 
is  entirely  hopeless.  At  the  same  time,  it  would  be  a  hazardous 
undertaking  for  the  Blues  to  attempt  to  move  the  convoy  in 
the  face  of  Red  forces  of  equal  strength.  It  could  only  be  done 
by  sending  the  convoy  ahead,  using  the  troops  as  a  rear  guard. 

In  the  situations  just  described,  many  problems  confronted 
the  Blue  commander.  He  had  to  conduct  foraging  operations 
in  a  hostile  country,  where  all  local  sources  of  information, 
open  to  his  enemy,  were  closed  to  him.  His  first  concern  was 
to  get  information  of  the  hostile  advance  in  time  to  prepare 
for  it.  His  camp  outposts  could  not  do  this  for  him-  He  must 
have  more  distant  patrols.  Then,  having  learned  of  the  hos- 
tile advance,  he  must  be  kept  advised  of  the  probable  direction 
of  the  Red  attack.  This  was  given  him  by  the  reconnoitering 
patrols,  assisted  by  the  camp  outposts.  Having  secured  the 
advantage,  by  the  arrival  of  the  Blue  battalion,  he  must  keep 
contact  with  the  Red  cavalry,  so  as  to  guard  against  possible 
surprise.  This  was  done  by  means  of  contact  patrols,  backed 
up  by  the  whole  squadron.  When  the  Red  battalion  arrived 


SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS  175 

on  the  scene,  it,  too,  must  be  kept  in  check,  and  under  observa- 
tion. This  was  done  by  deploying  the  cavalry,  dismounted,  in 
a  good  position,  and  by  the  use  of  combat  patrols.  The  cav- 
alry line  was  not  strong  enough  to  hold  the  position  selected, 
so  the  infantry  relieved  it,  and,  by  so  doing,  enabled  three  of 
the  cavalry  troops  to  mass  themselves  on  the  left  of  the  in- 
fantry, and  prevent  any  flank  attack  by  the  Red  cavalry,  which 
had  moved  so  as  to  threaten  this  flank,  while  the  fourth  troop, 
assembled  under  cover  of  the  right  flank,  could  quickly  move 
to  the  flank  or  rear  of  any  part  of  the  Red  infantry  that  threat- 
ened an  attack  on  that  flank. 

This  troop,  too,  in  case  the  Red  infantry  should  be  suc- 
cessful, might,  at  the  critical  moment,  charge  the  Red  infantry 
lines  in  flank,  in  column  of  platoons,  creating  such  a  condition 
of  momentary  panic  in  their  ranks  that  the  Blue  line,  pouring 
rapid  fire  into  their  disordered  lines,  might  easily  turn  defeat 
into  victory.  This  would  be  an  excellent  application  of  the 
principle :  "When  cavalry  attacks  infantry,  material  effect  is 
nothing,  moral  effect  everything.  In  the  case  of  infantry 
directly  engaged  with  infantry  of  the  other  side,  this  moral 
effect  may  be  produced  with  the  smallest  units,  especially  if 
they  attack  it  in  flank  or  in  rear." 

Infantry  is  the  backbone  of  all  armies.  All  the  other  arms 
are  auxiliary  —  subsidiary  to  the  infantry,  and  all  their  ener- 
gies, all  their  talents,  should  be  devoted  to  futher  the  success 
of  the  infantry  programme. 

When  cavalry  attacks  hostile  cavalry  to  destroy  it,  its  com- 
mander hopes  thereby  to  secure  two  ends :  first,  to  relieve  his 
own  infantry  of  the  necessity  of  dissipating  its  strength  in 
closely  guarding  its  line  of  communications,  and,  second,  to  be 
himself  free  to  attack  the  hostile  line  of  communications,  and 
so  to  reduce  the  number  of  infantry  rifles  opposed  to  those  of 
the  infantry  of  his  own  side. 

So  with  artillery;  in  its  action  with  the  hostile  artillery  it 
seeks  to  destroy  it,  not  so  that  it,  the  artillery,  may  win  the 
battle  that  decides  the  war.  It  purposes  also  are  two-fold: 
First,  to  put  the  hostile  artillery  out  of  action,  so  that  it  may 
no  longer  hinder  the  movements  of  the  attacking  infantry; 


17«  MILITARY  PRIMER 

and,  second,  that  it  may  turn  its  guns  on  the  hostile  infantry, 
so  assisting  its  own  infantry  in  gaining  that  superiority  of  fire 
that  is  essential  to  the  winning  of  every  victory. 

It  is  the  infantry,  the  men  on  foot,  carrying  their  weapons 
in  their  hands,  that  must  do  the  decisive  fighting  in  every 
battle,  but  the  infantry  cannot  gain  decisive  victories  unas- 
sisted. All  officers,  of  whatever  arm  and  grade,  should  study 
the  uses  and  tactics  of  the  other  mobile  arms,  and  should 
"divorce  themselves  from  the  surroundings  and  prejudices  of 
their  particullar  arm,  whatever  it  may  be,  and  to  enter  whole- 
heartedly and  unreservedly  into  the  spirit  of  the  Napoleonic 
maxim:  'Infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  are  nothing  without 
each  other.' "  (General  Rimington,  British  Army.) 

To  return  to  our  problem :  Darkness  found  the  Blue 
troops  as  follows :  Three  companies  of  infantry  were  de- 
ployed on  the  ridge  602.  Outguards  were  posted,  without  sup- 
ports, directly  from  this  line ;  No.  1,  a  picket  of  16  men,  in 
the  orchard  600  yards  northwest  of  crossroad  564;  No.  2,  a 
picket  of  16  men,  at  the  western  end  of  the  fringe  of  trees  on 
the  road  running  west  from  564 ;  No.  3,  a  sentry  squad  in  the 
orchard  west  from  hill  602 ;  No.  4,  a  sentry  squad,  at  the  farm 
buildings  at  the  northern  end  of  the  private  road  800  yards 
southwest  of  Outguard  No.  3 ;  No.  5,  a  picket  of  16  men,  350 
yards  south  of  No.  4. 

Troop  A  furnished  four  mounted  men  for  patrol  duty  to 
Outguards  Nos.  1  and  2,  and  then  moved  to  crossroad  548, 
three-fourths  of  a  mile  northeast  of  Hampton.  The  rest  of 
the  Blue  squadron  withdrew  to  the  farm  700  yards  northeast 
of  Oakwood  School  House,  furnishing  6  mounted  men  for 
Outguard  No.  5,  and  establishing  pickets  of  24  men  each  at 
Oakwood  School  House  and  at  Miller's- 

The  Red  infantry  withdrew  to  the  woods  south  of  532, 
near  Plum  Run,  leaving  one  company  in  the  eastern  edge  of 
the  woods  to  the  east  as  a  support  for  a  line  of  sentry  squads 
paralleling  the  Blue  outpost  line,  and  about  600  yards  distant 
from  them. 

One  troop  of  the  Red  cavalry  was  at  Waldheim,  with 
detached  posts  on  the  bridges  at  434W  and  423.  The  rest  of 


SECURITY  FOR  SMALL  COMMANDS  177 

the  Red  squadron  was  at  the  crossroad  452,  1^4  miles  south- 
east of  Hampton,  with  a  platoon  at  Hafer's  Mill  and  a  squad 
at  the  ford  to  the  west.  The  Blue  cavalry,  using  its  patrols, 
kept  in  touch  with  the  Red  cavalry  until  it  crossed  the  bridge 
at  434W.  Here  contact  was  lost,  as  the  patrols  were  stopped 
from  crossing  the  Conewago  by  detachments  from  the  Red 
cavalry  at  all  the  bridges  and  fords. 

The  captain  of  Troop  A,  Blue  cavalry,  posted  a  detached 
post  on  the  hill  north  of  Hafer's  Mill.  This  detachment 
found  the  Red  outguard  on  the  bridge,  but  could  not  determine 
the  strength  of  the  body  behind  it.  Similarly  the  pickets  at 
Miller's  and  Oakwood  School  House  sent  patrols  to  the  cross- 
ings of  the  Conewago  south  of  their  positions,  and  found  them 
both  occupied. 


CHAPTER  XV. 
FIELD  SANITATION.     INDIVIDUAL  COOKING. 

To  keep  well,  to  preserve  your  strength,  is  your  first  duty. 

Sick  men  not  only  reduce  the  effective  strength  of  an  army;  they 
divert  the  resources  of  the  State  from  useful  channels,  and  so  weaken 
it  doubly. 

Nearly  all  camp  diseases  are  preventible,  but  all  men  must  co- 
operate to  prevent  them. 

On  going  into  camp  tents  should  always  be  ditched  and 
drains  dug  so  that  the  water  will  be  carried  away  from  the 
tents  rapidly.  This  should  be  done  at  the  same  time  the  tents 
are  pitched,  unless  the  camp  is  for  only  one  night,  and  the 
weather  signs  point  unmistakably  to  fair  weather.  To  do  this 
will  take  only  a  very  few  minutes,  and  will  insure  dry  bedding 
and  tent  floors.  The  dirt  from  the  ditches  should  be  scattered, 
and  the  pins  for  the  skirts  of  the  tents  should  be  driven  in  the 
bottom  of  the  ditches. 

When  a  camp  is  made  that  will  be  occupied  for  some  time, 
and  the  soil  is  at  all  light  or  sandy,  great  care  should  be  taken 
to  distribute  the  sod  and  leaves  or  dried  grass  already  on  the 
ground  as  little  as  possible.  Dust  is  one  of  the  greatest  nui- 
sances in  a  permanent  camp,  and  anything  that  will  hold  the 
soil  in  place  should  remain  undisturbed. 

The  following  rules  concerning  Field  Sanitation  are  taken 
from  Notes  on  Sanitation  in  the  Field,  by  Major  James  S.  Wil- 
son, Medical  Corps,  U.  S.  Army. 

PERSONAL  HYGIENE,  a.  The  body  must  be  kept  clean  in 
order  that  boils,  lice,  and  various  skin  diseases  may  be  pre- 
vented. It  is  important,  particularly  with  mounted  troops,  that 
the  inside  and  back  of  the  thighs  and  buttocks  be  clean,  to  pre- 
vent chafing. 

b.  The  hair  of  the  head  should  be  trimmed  close  to  pre- 
vent diseases  of  the  scalp. 


FIELD  SANITATION  179 

c.  The  tooth  brush  should  be  used  daily  to  prevent  decay 
of  the  teeth. 

d.  The  hands  must  be  washed  before  each  meal,  and  after 
returning   from   the   sink.      Disregard   of   this   custom   resulted 
in  many  cases  of  typhoid  fever  in  our  recent  war  with  Spain. 

e.  The  feet  of  dismounted  troops  should  be  cleaned  daily 
on  arrival  in  camp,  and  clean  socks  should  replace  the  ones 
used  on  the  march.    If  the  feet?  are  tender,  apply  to  the  surgeon 
for  the  foot  powder  provided  for  such  a  condition.     Ingrowing 
toe  nails  are  prevented  by  keeping  the  nails  constantly  trimmed 
squarely  across.    If  the  feet  become  blistered  they  must  be  given 
the  most  careful  attention.     Observe  the  following  rules:     Use 
only  a  needle  to  open  a  blister.     Never  open  it  at  the  top,  but 
as  follows :    first  heat  the  needle  in  the  flame  of  a  match  to  kill 
the  germs  on  it;  then  run  the  needle  through  the  base  of  the 
blister   and  gently   express   the   water.       Another  method   not 
generally  known  or  practiced  is  to  place  over  the  blister  thus 
treated  a  small  piece  of  ordinary  surgeon's  adhesive,  or,  as  it 
is  generally  called,  "sticking"  plaster;  this  prevents  the  blister 
from  refilling  and  permits  it  to  heal. 

/.  Do  not  drink  or  eat  food  prepared  or  sold  from  an  un- 
authorized source.  One  of  the  most  serious  contributing  causes 
of  intestinal  ills  and  kindred  diseases  in  camps  of  concentration, 
is  the  unauthorized  sale  of  alleged  "ripe  fruit,"  "digestible  pas- 
try" and  "pure  beverages,"  which  are  usually  the  reverse. 

g.  The  necessity  of  the  daily  bath,  when  practicable,  can 
not  be  overestimated,  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  cleanliness, 
but  because  such  a  bath  greatly  refreshes  one  after  a  long  and 
tiresome  march. 

CARE  OF  THE  TENT.  a.  Air  the  ground  covered  by  the  tent 
daily,  also  raise  the  walls  so  that  as  much  sunlight  as  possible 
will  enter  it.  Do  this  not  only  to  dry  the  tent  floor,  but  also 
to  obtain  the  disinfectant  action  of  the  sun. 

b.  Air  the  bed  sacks  and  blankets  on  the  tent)  guys — not 
on  the  ground,  on  account  of  its  dampness.  Do  this  daily,  if 
possible,  as  the  bed  clothes  absorb  the  odors  of  the  body  very 
much  more  rapidly  than  when  sheets  are  used. 


180  MILITARY  PRIMER 

c.  Do  not  close  the  tent  door  entirely  at  night,  as  it  is  not 
generally  appreciated  that  the  fibres  of  the  canvas  swell  at 
night  after  the  dew  falls,  to  a  degree  that  makes  the  tent  almost 
airtight,  and  vitiation  of  the  air  in  the  tent  results. 

DISEASES  OF  THE  INTESTINES.  One  of  the  most  common 
diseases  of  the  young  soldier  is  some  disorder  of  the  bowels, 
and  the  most  frequent  is  constipation  and  its  attendant  ills.  A 
daily  stool  is  necessary  for  health.  A  most  important  point  in 
this  connection  is  to  designate  a  place  immediately  on  arrival 
in  camp  for  the  men  who  wish  to  relieve  themselves  at  once, 
and  to  construct  at  least  a  shallow  pit.  Nothing  is  more  de- 
moralizing to  troops  on  going  into  camp,  than  to  permit  the 
men  of  the  command  to  relieve  themselves  in  the  nearest  place 
available  regardless  of  the  purpose  for  which  the  ground  may 
be  used  later. 

MOSQUITOES.  The  use  of  the  mosquito  bar  is  not  always 
enforced  as  strictly  as  it  should  be.  If  not  used  in  countries 
where  malaria-carrying  mosquitoes  are  found,  the  result  is 
malarial  fever.  A  report  should  be  promptly  made  if,  in  a  per- 
manent camp,  a  place  is  found  where  mosquitoes  are  breeding. 
The  breeding  place  should  be  immediately  destroyed.  Mosqui- 
toes will  breed  in  old  tin  cans,  bottles  or  anything  that  will  hold 
a  little  stagnant  water. 

WASHING  WOOLEN  CLOTHING.  Inasmuch  as  the  ordinary 
woolen  underclothing  can  be  easily  rendered  almost  unservice- 
able by  improper  washing,  it  is  suggested  that  they  be  laundered 
as  follows: 

1.  Put  the  clothes  in  warm  soapsuds  and  move  them  about 
freely. 

t.     Next,  place  in  clean  cold  water. 

3.     Hang  them  out  to  dry,  and  on  no  account  dring  them. 

Many  times  in  the  field  it  will  be  found  impossible  to  wash 
underclothes,  and  have  them  dry  in  .time  for  the  next  day's 
march.  In  this  event  they  can  be  freshened  materially  by 
thorough  brushing,  shaking,  and  sunning. 

BUTTONS.  A  point  that  is  often  overlooked  because  of  its 
apparent  unimportance,  is  to  see  that  the  buttons  on  the  cloth- 


FIELD  SANITATION  181 

ing  are  replaced  when  lost,  for  if  this  is  not  done,  particularly 
with  underclothing,  chafing  or  blistering  may  result  from  an 
improperly  fitting  garment. 

CHOLERA  BELT.  For  many  years  it  has  been  recommended 
that  in  the  field  the  "Cholera  belt"  be  worn  around  the  waist. 
This  belt  consists  usually  of  a  band  of  woolen  material.  It 
frequently  rolls  up  into  a  rope-like  mass,  and  ceases  to  exercise 
the  function  for  which  it  is  intended,  viz:  to  protect  the  deli- 
cate organs  of  the  abdomen.  A  much  better,  simpler,  more 
economical  and  satisfactory  appliance  is  the  "Cholera  apron," 
which  covers  the  front  of  the  lower  part  of  the  abdomen,  fasten- 
ing around  the  waist  by  two  pieces  of  tape.  This  accomplishes 
all  the  cholera  belt  does,  and  has  none  of  its  disadvantages. 

FIT  OF  CLOTHING.  Clothing,  especially  for  the  field,  should 
be  loose  and  comfortable.  No  construction  of  the  chest  is  per- 
missible, in  order  that  the  movement  of  the  body,  and  par- 
ticularly those  of  respiration,  may  be  free  from  restraint. 

WAIST  BELT.  Many  men  use  a  belt  to  hold  up  the  trousers, 
suspenders  are  better,  as  the  belt  places  too  much  pressure  on 
the  abdomen. 

SHOES.  The  importance  of  correctly  fitting  shoes  is  fre- 
quently overlooked  or  disregarded  by  the  inexperienced  soldier. 
The  result  is  always  readily  seen  in  commands  where  this  im- 
portant feature  is  disregarded.  As  an  example  of  the  importance 
of  the  proper  care  of  the  feet,  it  might  be  noted  that  in  the 
early  part  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  the  German  Army, 
during  a  given  period  lost  from  killed  and  wounded,  60,000 
men,  and  during  the  same  period  30,000  men  were  incapacitated 
for  duty  by  injuries  to  their  feet.  It  is  recommended  that  two 
pairs  of  properly  fitting  shoes  be  obtained  and  well  broken 
in  before  leaving  for  a  campaign,  and  that  they  be  given  a 
thorough  coating  of  neatsfoot  oil  several  days  before  taking  the 
field.  On  the  march  when  shoes  become  wet,  fill  them  with 
dry  hay  or  straw,  and  do  not  place  them  too  near  a  fire  to  dry. 
When  dry,  give  them  a  good  coating  of  oil,  or  of  any  available 
form  of  grease. 

SELECTION  OF  SHOES,     a.     Avoid  selecting  a  shoe  with  too 


182  MILITARY  PRIMER 

low  an  instep,  or  too  loose  an  instep ;  the  former  defect  is  fre- 
quently noticed  in  the  "issue"  shoe. 

b.  Remember  that  the  feet  swell  after  a  long  march ;  there- 
fore have  the  shoes  roomy. 

c.  Remember  that  when  the  weight  of  the  body  is  thrown 
on  the  foot  in  walking,  there  is  a  considerable  widening  of  the 
foot,  and  also  a  slight  lengthening.    A  marching  shoe,  there- 
fore, must  be  comfortable  when  the  entire  weight  of  the  body 
is  thrown  on  either  foot. 

d.  In  getting  a  shoe  for  use  on  foreign  service,  select  one 
a  quarter  to  a  half  size  larger  than  usual,  as  the  feet  of  an 
individual  either  enlarge,  or  seem  to,  in  the  tropics.     In  cold 
countries  a  heavier  sock  is  usually  worn. 

e-  Be  careful,  however,  not  to  choose  a  shoe  too  large,  as 
it  is  likely  to  produce  a  blister  from  rubbing. 

/.  Recently  the  French  adopted  a  method  of  treating  feet 
blistered  while  on  the  march.  It  is  as  follows :  Take  a  strap 
half  an  inch  broad,  (the  ordinary  coat  strap  from  the  regula- 
tion saddle  answers  very  well)  and  spread  it  on  the  ground. 
Place  the  instep  of  the  foot  over  its  center ;  bring  up  each  end 
of  the  strap  over  the  top  of  the  instep,  cross  and  bring  around 
the  ankle  and  buckle. 

So  satisfactory  is  this  method  that  it  is  claimed  that  men 
who  were  suffering  with  blistered  feet  were  cured  by  wearing 
this  appliance,  even  though  marching  fifteen  to  twenty  miles 
a  day. 

SOCKS.  Under  ordinary  circumstances  the  light  woolen  sock, 
that  is  now  issued  in  our  Army,  owing  to  its  elasticity  and 
absorbent  qualities,  furnishes  a  most  excellent  foot  covering. 
It  is,  however,  imperative,  particularly  for  foot  troops,  that  a 
clean,  or  at  least,  a  fresh  pair  of  socks  be  put  on  each  day.  It 
may  sometimes  happen  that  it  is  impossible  to  wash  or  to 
change  the  socks.  In  this  event  it  is  recommended  that  they 
be  aired  and  sunned,  turned  inside  out,  and  replaced  on  the 
feet. 

CARE  OF  THE  CANTEEN,  a.  Scald  a  new  canteen  inside 
and  out  before  using  it.  This  is  important  in  all  cases ;  it  re- 


INDIVIDUAL  COOKING  183 

moves  the  sizing  on  the  cloth  on  the  outside,  making  the  cover- 
ing more  absorbent,  and  sterilizes  the  interior. 

b.  Fill  the  canteen  only  from  authorized  sources. 

c.  In  order  to  cool  the  contents  of  the  canteen  for  the  next 
day  fill  it  at  night,  wet  the  outside  covering,  and  hang  in  the 
breeze  until  morning- 

d.  Avoid  the  bad  habit  frequently  seen  among  the  un- 
trained of  drinking  too  much  water  on  the  march.    This  type 
of  man  empties  his  canteen  early  in  the  day,  and  is  likely  to 
drink  water  from  an  unauthorized  source  on  the  march  or  in 
camp,  before  a  suitable  supply  can  be  obtained  for  him. 

e.  Make  it  a  rule  to  scald  the  inside  of  the  canteen  at  least 
once  a  week  while  in  the  field. 

INDIVIDUAL  COOKING. 

The  soldier's  mess  kit  —  meat  can,  with  its  top,  tin  cup, 
knife,  fork  and  spoon  —  furnishes  him  with  every  needed 
utensil  for  cooking  the  raw  materials  he  is  liable  to  get  for 
his  ration  in  the  field. 

Three  times  a  day  a  man  must  eat  to  sustain  his  physical 
forces  so  he  is  capable  of  a  maximum  of  effort,  and  no  calling 
that  men  engage  in  requires  such  strength  to  withstand  fatigue 
as  does  the  life  of  a  soldier  in  a  campaign.  Without  proper 
food,  properly  cooked,  his  strength  dwindles  and  his  efficiency 
is  reduced.  No  part  of  his  training  is  so  necessary  as  is  the 
knowledge  of  how  to  prepare  his  food  so  as  to  receive  from  it 
the  greatest  amount  of  benefit.  Food  and  sleep  are  the  great 
restorers  of  exhausted  physical  strength.  To  sleep  needs  no 
training;  the  proper  preparation  of  suitable  food  does  need 
and  should  receive  most  careful  attention  in  the  training  of  a 
soldier. 

THE  FIRE.  Do  not  have  too  big  a  fire,  but  have  it  burning 
well,  with  a  good  bed  of  coals  before  beginning  to  cook.  Do 
not  cool  the  fire  by  adding  fuel  while  cooking  is  actually  in 
progress. 

Make  the  fire  in  a  little  trench,  or  between  two  stones  or 
bricks  or  pieces  of  wood.  Supports  should  be  made  for  the 


184  MILITARY  PRIMER 

frying  pan  —  the  deeper  part  of  the  meat  can  —  and  the  tin 
cup,  so  that  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  hold  them  over  the  fire 
by  hand. 

COFFEE.  Fill  the  tin  cup  two-thirds  full  of  clean  water; 
bring  it  to  a  boil,  then  add  a  heaping  spoonful  of  roasted  and 
ground  coffee,  stirring  gently  while  adding  it.  Let  it  boil 
slowly  for  five  minutes,  then  add  sugar  to  taste.  Stir  the 
sugar  in,  and  add  a  dash  of  cold  water  to  settle.  Let  it  now 
rest  without  moving  until  it  is  cool  enough  to  drink ;  it  will 
then  be  clear. 

BACON.  Cut  a  side  of  bacon  in  half  lengthwise.  Then 
cut  slices  about  five  to  the  inch;  three  of  these  should  be 
enough  for  one  man  for  one  meal.  Place  them  in  the  frying 
pan  with  about  half  an  inch  of  cold  water.  Let  it  come  to  a 
boil,  and  then  pour  the  water  off.  Fry  over  a  brisk  fire,  turn- 
ing the  bacon  once  and  quickly  browning  it.  Remove  the 
bacon  to  the  lid  of  the  meat  can,  leaving  the  bacon  grease  for 
frying  other  parts  of  the  meal. 

FRESH  MEAT.  To  Fry.  A  small  amount  of  grease  (one 
to  two  spoonfuls)  is  necessary.  Put  this  in  the  frying  pan 
and  heat  it  until  it  smokes,  then  drop  the  meat  in  it.  If  the 
meat  is  about  half  an  inch  thick,  let  it  fry  for  about  a  minute, 
more  or  less,  depending  on  whether  it  is  wished  rare,  medium, 
or  well  done-  If  the  grease  is  smoking  hot,  and  the  fire  is  kept 
up,  the  meat  will  be  not  at  all  greasy.  Salt  and  pepper  to  taste, 
after  it  is  cooked. 

POTATOES  or  ONIONS.  To  Fry :  Peel  and  cut  into  slices 
about  a  quarter  of  an  inch  thick,  and  scatter  well  in  the  frying 
pan  in  which  the  grease  remains  after  cooking  the  bacon  or 
meat.  Add  enough  water  to  half  cover  the  potatoes  or  onions, 
cover  with  the  lid  to  keep  the  moisture  in,  and  let  come  to  a 
boil  from  fifteen  to  twenty  minutes.  Remove  the  cover  and 
dry  as  desired.  Salt  and  pepper  to  taste.  During  the  cooking 
the  bacon  may  be  kept  on  the  cover,  which  is  most  conveniently 
placed  bottom  side  up,  over  the  cooking  vegetables. 

(The  above  receipts  are  adapted  from  the  Manual  for 
Army  Cooks.  Other  receipts  are  found  on  pages  167  to  173 
of  that  Manual.) 


INDIVIDUAL  COOKING  185 

From  the  chapters  that  precede  it  should  be  plain  to  the 
young  student  of  the  Art  of  War  that  an  army  is  a  very  large 
aggregation  of  men,  commanded  by  one  man  on  whom,  in  bat- 
tle, devolves  the  fate  of  the  nation  his  army  is  defending. 
He  must,  with  the  advice  and  assistance  of  a  few  men,  plan 
his  campaigns,  and  he  must  keep  his  plans  secret.  To  tell 
everyone  in  his  army  what  he  proposes  to  do  would  surely 
result  in  putting  his  enemy  in  possession  of  his  plans,  and  so 
lead  to  the  defeat  of  them.  To  each  of  his  principal  subordiA 
nates  he  assigns  a  task,  confiding  so  much  of  his  plans  as  is; 
necessary  to  a  proper  performance  of  the  task  assigned.  The 
success  of  the  campaign  depends  upon  the  zeal  and  willingness 
of  these  principal  subordinates- 

In  turn  they  assign  to  their  immediate  subordinates  the 
share  each  is  to  take  in  the  undertaking,  and  so  the  orders  are 
transmitted  from  superior  to  subordinate,  until  finally  they 
reach  the  colonels  of  regiments,  the  majors  of  battalions,  the 
captains  of  companies,  the  individual  soldiers  who  are  to  do 
the  work-  In  a  general  engagement  these  men  can  know  but 
little  of  the  reasons  why  they  are  moved  from  position  to  posi- 
tion, why  they  are  ordered  to  the  attack,  often  where  it  seems 
to  them  a  hopeless  effort ;  why  they  are  sacrified,  to  them  ap- 
parently to  no  purpose,  or  why  they  are  sometimes  withdrawn 
when  they  seem  to  be  victorious.  It  is  the  business  of  each 
to  do  this  thing  he  is  told  to  do,when  told  to  do  it,  and  only 
by  so  doing  can  victory  be  secured. 

These  are  some  of  the  reasons  for  a  military  education,  for 
exacting  obedience  in  every  detail  of  daily  life,  until  obedience 
becomes  instinctive. 


APPENDIX 

The  elementary  training  of  all  soldiers  may  be  said  to 
extend  in  three  directions ;  first,  towards  a  condition  of  perfect 
discipline,  so  that  they  may  be  controlled  by  their  officers, 
automatically  controlled,  by  instinct  rather  than  by  an  effort 
of  the  will. 

The  second  direction  in  which  a  soldier's  training  should 
extend  is  towards  excellence  in  marksmanship,  so  that  the 
machine  of  which  he  is  a  member  may  be  a  greater  menace 
to  the  enemies  of  his  country,  and,  in  exact  ratio,  a  better 
guarantee  of  his  country's  peace.  The  third  direction  is  to- 
wards a  knowledge  of  field  sanitation,  that  the  efficiency  of  the 
machine  may  not  be  impaired  by  the  ignorant  violation  of  the 
laws  governing  his  own  and  his  comrade's  health. 

Given  thorough  training  in  these  three  directions  the  sol- 
dier is  a  powerful  member  of  the  machine ;  give  all  its  members 
this  training,  and  to  the  officers  a  thorough  knowledge  of  tac- 
tics, and  the  machine  becomes  well-nigh  invincible ;  its  size  is 
its  only  limiting  factor. 

Discipline  is  taught  by  drill,  by  the  constant  insistance  that 
certain  things  be  done  in  a  certain  way,  and  in  no  other  way ; 
by  the  constant  repetition  of  familiar  acts  in  response  to 
familiar  orders,  until  the  soldier's  obedience  is  inevitable,  sub- 
conscious; so  that  "under  whatever  stress  of  circumstances, 
danger,  and  death,  he  hears  that  word  of  command,  even  if  his 
mind  be  too  confused  and  astounded  to  understand,  yet  his 
muscles  will  obey." 

After  being  disciplined,  trained  to  shoot  well,  and 
familiar  with  the  laws  of  health  and  the  necessity  of  their 
observance,  soldiers  need  further  and  explicit  training  in  the 
art  of  scouting.  Nowhere  can  young  officers  and  enlisted 
men  of  all  grades  get  that  independence  of  action,  that  sense 
of  personal  responsibility  so  necessary  to  good  soldiers,  as 
in  the  conduct  of  patrols.  Here  is  a  chance  for  all  to  excel, 
and  here  is  a  study  that  will  compel  your  interest. 


APPENDIX  187 

rhe  first  three  departments  of  a  soldier's  training  can  be 
taught  exactly,  on  a  limited  field  of  operations.  The  last  can 
only  be  learned  by  applying  its  laws  to  a  multitude  of  differ- 
ent fields  of  operations,  as  has  already  been  sufficiently  shown 

The  problems  discussed  are  typical  of  thousands  of  others 
that  the  progressive  student  should  work  out  for  himself. 
Map  problems  are  poor  substitutes  for  properly  conducted 
field  maneuvers.  The  latter  are  equally  poor  substitutes  for 
the  school  of  actual  war,  but  the  problems  of  war  can  be  bet- 
ter solved  by  students  well  schooled  in  maneuver  duties,  and 
good  preparation  for  the  latter  can  be  gained  from  a  careful 
study  of  maps  and  map  problems.  For  these  reasons  every 
military  student  should  perfect  himself  in  map  reading  until 
a  map  is  as  easily  read  as  a  printed  page. 

SUGGESTIONS  FOR  PROBLEMS 

MAP  READING. 

In  all  map  problems,  unless  otherwise  stated,  neglect  all 
consideration  of  trees,  houses  and  standing  crops.  Consider 
only  the  bare  surface  of  the  ground.  Assume  the  observer's 
eyes  to  be  five  feet  above  the  ground  on  the  Topographical 
Map  —  one  contour  interval  —  and  neglect  the  height  of  the 
observer's  eyes  when  using  the  Strategic  Map. 

1.  If  you  were  standing  at  the  Y  in  the  road  at  Oak  Grove 
School  House,  Topographical  Map: 

REQUIRED:     a.     Could  you  see  crossroad  529,  to  the  west? 

b.  Could  you  see  Belmont  School  House? 

c.  Could  you  see  Chromis'  house,  to  the  northeast? 

d.  Could  you  see  Oakwood  School  House,  to  the  east? 

e.  Could  you  see  Crossroad  594,  to  the  southwest? 

f.  Could   you   see   Husbach's   house,    in   the  bend   of   the 
Conewago,  to  the  east? 

Note.     Require  proof  of  these  and  all  similar  problems  by  draw- 
ing profiles. 

2.  Draw  lines  to  the  north,  east,  south,  and  west  from  Oak 
Grove  School  House,  and  then  erase  all  parts  of  them  that  are 
invisible  from  the  school  house. 


188  MILITARY  PRIMER 

3.  You  are  a  patrol  leader;  you  are  at  Bowlder,  near  the 
central  part  of  the  northern  part  of  the  Topographical  Map. 
You  plan  to  lead  your  patrol  by  574,  southwest,  to  Newchester, 
thence  to  Oakwood  School  House  and  back  to  Bowlder. 

Consider  in  this  problem  that  the  trees  are  in  full  leaf,  and 
not  more  than  25  feet  high. 

REQUIRED  :  a.  How  far  can  you  see  in  the  direction  you 
are  to  go? 

b.  Describe  the  road  from  Bowlder  to  565. 

c.  When  you  get  to  the  western  edge  of  the  woods  between 
565  and  574  you  see  that  there  is  a  hostile  patrol  on  hill  584. 
How  do  you  lead  your  patrol,  following  your  originally  planned 
route  as  closely  as  possible,  so  that  this  hostile  patrol  can  not 
see  it? 

d.  Describe  the  country  for  half  a  mile  to  the  right  of  the 
road  as  you  go  from  Oak  Grove  School  House  to  Newchester. 

e.  What  parts  of  the  road  from  Oakwood  School  House 
to  Bowlder  are  visible  to  a  sentinel  on  hill  602,  northwest  of 
Hampton  ? 

f.  What  is  the  lowest  point  on  the  road  this  patrol  planned 
to  take?    The  highest? 

g.  Where,  within  a  half  mile  of  the  road  this  patrol  planned 
to  take  would  the  leader  get  the  most  comprehensive  view  of  the 
valley  of  the  Conewago? 

h.  Where,  from  the  road,  does  the  leader  get  the  most  ex- 
tended view  to  the  northeast?  The  southeast?  The  southwest? 
The  northwest? 

4.  How  far  up  each  of  the  four  roads  radiating  from  Oak- 
wood  School  House  would  a  man  walking  away  from  the  corners 
be  seen  by  a  man  standing  there  ?    Assume  for  this  problem  that 
there  are  no  trees  to  obstruct  the  view. 


NOTE  TO  INSTRUCTORS:  The  above  are  suggestions  of  classes  of 
questions  that  can  be  multiplied  indefinitely. 

Students  should  be  provided  with  contoured  maps  of  their  own 
neighborhood,  where  such  maps  are  available,  and  learn  from  them 
how  a  familiar  landscape  looks  on  a  map. 

By  application  to  the  Director,  U.  8.  Geological  Survey,  WashJ 
ington,  D.  C.,  information  can  be  secured  a«  to  whether  or  not  any 
particular  portion  of  the  United  States  has  been  mapped  by  the  Survey. 


APPENDIX  18f 

ORIENTATION. 

Instruction  in  this  most  important  part  of  the  soldier's  train- 
ing can  only  be  given  in  the  field.  Students  can  be  taught  to 
read  maps  in  the  class  room.  This  instruction  must  be  thorough 
and  constant;  until  students  can  read  maps  readily  and  ac- 
curately, all  tactical  instruction  involving  the  use  of  maps  will 
be  nearly  usless.  Map  reading  is  to  the  study  of  tactics  what 
reading  is  to  the  study  of  a  language  or  any  of  the  arts  and 
sciences.  Having  learned  the  meaning  of  the  conventional  signs 
of  maps,  and  how  to  vizualize  the  terrain  represented  on  them, 
the  student  should  be  given  a  local  map,  taken  out  into  the  country 
represented  on  it,  and  taught  to  "find  himself"  on  the  map. 

Another  method  is  to  put  the  open  map  on  the  ground. 

Better  results  can  be  made  if  an  automobile  is  available,  be- 
cause so  much  more  country  can  be  covered  by  it,  in  a  given 
time,  than  in  any  other  way. 

In  the  chapter  on  Orientation,  pages  41  and  42,  ante,  one 
method  to  be  followed  is  described  in  detail. 

Onother  method  is  to  put  the  open  map  on  the  ground. 
Place  a  compass  on  the  map,  and  slowly  turn  the  map  until  the 
needle  of  the  compass  lies  parallel  to  the  north  and  south  lines 
of  the  map  the  north  point  of  the  needle  pointing  to  the  north  end 
of  the  map. 

No  matter  how  unfamiliar  the  student  may  be  with  the  ter- 
rain shown  on  the  map  he  is  working  with,  there  will  always  be 
one  or  two  points  on  it  whose  location  is  known. 

For  instance:  a  party  of  students  has  been  taken,  by  rail,  to 
Gettysburg,  where  none  of  them  have  ever  been  before.  They 
are  provided  with  a  copy  of  the  Strategic  Map.  An  automobile 
is  provided  for  the  party.  They  set  out  on  the  Harrisburg  Road, 
and,  after  a  while,  the  car  is  stopped  and  they  get  out.  Except 
the  instructor,  no  one  had  paid  any  attention  whatever  to  the 
direction  they  have  come. 

The  map  is  spread,  and  oriented  as  described  above.  The 
position  of  Gettysburg  is  indicated  to  the  students,  on  the  map. 
They  are  assembled  on  the  north  side  of  the  map  (beyond 
Gettysburg,  so  that  they  may  look  towards  it).  The  instructor 


190  MILITARY  PRIMER 

points  to  Gettysburg  on  the  map,  and  then  towards  its  actual 
direction  on  the  ground.  The  students,  following  the  direction 
opposite  to  that  in  which  he  is  pointing,  run  out  from  Gettys- 
burg, on  the  map.  This  fixes  one  line  on  their  map  for  them : 
the  line  from  Gettysburg  to  their  present  position. 

Looking  about  them,  the  see  that  the  most  prominent 
physical  features  of  the  ground  near  them  are  these:  they  are 
standing  on  a  slanting  crossroad,  one  road  runs  from  southwest 
to  northeast,  the  other  from  southeast  to  northwest.  Three  or 
four  miles  away,  to  the  east,  is  a  little  round-topped  hill,  and 
towards  the  west,  a  couple  of  miles  away,  is  another  hill,  that 
seems  much  larger  and  higher. 

The  problem  now  is :  where,  on  the  map  line  they  have  lo- 
cated through  Gettysburg  and  their  present  position  is  a  spot 
where  a  slanting  crossroad  lies  between  two  prominent  hills, 
one  to  the  east,  the  other,  nearer,  larger  and  higher,  to  the  west  ? 
It  must  be  the  point  617;  no  other  point  on  the  map  fits  all  of 
these  conditions.  To  verify  this  still  closer,  they  remember 
that,  about  a  mile  back  on  the  road  they  went  through  a  little 
village  —  there  it  is,  Heidlersburg,  on  the  map,  about  an  inch 
southwest  of  617. 

It  is  essential,  in  order  to  orient  oneself  on  the  map  to  know 
definitely  two  lines.  The  compass  gives  the  north  and  south 
line;  one  other  line  must  be  known.  The  intersection  of  these 
two  lines,  on  the  map,  fixes  the  position  of  the  observer.  There 
remains  only  to  verify  this  intersection  by  comparing  the  topo- 
graphical features  shown  on  the  map  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
intersection  with  the  actual  physical  features  of  the  ground  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  observer.  If  they  agree,  the  orientation  is  com- 
plete; the  observer  knows  to  a  certainty  exactly  where  he  is,  on 
the  map. 

APPLIED  MINOR  TACTICS. 

The  following  suggestions  for  the  preparation  of  problems 
in  applied  minor  tactics,  whether  map  problems,  war  game 
problems,  or  problems  for  field  maneuvers,  are  issued  by  the 
Department  of  Military  Art,  at  the  Service  Schools,  Fort 
Leavenworth : 


APPENDIX  191 

1.  Give  them  a  semblance  of  reality. 

2.  Make  them  simple  and  as  brief  as  possible. 

3.  Make  them  illustrate  some  tactical  idea  or  principle. 

4.  Make  them  as  instructive  as  possible. 

5.  Adapt  the  problem  to  the  number  and  quality  of  troops 
involved. 

6.  Have  them  contain  only  such  information  as  in  war  the 
commander   might   be   supposed   to   have,    and   require,   where 
practicable,   the  gaining  of   necessary   information  by  military 
means,  as  reconnoissance. 

7.  Make  the  desired  contact  certain  to  result  and  on  ground 
where  it  is  permissible. 

8.  Introduce  as  few  unnatural  conditions  as  possible. 

9.  Give  the  necessary  instructions  for  placing  the  troops  to 
solve  the  problem. 

To  apply  these  suggestions,  let  us  assume  that  you  are  going 
to  prepare  a  one-side  war  game  problem  for  your  non-commis- 
sioned officers,  or  class  of  students. 

How  are  you  going  to  give  your  problem  the  semblance  of 
reality?  You  must  assume  a  state  of  war,  two  belligerents,  a 
frontier,  one  side  invading,  one  defending.  You  must  give  your 
students  a  mental  picture  of  the  location  of  the  larger  masses. 
You  should  assume  the  state  of  the  weather,  the  condition  of 
the  roads,  the  attitude  of  the  inhabitants. 

The  second  suggestion  —  simplicity  and  brevity  —  is  neces- 
sary in  order  not  to  introduce  so  many  preliminaries  for  the 
student  to  remember  that  he  will  not  have  his  own  mission  stand 
out  clearly  in  his  mind. 

The  third  suggestion  hardly  needs  comment.  Decide  on  the 
tactical  principle  you  wish  to  illustrate,  and  keep  that  foremost 
in  your  mind  —  let  everything  lead  up  to  that  principle. 

In  carrying  out  the  fourth  suggestion,  have  your  problem 
illustrate  as  many  different  phases  of  the  tactical  principle  you 
are  teaching  as  possible.  This  will  tax  your  ingenuity  more  than 
any  other  part  of  the  problem. 

If,  in  considering  the  fifth  suggestion,  you  are  dealing  with 
a  problem  in  reconnoissance,  do  not  give  your  students  enough 
troops  to  lead  to  combats.  If  an  advance  guard  problem,  give 


192  MILITARY  PRIMER 

them  enough  troops,  and  make  the  enemy  weak  enough  so  that 
they  may  advance  —  really  may  overcome,  if  they  properly 
handle  the  troops  given  them,  any  opposition  offered  them.  In 
an  outpost  problem,  give  them  enough  men  to  cover  the  front 
assigned  them,  but  not  enough  to  permit  that  they  solve  the 
problem  by  posting  a  cordon  of  sentinels.  If  you  wish  to  illus- 
trate a  combat,  make  them  strong  enough  so  that  they  do  not 
attempt  a  rear  guard  action  —  in  other  words,  lead  them  so 
that  the  thing  you  wish  to  illustrate  is  manifestly  the  only  thing 
to  do. 

Once,  at  maneuvers,  a  problem  was  anounced  as  a  rear-guard 
problem,  and  its  situations  were  so  worded  that  each  commander 
thought  he  commanded  the  rear  guard.  That  would  not  have 
happened  if  one  side  had  been  told  his  mission  was  to  advance, 
the  other  to  cover  a  retreat. 

The  sixth  suggestion  is  excellent,  and  self-explanatory. 

The  seventh  suggestion  is  met  by  working  backwards.  De- 
cide where  your  contact  is  to  take  place,  and  then  work  back 
from  that,  in  your  preparatory  work,  to  the  point  where  you 
are  going  to  begin  the  problem. 

The  eighth  suggestion  is  inserted  to  prevent  your  students 
from  being  led  away  from  the  principle  you  wish  to  teach  by 
arguments  on  manifest  absurdities. 

The^  ninth  suggestion  is  a  very  important  one.  Place  the 
troops  in  logical  positions,  and  tell  your  students  how  to  open 
the  problem.  Then,  after  starting  their  particular  units  on  their 
mission,  try  to  keep  their  minds  away  from  the  fabric  you  have 
woven  in  complying  with  previous  suggestions,  particularly  the 
first,  fifth,  and  sixth,  and  concentrate  on  their  own  mission. 
Of  course  they  must  keep  the  idea  of  team  work  constantly  in 
mind. 

To  illustrate:  You  wish  to  show,  in  a  one-side  war  game 
problem,  the  methods  of  reconnoissance  to  be  employed  in  ob- 
serving the  march  of  a  hostile  column,  using  several  small 
patrols. 

You  have  the  Guide  Map,  Strategic  Map,  and  Topographical 
Map  to  use  in  the  preparation  of  the  problem.  It  is  a  good  plan 
to  mark  a  rectangle  on  the  Guide  Map  to  show  the  terrain  cov- 


APPENDIX  193 

ered  by  the  other  two,  and  on  the  Strategic  Map  to  show  that 
covered  by  the  Topographical  Map.  On  the  margin  of  the 
Strategic  Map  it  is  well  to  draw  arrows  indicating  the  direction 
to  the  towns  named  on  the  Guide  Map,  and  the  distances  to 
them. 

Then  take  two  lines  that  might  be  assumed  as  frontiers  — 
the  Susquehanna  River  and  the  line  between  Pennsylvania  and 
Maryland.  If  you  wish  your  movement  to  be  east  and  west, 
choose  the  former;  if  north  and  south,  the  latter.  Take  the  lat- 
ter as  our  assumption.  Troops  from  both  sides  are  hastening  to 
the  frontier.  Blue  cavalry  has  preceded  its  infantry  masses,  and 
is  searching  for  information  of  movements  of  the  Red  troops. 
If  you  have  the  body  sending  out  the  patrols  located  at  Hanover 
(Guide  Map;  Midway,  Strategic  Map)  it  would  be  natural  for 
one  of  the  secondary  groups  to  have  assigned  to  it  the  sector 
between  the  Baltimore  Pike  (Strategic  Map)  and  the  road  from 
McSherrystown  and  Hunterstown.  To  make  the  patrols  small 
enough,  make  the  group  at  Hanover  a  squadron  and  the  sec- 
ondary group  a  platoon.  Now  you  must  arrange  for  the  contact 
near  the  center  of  your  Topographical  Map  —  so  have  a  Red 
force  march  past  the  Belmont  School,  through  Newchester, 
thence  southwest  to  Moritz  School.  Decide  on  its  composition, 
rate  of  march,  and  protective  groups. 

Give  the  Blue  side  enough  information  so  that  they  may  be 
cautious  in  all  their  movements,  not  enough  to  cause  them  to 
make  a  break  for  the  strategical  points,  ignoring  the  precautions 
that  should  always  be  taken  when  in  the  proximity  of  the  enemy. 
Remember  that  the  "fog  of  war"  always  makes  it  uncertain  as 
to  what  is  beyond  the  immediate  horizon. 

The  problem  might  then  take  this  form: 

GENERAL  SITUATION  :  War  exists  between  Pennsylvania, 
Red,  and  Maryland,  Blue.  Red  forces  have  been  concentrating 
at  Carlisle,  and  are  reporting  as  advancing  towards  the  frontier 
Blue  troops  are  advancing  from  Frederick  and  Baltimore  to- 
wards Gettysburg.  Advanced  Blue  forces  are  reported  at  West- 
minster. 

SPECIAL  SITUATION  BLUE:     On  the  evening  of  June  20th 


194  MILITARY  PRIMER 

a  squadron  of  the  1st  Blue  Cavalry  reached  Midway,  and  went 
into  camp  on  Plum  Creek,  near  Edgegrove. 

At  5:00  A.  M.,  Major  A ,  commanding,  sent  for  Lieu- 
tenants B and  C ,  and  ordered:  "Spies  report  a 

mixed  Red  command  as  advancing  from  the  north  towards  York 
Springs  and  Gettysburg.  Reports  conflict,  but  indicate  about  a 
division  (20,000  men).  The  rest  of  our  regiment  is  at  Littles- 
town,  6  miles  southwest  of  here. 

"I  have  directed  Captain  D to  have  25  of  his  men 

reported  to  each  of  you.  Lieut.  B ,  you  will  have  the  sec- 
tor :  road  through  Cedar  Ridge  and  Hunterstown,  inclusive  — 
Baltimore  Pike,  inclusive.  Patrols  from  Littlestown  will  be 
responsible  for  the  territory  to  the  west  of  your  sector.  Lieut. 

C ,  your  sector  is  from  Baltimore  Pike,  inclusive,  etc. 

Start  at  six  o'clock. 

'The  regiment  will  march  on  Gettysburg  today.  I  shall 
march  on  Berlin  Junction,  with  the  intention  of  remaining  there 
throughout  the  day.  Send  reports,  after  eight  o'clock,  to  me 
there." 

The  weather  is  warm  and  clear.  The  people  are  hostile  to 
the  Blues. 

There  is  the  data  for  the  student.  In  order  to  have  them 
familiar  with  its  conditions  and  the  terrain,  and  to  be  sure  that 
they  work  out  a  plan  beforehand,  it  is  a  good  plan  to  have  the 
problem  first  worked  out  in  writing,  as  a  map  problem.  So  you 
might  add  this  to  the  problem : 

REQUIRED:  a.  How  many  patrols  would  Lieut.  B 

use? 

b.  How  would  he  divide  his  sector  for  the  various  patrols, 
and  why? 

It  is  not  enough  that  you  anounce  the  Blue  situation  and  in- 
dicate the  problems  to  be  solved.  You  must  work  out  a  Red 
plan,  and  determine  how  you  will  employ  the  Red  forces. 

In  this  problem  it  might  be  well  to  assume  that  the  Red 
force  marching  on  Gettysburg  is  a  division,  and  that  the  one 
marching  on  York  Springs  is  a  flank  guard  for  it.  It,  the  latter, 
is  composed  of  a  brigade  of  infantry,  with  a  troop  of  cavalry, 
a  battery,  and  a  company  of  engineers  attached. 


APPENDIX  195 

You  decide  on  the  size  of  its  advance  guard,  the  way  the 
advance  guard  cavalry  is  conducted,  the  rate  of  march,  where 
halts  shall  be  made,  and  the  hour  the  head  of  the  advance  guard 
reaches  Belmont  School. 

It  is  always  well  to  draw,  to  the  scale  of  the  war  game  map 
—  12  inches  to  the  mile  —  a  diagram  showing  the  road  spaces 
and  relative  positions  of  the  advance  cavalry,  the  infantry  sup- 
port and  reserve,  and  the  main  body.  Tables  of  road  space  will 
be  found  on  pages  172  and  173,  Field  Service  Regulations.  This 
diagram  may  be  laid  on  the  map,  and  the  positions  of  all  the 
various  elements  shown  graphicaly  for  any  given  moment  with 
practically  no  delay. 

In  drawing  up  your  problems,  always  give  the  Blues  —  the 
student's  side  —  a  little  the  best  of  the  bargain.  Make  loop 
holes  so  they  can  get  through  the  Red  protective  groups  if  they 
are  active  and  thorough,  and  so  give  them  an  occasional  glimpse 
of  the  Red  masses.  Nothing  will  so  soon  destroy  interest  in  war 
games  as  subjecting  your  students  to  continual  defeat.  Don't 
make  it  too  easy,  but  give  them  a  chance. 

ESTIMATING  THE  SITUATION. 

Problems  exercising  the  student  in  this  subject  can  be  readily 
improvised  from  the  discussions  of  the  various  situations  in  the 
preceding  text.  Thus: 

On  page  126  a  situation  is  described.  This  point  of  an 
advance  guard  is  fired  on,  just  as  it  has  crossed  the  bridge. 
An  instructor  might  say  to  a  student:  "Take  the  conditions 
given  in  this  situation.  You  are  in  command  of  the  point.  How 
do  you  estimate  the  situation?" 

The  student  should  be  required  to  go  formally  through  each 
step,  writing  it  out  as  described  in  Chapter  VI.  He  should  be 
required  to  do  this  even  if  he  should  object  on  the  ground  that 
such  an  estimate  is  an  absurdity;  that,  long  before  the  leader 
of  this  point  could  have  estimated  the  situation  with  so  much 
elaboration  his  point  would  be  shot  to  pieces. 

This  is  apparently  very  true,  provided  the  leader  had  not 
been  trained  to  think  quickly  and  to  estimate  situations  auto- 


196  MILITARY  PRIMER 

matically.  Actually,  when  the  situation  described  arose,  the 
commander  of  the  point  knew  (1)  his  mission;  he  knew  (2) 
that  the  enemy  was  in  his  front  and  liable  to  be  met  at  any 
moment,  and  he  knew  where  supporting  troops  were.  He  knew 
(3)  that  he  was  approaching  the  crest  of  a  hill  that  hid  every- 
thing beyond  it  from  his  view ;  that  every  step  took  him  nearer 
his  enemy;  that  he  had  just  crossed  a  stream,  and  he  had  a 
defile  —  the  bridge  —  at  his  back;  he  knew  all  the  attendant 
conditions.  He  knew  (4)  that  if  the  enemy  we're  met  with  he 
would  probably  fire  at  his  command,  the  point;  that  he  would 
conceal  his  own  strength  and  seek  to  appear  as  formidable  as 
possible.  He  knew  (5)  the  nature  of  the  terrain,  where  he  must 
go,  where  his  line  of  retreat  was.  He  had  been  attacked,  and 
now  all  the  commander  of  the  point  really  has  to  do  is  to  con- 
sider the  question :  "What  courses  are  open  to  me  ?  What  shall 
I  do  now  ?"  and  to  decide  on  his  course. 

The  student  has  not  been  in  possession  of  the  data  that  has 
been  gradually  accumulated  by  the  leader  of  this  point  all  the 
morning,  and  the  days  preceding.  He  is  not  actuated  by  the 
need  of  being  ready  for  whatever  may  come  that  was  the 
strongest  motive  in  that  leader's  life  at  that  particular  moment, 
so,  what  in  the  commander  of  the  point  would  be  sound  judg- 
ment, anticipated  by  mature  study  of  the  tactical  possibilities  of 
the  ever-changing  landscape  in  his  front,  in  the  case  of  the  stu- 
dent who  did  not  consider  all  the  phases  of  the  problem  in 
arriving  at  his  estimate,  would  be  snap  judgment,  mere  guess- 
work. 

The  leader  of  the  advance  party,  too,  when  he  comes  where 
he  can  see  what  is  going  on  at  the  bridge,  must  estimate  the 
situation  before  he  decides  on  a  line  of  action  to  be  followed. 
He  is  an  officer  of  more  rank  and  experience  than  the  com- 
mander of  the  point.  He  has  a  larger  command,  and  propor- 
tionally larger  responsibilities. 

He  has  been  studying  his  map,  and  he  realized,  before  reach- 
ing the  vicinity  of  the  stream,  that  the  crossing  of  the  Little 
Conewago  might  be  contested.  He  had  solved  the  various  steps 
in  making  his  estimate  before  the  first  shot  had  been  fired.  But 
it  was  only  by  study  in  peace  time,  by  estimating  many  situations, 


APPENDIX  197 

that  he  was  able  to  do  this.  So  it  is  with  all  students.  No  divine 
spark  of  genius  can  replace  study  in  any  art;  it  will  reward 
study  with  success,  but  it  will  never  replace  it. 

The  commander  of  the  support  has  also  planned  just  what 
he  would  do,  in  case  the  Red  forces  should  oppose  his  crossing 
of  the.  Little  Conewago,  and  so  has  the  commander  of  the  main 
body,  and  each  is  now  waiting  for  information  from  the  patrols 
of  the  advance  guard  in  order  to  know  which  plan  of  several 
already  conceived  shall  be  adopted,  what  plans  shall  be  rejected. 

It  is,  therefore,  recommended  that  all  instructors  place  the 
highest  value  on  thorough  training  in  the  estimation  of  every 
situation  with  which  the  student  may  be  confronted. 


ESTIMATING  THE  SITUATION 

1.     Your  Mission. 

What  special  thing  are  you  going  to  do  ?  What  does  your 
superior  expect  of  you? 

You  must  have  a  mission  and  it  must  be  kept  clearly 
in  mind. 

2-     The  Forces. 

What  is  the  strength  and  what  the  location  of  your  own 
forces  ? 

What  of  the  enemy's  forces?  Consider  all  you  can  learn 
of  them? 

3.  Conditions. 

Consider  all  the  conditions  surrounding  your  problem. 
What  of  the  weather?  What  is  the  condition  of  the  roads? 
What  of  the  morale,  activity  and  aggressiveness  of  the  enemy? 
What  is  the  state  of  efficiency  of  your  own  command?  In  short 
consider  everthing  that  will  affect  your  problem  either  favor- 
ably or  unfavorably. 

4.  What  will  the  Enemy  probably  do? 

What  would  you  do  if  you  were  in  his  place,  under  exist- 
ing conditions? 

5.  What  of  the  Terrain? 

How  does  the  terrain  you  are  to  work  over  affect  your 
problem  ? 

6.  What  Courses  are  Open? 

In  how  many  and  what  different  ways  may  you  accomplish 
your  mission?  Go  over  them  all,  considering  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  each. 

7.  Decision. 

Decide  which  of  the  courses  considered  is  best  calculated 
to  enable  you  to  successfully  execute  your  mission,  and  having 
come  to  a  decision  do  not  change  it.  Forget  all  the  other 


APPENDIX  199 

courses  open  to  you,  and  concentrate  all  your  energies  on  the 
one  adopted. 
8.     Orders. 

After  you  have  taken  all  the  steps  indicated  in  the  fore- 
going, and  not  until  then,  issue  your  orders  to  carry  out  the  plan 
you  have  adopted. 

MESSAGES. 

Exercises  in  writing  messages  are  very  important,  and  in- 
structors should  give  their  students  as  complete  data  as  is  logical 
on  which  to  base  them. 

It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  the  carefully  written, 
detailed  message  of  the  leader  of  a  strategic  patrol,  who  can  at 
best  send  in  but  two  or  three  messages  a  day,  and  the  frequent 
messages  sent  in  by  leaders  of  combat  patrols,  of  advance,  flank, 
and  rear  guards,  and  by  commanders  of  outguards.  The 
strategic  patrol  leader's  message  cannot  be  quickly  verified;  the 
others  admit  of  immediate  verification.  The  information  sent 
by  the  various  strategic  patrols,  tabulated  and  digested  by  the 
supreme  commander,  forms  the  basis  of  his  plans  for  the  fol- 
lowing day;  that  sent  in  by  the  protective  patrols  is  for  im- 
mediate tactical  use. 


PROBLEM. 
GENERAL  SITUATION. 

The  Susquehanna  River  divides  two  States  at  war.  Blue, 
Eastern,  forces  have  invaded  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland,  and 
are  advancing  from  Havre  de  Grace,  on  Gettysburg.  A  regi- 
ment of  Blue  cavalry  is  at  Manchester  (Guide  Map),  whose 
mission  is  to  back  up  strategic  reconnoissance  in  the  sector: 
Manchester-Chambersburg-Carlisle. 

Red  forces  are  reported  to  be  concentrating  on  Gettysburg. 
The  people  are  bitterly  hostile  to  the  Blues. 


200  MILITARY  PRIMER 

FIRST  SPECIAL  SITUATION. 

You  command  a  patrol  of  two  non-commissioned  officers  and 
six  men.  Yesterday  morning  you  received  this  verbal  order 
from  the  Adjutant  of  your  regiment : 

"Red  troops  are  reported  concentrating  on  Gettysburg.  This 
regiment  will  remain  here  today  and  tomorrow.  One  troop  will 
be  sent  to  Sell's  Station  today.  Day  after  tomorrow  the  regi- 
ment will  advance  to  Abbottstown.  Our  main  forces  are  ad- 
vancing on  Gettysburg,  but  will  not  reach  this  place  until 
tomorrow. 

"You  will  take  your  patrol  and  reconnoiter  towards  Round 
Hill.  Lieut.  B will  reconnoiter  towards  Chestnut  Hill. 

"Take  three  days'  haversack  rations  for  your  patrol. 

"Messages  will  be  relayed  through  Sell's  Station  (southeast 
corner,  Strategic  Map)  after  this  afternoon;  before  then  send 
them  directly  here." 

Last  night  you  hid  for  the  night  on  Pigeon  Hill  (east  of 
Berlin  Junction). 

REQUIRED:  You  reach  561,  1%  miles  northeast  of  New 
Oxford  (Topographical  Map)  at  6:00  A.  M.,  and  you  wish 
to  reconnoiter  the  vicinity  of  Newchester.  How  do  you  go 
about  it? 

SECOND  SPECIAL  SITUATION. 

It  is  early  the  following  morning.  You  spent  the  night  on 
Round  Hill,  hidden  in  the  woods.  You  are  in  the  southwest  edge 
of  the  woods,  on  the  740  contour,  with  a  pair  of  good  glasses. 

You  see  a  troop  of  Red  cavalry  march  southeast  through 
Bowlder,  from  the  north.  As  you  are  watching  them  one  of 
the  men  you  left  in  observation  in  a  tree  on  top  of  the  hill 
comes  to  you  and  says :  "A  platoon  of  Red  cavalry  is  march- 
ing south  on  the  Carlisle-Baltimore  Pike.  It  is  followed  by 
a  mass  of  infantry.  The  road  is  full  of  them  as  far  as  we 

i  see." 

REQUIRED  :     What  do  you  do  ? 


APPENDIX  201 

THIRD  SPECIAL  SITUATION. 

The  Red  troops  referred  to  above  took  three  hours  to  pass  a 
given  point.  The  Red  cavalry  disappeared  to  the  south.  The 
infantry  turned  southwest  when  it  reached  Hampton. 

REQUIRED:  How  did  you  continue  your  reconnoissance,  and 
what  message  did  you  send? 

Here  is  an  example  of  the  two  classes  of  messages.  The 
leader  of  the  first  mentioned  patrol  got  a  verbal  message  in  the 
second  situation,  from  one  of  his  protective  patrols.  On  the  in- 
formation contained  in  that  message  he  took  immediate  steps 

(1)  to  secure  the  safety  of  his  patrol,  and  (2)  to  enable  him  to 
observe  the  enemy.     Later,   his   observations   safely  made,   he 
wrote  a  message,  detailing  to  his  chief  what  had  been  seen.    The 
latter  had  no  interest  in  the  first  message.     He  is  not  interested 
in  how  the  information  was  obtained;  what  he  wants  is  news 
of  the  enemy. 

Instructors  should  submit  every  message  written  by  their 
students  to  these  tests :  (1)  Does  it  contain  all  the  informa- 
tion collected  by  the  patrol  that  is  of  value  to  the  commander? 

(2)  Does  it  contain  anything  that  will  not  be  of  use  to  him? 

(3)  Is  it  limited  to  facts  that  have  been  verified  by  the  patrol 
leader?     (4)  Is  it  legibly  written,  and  without  ambiguities, 
so  that  it  may  be  quickly  read  and  instantly  and  accurately 
comprehended? 

OUTPOSTS. 

Continuing  the  situations  of  the  above  problem. 
FOURTH  SPECIAL  SITUATION. 

The  Red  troops  referred  to  marched  towards  Gettysburg.  It 
is  the  following  day.  Your  regiment  is  camped  in  the  fields 
northwest  of  New  Oxford,  in  the  bend  of  the  river  (Topo- 
graphical Map).  An  outpost  support  of  one  troop  is  at  557. 
You  command  a  picket  of  18  men  sent  from  this  support  to  584. 

No  Blue  troops  are  within  twenty  miles  of  Gettysburg  ex- 
cept your  regiment.  The  only  Red  troops  known  to  be  nearer 


202  MILITARY  PRIMER 

than  Gettysburg  are  cavalry  patrols.  These  have  been  very 
active,  and  have  prevented  your  own  patrols  from  making  a 
close  reconnoissance  to  the  west. 

REQUIRED:  a.  Where  do  you  post  your  sentinels,  and 
what  orders  do  you  give  them? 

b.     What  patrols  do  you  use  in  the  daytime?     In  the  night? 

Instructors  would  do  well,  in  prescribing  requirements  for 
their  problems  to  vary  the  conditions  that  surround  each  of 
them.  In  this  case,  the  student  is  required  to  post  the  sentinels 
of  an  outguard  in  the  outpost  line  of  a  regiment  of  cavalry 
operating  in  enemy  country,  near  a  greatly  superior  hostile  in- 
fantry force.  He  is  also  required  to  indicate  his  patrol  system 
for  this  outguard. 

Take  the  same  situation  except  that  the  country  is  friendly 
to  the  Blues,  and  the  command  in  camp  near  New  Oxford  is  a 
regiment  of  Blue  infantry.  What  changes  would  be  made  in 
the  solutions 

Cavalry,  in  camp  at  night,  is  nearly  immobile.  If  surprised 
at  night  it  must  lose  its  horses,  if  the  surprising  force  is  equal 
in  size,  or  greater.  If  warned  of  the  menace  of  attack  at  night 
it  must  have  ample  time  to  prepare  either  for  retreat  or  defense. 
Infantry  in  camp  needs  much  less  time  to  prepare  for  similar 
emergencies,  but,  by  the  very  nature  of  the  two  arms,  cavalry 
can  spread  its  outpost  and  patrol  systems  much  farther  from 
its  camp. 

It  is  inconceivable  that  the  United  States  should  ever  engage 
in  a  war  of  invasion  against  a  first-class  military  power.  Its 
wars  must  be  fought,  if  at  all,  defensively  on  its  own  soil.  For 
this  reason,  more  problems  should  be  proposed  where  the  stu- 
dents' troops,  the  Blues,  operate  in  friendly  territory,  than  where 
they  operate  in  hostile  territory.  However,  both  aspects  of  the 
problem  must  be  studied,  for  the  students  may  become  in- 
structors themselves  later  on,  and  they  should  know  how  to 
handle  troops  under  both  conditions. 

The  last  problem  is  introduced  here  to  give  instructors  a  hint 
as  to  how  outguard  problems  might  be  worded.  Very  few  out- 
guard problems  should  be  solved  on  the  map.  They  are  dis- 
tinctly field  problems,  and,  since  every  private  soldier,  every 


APPENDIX  203 

non-commissioned  officer,  every  subaltern  officer  will  be  fre- 
quently called  on,  in  campaign,  to  do  outpost  duty,  under  con-' 
ditions  that  place  a  heavy  individual  responsibility  on  them,  they 
cannot  be  too  thoroughly  grounded  in  the  duties  of  outguard 
commanders,  of  leaders  of  outpost  patrols,  or  outguard  senti- 
nels. 

No  soldier  should  allow  himself  to  be  posted  as  an  outguard 
sentinel  without  receiving  full  data  as  to  the  situation  in  front 
of  and  behind  him.  He  must  know  what  friendly  groups  are 
on  his  right  and  left,  where  his  outguard  is,  where  his  support 
is.  He  must  know  what  friendly  patrols  are  working  in  his 
sector.  He  must  know  where  all  friendly  detachments  within 
his  horizon  are  located.  He  must  know  everything  that  is  known 
about  the  enemy  in  his  immediate  front,  as  far  as  he  can  see. 

These  things  must  be  told  him,  and  he  must  not  be  satisfied 
until  he  knows  that  his  information  is  complete  in  these  regards. 
His  own  safety  depends  on  this  information,  and  his  duty  can- 
not be  satisfactorily  performed  without  it. 

Having  this  information  in  his  possession,  he  should  be  re- 
quired to  tell  how  he  proposes  to  conduct  himself  on  his  post, 
under  what  circumstances  he  is  to  use  his  arms,  what  he  is  to  do 
with  all  persons  who  come  near  his  post. 

In  the  years  that  have  passed  much  stress  has  been  laid  on 
the  verbatim  knowldge  of  the  General  Orders  for  Sentinels,  none 
on  the  knowledge  of  the  orders  for  outpost  sentinels.  The 
former,  prescribed  in  the  Manual  of  Guard  Duty,  do  not  fit  out- 
post duty  in  any  spot.  The  latter  sentinel  does  not  walk  his 
post  in  a  military  manner — he  does  not  walk  it  at  all,  and  his 
manner  is  such  that  he  may  see  without  being  seen.  He  carries 
his  piece  at  will,  loaded  and  locked ;  he  salutes  no  one,  et  cetera, 
et  cetera.  The  General  Orders  for  Sentinels  bear  the  same  rela- 
tion to  the  orders  for  outpost  sentinels,  as  far  as  their  applica- 
tion in  war  is  concerned,  that  full  dress  parade  does  to  the  evolu- 
tions necessary  to  adopt  under  an  enemy's  fire. 

Instructors  are  urged  to  train  their  men  thoroughly  in  out- 
guard duty.  It  will  be  the  first  duty  required  of  them  in  war, 
and  the  last.  Nothing  is  more  important;  nothing  is  equally 


204  MILITARY  PRIMER 

so,  for  the  infantry  or  cavalry  soldier,  except  the  principles  of 
infantry  combat. 

ORDERS  FOR  OUTPOST  SENTINELS. 
FIRST:     About  myself  and  friendly  neighbors. 

My  post  is  number, ,  outguard  number The 

outguard  is  there The  post  on  my  right  is  number  , 

outguard  number  ,  and  is  there.     The  post  on  my  left 

is  number ,  outguard  number ,  and  is  there.     The 

support  is  there.     Other   detachments  are  there   and  there. 
Such  and  such  patrols  are  operating  in  my  front.     This  road 

leads  to 

SECOND :     About  the  enemy. 

The  enemy  is  reported  to  be  there.  I  have  seen  him  (de- 
scribing exactly  what  hostile  bodies  I  have  seen)  there;  or,  I 
have  not  seen  him.  I  am  to  watch  for  him  between  there 
and  there*  If  I  see  any  unusual  movement  I  am  to  report  it 
at  once  to  my  outguard  commander  who  is  there.  If  suddenly 
attacked  and  forced  to  retire  or  threatened  with  capture,  I 
shall  rejoin  my  outguard  by  going  around  that  way  so  as  not 
to  disclose  the  position  of  my  outguard  to  the  enemy  or  to 
mask  its  fire. 
THIRD :  How  to  conduct  myself  on  my  post. 

By  day  I  shall  make  the  best  use  possible  of  such  natural 
or  artificial  cover  as  is  available,  standing,  crouching  or  lying 
down,  and  remaining  stationary  or  moving  about  as  will  en- 
able me  to  observe  the  sector  assigned  me  to  watch  in  the  most 
efficient  manner.  I  shall  carry  my  piece  at  will,  loaded  and 
locked.  I  shall  inform  passing  friendly  patrols  of  what  I  have 
seen. 

At  night  I  shall  remain  standing,  habitually  stationary, 
moving  about  only  for  the  purposes  of  observation.  I  shall 
not  sit  or  lie  down  unless  authorized  to  do  so. 

FOURTH     When  to  open  fire  on  the  enemy. 

Unless  specially  ordered  to  fire  on  the  enemy  whenever 
seen  I  shall  fire  only  under  the  following  circumstances :  (a) 


APPENDIX  205 

when  suddenly  attacked  and  there  is  no  time  to  call  the  out- 
guard  commander,  I  shall  fire  rapidly,  but  with  careful  aim. 
(b)When  a  person  approaching  my  post  is  ordered  to  halt  and 
fails  to  do  so,  or  otherwise  disobeys  me,  I  shall  fire  deliber- 
ately, taking  careful  aim,  so  as  to  be  sure  to  stop  him. 
FIFTH :  Treatment  of  individuals  approaching  my  post. 

By  day  I  shall  allow  only  officers,  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers, and  detachments  recognized  as  part  of  the  outpost,  and 
officers  known  to  have  authority  to  do  so,  to  pass  my  post 
either  in  or  out.  I  shall  detain  all  others  and  notify  my  out- 
guard  commander. 

At  night  when  any  persons  approach  my  post,  I  shall  come 
to  a  ready,  halt  them,  and  notify  the  outguard  commander- 
Persons  claiming  to  be  deserters  from  the  enemy  are  required 
to  lay  down  their  arms.  If  they  are  pursued  by  the  enemy, 
I  shall  order  them  to  drop  their  arms  and  I  shall  give  the 
alarm.  If  they  fail  to  obey  me  at  once  I  shall  fire  on  them. 
I  shall  halt  bearers  of  flags  of  truce  and  their  escorts,  require 
them  to  face  outwards,  and  at  once  notify  the  commander  of 
the  outguard. 

ADVANCE,  FLANK  AND  REAR  GUARDS 

In  teaching  applied  minor  tactics  to  any  class  of  students, 
it  is  a  good  plan  to  adopt  one  general  situation  for  a  series  of 
problems,  covering  several  days  of  the  course.  As  explained 
on  page  201  of  this  book,  the  student  should  be  given,  usually, 
the  Blue  side,  and  the  theatre  of  operations  should  be  laid  in 
Blue  territory. 

The  problem  propounded  for  any  one  session  should,  as 
stated  in  rule  3,  Suggestions  for  the  Preparation  of  Problems, 
be  planned  to  especially  illustrate  one  tactical  principle,  and  but 
one.  So,  if  it  is  proposed  to  begin  the  course  with  an  applica- 
tion of  the  rules  governing  the  conduct  of  distant  patrols,  place 
the  forces  far  enough  apart  *o  make  patrolling  the  most  evident 
thing  to  be  done. 

The  data  for  starting  the  series  of  problems  would  then  be 
contained  in  the  first  special  situation.  The  instructor,  as  ex- 
plained before,  must  adhere  to  the  plan  he  has  decided  on  as  to 


206  MILITARY  PRIMER 

how  the  Red  troops  are  to  be  moved,  and  he  must  take  care  to 
leave  open  certain  routes  to  the  Blue  patrols,  so  that  they  may 
actually  observe  the  Red  columns  as  they  are  moved.  Often  it 
will  be  necessary  for  the  instructor  to  guide  the  patrols  (as 
tactfully  as  possible,  so  as  not  to  seem  to  be  helping  the  stu- 
dents) so  that  they  may  make  the  necessary  discoveries. 

Successive  special  situations  should  be  constructed  from  the 
data  these  patrols  obtain.  At  this  first  session  much  valuable 
instruction  can  be  given  both  in  the  conduct  of  patrols  and  in 
the  preparation  of  messages. 

Having  satisfactorily  led  the  student  to  a  clear  idea  of  the 
location  of  the  hostile  groups  and  the  direction  of  their  advance, 
they  may  next  be  brought  to  the  discussion  of  the  duties  of  the 
advance  guard.  This  might  take  one  or  more  sessions  of  the 
class.  All  the  time  they  should  be  made  to  grasp  —  exactly  as 
happens  in  war  —  a  picture  of  what  is  happening  in  their  front ; 
in  this  way  successive  estimates  of  the  situation  are  easier  and 
more  quickly  made. 

Having  got  the  advance  guard  fabric  well  in  hand,  a  new 
Red  force  now  might  threaten  a  flank,  and  at  least  one  session 
of  the  school  devoted  to  this  important  study. 

The  students  now  might  see  the  two  main  bodies  brought  so 
close  together  that  combat  is  inevitable.  For  this  phase  of  the 
instruction,  more  than  any  other,  the  instructor  should  proceed 
slowly.  He  should  compel  careful  reconnoissance,  and  require 
explicit  orders  concerning  the  deployment  into  line  of  battle. 
Here  would  come  the  instruction  in  estimating  ranges,  in  assign- 
ing targets  and  sectors,  in  sight  setting,  and  in  fire  control.  A 
constant  watch  should  be  kept  of  the  way  the  students  cover 
their  flanks  and  dispose  of  their  supports  and  reserves. 

Having  started  the  fire  fight,  it  is  generally  useless  to  con- 
tinue the  phases  of  the  combat.  Map  problems,  and,  indeed, 
field  maneuvers,  are  very  difficult  to  manage  in  the  final  stages 
of  combat,  and  more  often  than  not  lead  to  absurdities.  It  is 
thought  best  to  break  the  continuity  of  the  problem  here,  and 
jump  to  the  next  phase  —  the  retreat  and  the  pursuit. 

If  it  is  thought  best  to  discuss  rear  guard  actions,  it  is 
believed  to  be  more  satisfactory  to  have  the  student  take  the 


APPENDIX  207 

beaten  side,  provided  the  instructor  will  fully  and  clearly  ex- 
plain the  formations  he  adopts  in  the  pursuit  and  the  reasons 
for  each. 

If  instructors  attempt  to  illustrate  each  tactical  principle 
by  an  entirely  new  problem  much  time  will  be  lost  by  the  stu- 
dents in  vizualizing  the  situations  that  is  saved  where  each 
situation  follows  naturally  the  ones  that  have  preceded. 

Instructors  should  be  careful,  in  map  problems  as  in  field 
exercises,  not  to  violate  the  principle  contained  in  the  last  para- 
graph of  Paragraph  357,  Infantry  Drill  Regulations:  "The 
same  exercise  should  not  be  repeated  over  the  same  ground  and 
under  the  same  situation.  Such  repetitions  lead  to  the  adoption 
of  a  fixed  mode  of  attack  or  defense  and  develop  mere  drill 
masters.  Fixed  or  prearranged  systems  are  prohibited." 

In  all  these  problems  instructors  should  require  students  to 
give  all  their  orders  accurately,  and  formally  correct.  Do  not 
permit  them  to  slur  their  orders,  for  it  is  vital  to  the  training 
of  an  officer  that  he  should  be  thoroughly  grounded  in  the  art 
of  estimating  situations  and  in  giving  orders.  No  amount  of 
inspiration  will  enable  an  officer  to  give  orders  that  express  his 
will  definitely,  clearly,  and  simply.  He  must  learn  it  by  tireless 
practice. 

Remembering  that  it  is  the  officer's  function  to  interpret  the 
orders  of  his  superiors,  and  apply  them  by  issuing  orders  to  his 
own  officers  and  men,  the  importance  of  knowing  how  is  quickly 
seen. 

In  preparing  problems  for  war  games,  it  is  well  to  use  other 
maps  than  those  of  this  text.  Students'  interest  will  be  better 
maintained  if  they  are  not  required  to  work  all  their  problems 
on  the  same  ground. 

General  situations  should  be  described  on  small  scale  maps ; 
special  situations  from  maps  of  larger  scales.  Sections  of  the 
three-inch  maps  (three  inches  to  the  mile)  of  the  entire  Gettys- 
burg-Antietam  region  and  also  of  a  large  area  in  the  vicinity  of 
Fort  Leavenworth  can  be  bought  from  the  Officer  in  Charge, 
Book  Department,  Army  Service  Schools,  Fort  Levenworth, 
Kansas,  Guide  (ten  miles  to  the  inch)  and  Strategic  (one  mile 
to  the  inch)  maps  of  this  region  can  also  be  obtained. 


208  MILITARY  PRIMER 

It  is  recommended  that  problems  be  first  solved  as  map 
problems,  and  then  played  as  war  games.  Major  Farrand 
Sayre's  book,  Map  Maneuvers  and  Tactical  Rides,  is  the  best 
text-book  available  for  giving  instruction  in  the  war  game.  It 
too  can  be  bought  very  cheaply  from  the  Book  Department. 


vr 


62333 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 

AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


OCT 


STANFORD 
ER-UBRART 


TOV   o0  fn 
*2  194* 

LUHra 

73 

22Apr'5CLj  J 

NOV  1  0  1967  5  9 

~D 

